Impaired democracy in Guatemala : 1944-1951

IMPAIRED DEMOCRACY

IN GUATEMALA:

1 944-1 951

BY

ALAN LEBARON

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
1988

II^PF F LIBRARIES

Copyright 1988
by

Alan LeBaron

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ABSTRACT iv

CHAPTERS

1 INTRODUCTION 1

2 THE REVOLUTIONARIES OF 1944 8

3 TRANSITION TO ELECTED GOVERNMENT, 1944-1945 18

4 DR. JUAN JOSf; ARfiVALO BERMEJO 3 4

5 POLICIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AREVALISTAS:
PART I 46

6 POLICIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AREVALISTAS:
PART II 75

7 THE BREAKDOWN OF REVOLUTIONARY UNITY 91

8 AREVALISTAS VS. THE OPPOSITION, 1945-1949 112

9 AREVALISMO: UNITY AND DISUNITY, 1945-1949 141

10 THE MILITARY AND THE ARANA-ARBENZ FEUD,
1945-1949 162

11 THE USA AND GUATEMALA, 1945-1949 178

12 ELIMINATION OF ARANA, 1949 199

1 3 THE ARBENZ COALITION 211

14 THE USA AND GUATEMALA, 1949-1951 235

1 5 SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATIONS 2 53

BIBLIOGRAPHY 270

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 286

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

IMPAIRED DEMOCRACY IN GUATEMALA:
1 944-1 951

BY
ALAN LEBARON

December 1 988

Chairman: David Bushnell
Major Department: History

In 1944, civilians and military officers united to
overthrow a dictatorial regime and install popular
government. With the fall of the dictatorship, a
remarkable group of men gained political control and
developed programs of reform that affected many aspects of
Guatemalan life. Acting largely on democratic principles,
the new men in charge worked for economic modernization
and social justice. Housing for the poor, hospitals,
schools, meal programs for children, water for the
villages, roads, and much more were integral parts of the
reform movement. The need to transform the landholding
patterns of traditional Guatemala was well understood, and

efforts were made in this regard. A popularly elected
constituent assembly drew up a democratic charter, and the
people elected a strongly reformist president. The
reformers could not achieve all of their high goals in
only six years, but significant progress did occur.

Unfortunately, the road to reform and modernization
lay covered with profound difficulties. Specifically,
three major obstacles hindered the reform movement and
left an impaired democracy in Guatemala. One obstacle was
a violent and rebellious opposition, composed mainly of
the traditionally dominant economic groups. Disunity
within the reform movement created another obstacle, while
the actions of the United States government and United
States-owned companies, which worked in tandem to oppose
the Guatemalan government and the reformers, created the
third obstacle. By the end of 1949, conflict and a lack of
compromise characterized Guatemalan society and politics.
The various actors on the scene had failed to find peace,
compromise, or consenting co-existence. They had instead
become more profoundly splintered, and prepared for
continued warfare. The impaired democracy thus developed
under Arevalo would continue into the presidency of Jacobo
Arbenz and eventually lead to the destruction of the
reform movement in 1954.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In marked contrast to the years which
immediately preceded and followed, the decade in
Guatemala from 1944 to 1954 was an outstanding period of
reform. During these ten years, the Guatemalan government
struggled to establish social, political, and economic
reforms, and made some impressive achievements. In the
words of Luis Cardoza y Aragon, the decade was "ten
years of spring in a nation of eternal tyranny." During
the "ten years of spring," three separate governments led
the Guatemalan nation: a three member "junta" from
October 20, 1944 to March 15, 1945; the government of
President Juan Jose Arevalo from March 15, 1945 to March
15, 1951; and the government of President Jacobo Arbenz
Guzman, March 15, 1951-June 27, 1954. The following pages
f this dissertation will treat the first two of the
three governments, with primary emphasis on the Arevalo

period .

General Jorge Ubico, a dictator who came to power
in 1931, still ruled Guatemala in 1944. Guatemala made
steady advances toward modernization under Ubico, and a

1

o

2

boom in export agriculture occurred. But Ubico's
policies benefited primarily the nation's wealthy few,
while the dictator virtually ignored the nation's social
problems. Furthermore, Ubico "ruthlessly eliminated" his
opposition, "rigidly restricted" the lives of Guatemalan
citizens, and "cynically perpetuated" himself in office.
The disparity between the rich and poor remained great.
Nearly ninety percent of the Guatemalan workers engaged
in agriculture. The national economy suffered from the
adverse effects of monoculture and overdependence on
foreign markets. Wealthy landowners possessed
approximately seventy percent of the good farm land, much
of which belonged to only a few dozen families. In spite
of a largely domestic control over the production of the
major export crop (coffee), U.S. companies dominated the
import-export trade, internal transportation, and
communications. Among Guatemala's many problems was an
underdeveloped transportation system. Urban centers were
far from the rural villages, often connected only by
small paths or very substandard roads. International
Railways of Central America (IRCA) owned the only
railroad that ran from Guatemala City to the Caribbean
coast. NO roads capable of competition with the railroad
ran the same route.

3

A small professional class had developed, but few
middle class opportunities existed. For example, Ubico
kept the government bureaucracy small, and did not allow
aspiring politicians a place in government. Education
received a low priority under Ubico. Teachers received a
low salary; secondary school students (who previously had
attended gratis) had to pay tuition, forcing many to
abandon studies; the university lost its autonomy; and
the freedom to express scholarly opinions was
surpressed.

The majority of the rural population did not share
the same culture or language as the city dwellers. Out
of a population of less than three million, about sixty
percent retained the Indian culture and remained
unassimilated with the more modern urban elements.
Indian Guatemala consisted of numerous small communities,
speaking a variety of languages and dialects, and having
few direct economic or social contacts outside their
local area. Indian communities remained suspicious and
afraid of outsiders and tended to self -protective
isolation. Ubico made no effort to develop the Indian's

potential .

In the spring of 1944, the dictatorship began to

fall apart, as large numbers of Guatemala's most

important citizens, along with university students.

4

military officers, and workers, clamored for Ubico's
resignation. Even members of Ubico's own government
turned against him. The movement became "as solid a wave
of unified political feeling as Guatemala has seen before
or since. "'^ Jorge Ubico resigned on July 1, and General
Federico Ponce, who had supported Ubico, became the
provisional president. Although Ponce promised some
limited reforms, he carried on much the same as Ubico had
done. When the leaders of the reform movement began to
suspect that the promised presidential elections would
never come about, they opted for revolution. On October
20, 1944, civilian and military dissidents united to
overthrow Ponce by armed force.

With the fall of dictatorship, a remarkable group
of men gained political control and developed programs
of reform that affected many aspects of Guatemalan life.
Acting largely on democratic principles, the new men in
charge worked for economic modernization and social
justice. Housing for the poor, hospitals, schools, meal
programs for children, water for the villages, roads, and
much more were integral parts of the reform movement. The
need to transform the landholding patterns of traditional
Guatemala was well understood, and efforts were made in
this regard. A popularly elected constituent assembly
drew up a democratic charter, and the people elected a

5

charter, and the people elected a strongly reformist
president. The reformers could not achieve all of their
high goals m only six years, but significant progress

did occur.

The revolution in Guatemala mirrored the rise of
relative freedom in many parts of the world, with the
defeat of nazism and fascism, and the further breakdown
of the international colonial order. Many Guatemalan
reformers realized their place in world events, and
looked forward to a free Guatemala contributing to world
peace and the growth of universal democracy. Contemporary
world events, in fact, had helped inspire the Guatemalan
revolution, although previous struggles for freedom, in
particular the Mexican Revolution, and Guatemala's own
inherent needs, provided even greater impetus.

Unfortunately, the road to reform and
modernization lay covered with profound difficulties.
Specifically, three major obstacles hindered the reform
movement, and left an impaired democracy in Guatemala.
One obstacle was a violent and rebellious opposition,
composed mainly of the traditionally dominant economic
groups. Disunity within the reform movement created
another obstacle, while the actions of the United States
government and United States-owned companies, which
worked in tandem to oppose the Guatemalan government and

6

the reformers, created the third obstacle. By the end of
1949, although the government was more democratic than
at any time before Arevalo, conflict and a lack of
compromise characterized Guatemalan society and politics.
The various actors on the scene had failed to find peace,
compromise, or consenting co-existence. They had instead
become more profoundly splintered, and prepared for
continued warfare. The impaired democracy thus developed
under Arevalo would continue into the presidency of
Jacobo Arbenz , and eventually lead to the destruction of
the reform movement in 1954.

Many authors have designated the entire 1944-1954
decade a "revolution," in order to emphasize the reforms
made, and the political continuity between the initial
anti-Ubico movement and the eventual programs of Arbenz.
Thus, "the revolution of 1944-1954," is a phrase of
wide popularity. The term "revolutionaries," in this
sense, indicates the men and women who supported the
reform governments of the October 1944 Junta, Juan Jose
Arevalo, and Jacobo Arbenz. However, "revolution" is
also frequently used in a more limited sense to denote
specifically the movement that defeated Jorge Ubico
and Federico Ponce. Thus it is not always clear whether
an author is referring to the "revolution" and
"revolutionaries" of October 20 or to the "revolution"

this confusion, "revolution" in the following pages will
indicate only the revolution of October 20, and
revolutionaries will indicate those Guatemalans who took
an active part in the overthrow of the dictators .Not all
of the revolutionaries in this sense would be supporters
of the subsequent governments of Arbenz and Arevalo, in
fact some of them would participate in the opposition.

Notes

1 . Manuel Galich, "Diez anos^ de primavera
(T944_54) en el pais de la eterna tirania (1838-974),"
Alero, 8 (Sept. -Oct. 1974), 70.

2. Kenneth J. Grieb, Guatemalan Caudillo: The
Regime of Jorge Ubico (Athens, 1979), xi, 282-283.

3. Carlos Gonzalez Orellana, Historia de la

educaciSn en Guatemala (Guatemala, 1970), 359.

4. Kalman H. Silvert, A Study in Government:
Guatemala (New Orleans, 1954), 5.

CHAPTER 2
THE REVOLUTIONARIES OF 1944

No single person, political party, age group,
economic sector or class, can claim full credit for the
fall of the dictatorship. A great many Guatemalans
contributed to the resignation of Ubico and the
subsequent October revolution, prompting El Imparcial
to claim that only a few hundred Guatemalans were not
happy with the revolution. To be sure, not all were
equally active, or effective. Many had joined the fight
against the dictators only during the last moments, and
many dragged their heels or worked against the more
profound reforms. Nor can one deny that some had been
motivated primarily by greed and ambition, and maybe
all of them hoped that their own interests would be
advanced during the revolution. They variously wished
for better jobs, more money, power, prestige, and the
self-fulfillment of living out their ideals. Some of the
revolutionaries would later be accused of political and
economic opportunism, and no doubt opportunism did exist.
According to Contreras Velez , himself a revolutionary,
there were those who took advantage of the new situation.

and "without having risked a finger for the cause,"

2
reaped financial gain. But many others were touched by

a desire to better not only themselves but all of

Guatemala; they envisioned a modern, industrialized

nation, under a government dedicated to justice and to

the needs of the inhabitants.

The words of the revolutionaries themselves best

capture the euphoria and the goals of the revolution.

Juan Jose Arevalo said, "The revolution of October was

not sectarian in its ideology. It was a national

3
movement of emancipation." Jorge Toriello stated that

"in the revolution of 20 October, all Guatemalans

participated without distinction of class or hierarchy.

Their only preoccupation was to forge a new Guatemala

within the concept that is today known as human

rights,"^ For Manuel Galich, it was a "romantic"

movement, and for Marco Antonio Villamar, the revolution

"recuperated national dignity." According to Contreras

Velez, "we did not fight for jobs, nor to make from the

revolution a lucrative enterprise with easy profit."

The revolutionary movement included men and women

from virtually all the major sectors of the Guatemalan

population: the military, rural landowners, businessmen,

students, journalists and other professional groups,

workers, and peasants. Each sector contained

10

individuals who variously accepted political views that
were conservative, moderate, or strongly reformist.
However, individuals who had benefitted from Ubico's
rule (primarily landowners and military generals) and
the hierarchy of the Church, which had close ties to the
upper class, opposed the revolution.

Military participation had been crucial in the
downfall of Ubico and Ponce. During Ubico's
dictatorship, some 80 generals commanded the armed
forces, which numbered about 15,000 men. In return for
the generals' support, Ubico handed out land, wealth, and
favors. In sharp contrast, he held back the younger
officers of lower rank, who did not share the fruits of
dictatorship, and earned a low salary. The generals, who
had received their positions from political or social
connections, were usually less well trained militarily
than the younger officers. Although military men who
joined the revolutionary movement were motivated also by
their desire for better pay and advancement
opportunities, many of them shared in the more idealistic
goals of the broader revolution. Only officers, however,
had leadership roles in the revolution, for the ordinary
soldiers had been largely conscripted from the peasantry,
and in the main they simply followed their officers.

11

Rural landowners made up another key sector of
the Guatemalan population. Wealthy landowners were
usually political conservatives, yet a significant number
had grown weary of Ubico's despotism. They wanted a

larger part in government, and they recognized a need for

9
certain economic reforms. A few embraced the

revolutionary ideals of democracy and justice. The role

of middle income landowners is less well documented, but

these groups had also suffered a lack of freedom and

opportunity under Ubico's rule, and had good reason to

support an end to dictatorship.

The professional middle class had strongly united
against Ubico, solidly supported the revolution, and
supplied much of its leadership. Special interest needs
of the professionals included freedom of speech for
journalists and newscasters, more responsibility and more
control over government policy for civilian politicians
and bureaucrats, and freedom of education for students
and teachers. Middle-class groups in general looked for
an expanded job market which would accommodate their
ability and ambitions.

Businessmen, or in many cases those who
aspired to be businessmen, also participated in the
revolution. Those who did so dreamed of an industrialized
and economically diversified state that could offer the

12
entrepreneur new opportunities. Ubico had largely
continued an old economic pattern that emphasized
a limited number of agrarian exports and
reliance on manufactured imports. Thus the businessmen
wanted modernization and reform leading to broader
and more rapid economic growth. The business-oriented
revolutionaries often demonstrated more concern with the
rights of management than labor, but they understood that
labor reform could promote a healthy and efficient labor

force, which in turn would boost production and create a

11
consumer sector.

Urban workers, many of them low-skilled or

unskilled, generally supported the revolution. In the

words of one observer, "an important sector of workers"

1 2
took part in the October fighting. But, weak and

unorganized, they were in no position to give leadership.

Rural workers in some areas, in particular around major

rural towns or large plantations, were aware of the

efforts being made to overthrow the dictatorship, and

some had been armed and organized with the help of the

urban revolutionaries. Shots were fired in at least

a few areas, and a potential for violence in the

countryside existed, but virtually all the major fighting

1 3
took place in Guatemala City.

1 3
Youth was a characteristic widely shared by the
revolutionaries, many of whom were in their teens,
twenties and early thirties. In 1944, Jose Manuel
Fortuny was twenty-eight, Alfredo Guerra Borges was
nineteen, Bernardo Alvarado Monzon was eighteen, Victor
Manuel Gutierrez was twenty-two, Mario Mendez Montenegro
was about thirty, Carlos Manuel Pellecer was twenty-four,
Mario Silva Jonama was twenty-one, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman
was thirty-one, Francisco Arana was about thirty-eight,
and Jorge Toriello was about thirty-five. Some of these
men had been fighting Ubico for years. At the age of
nineteen, Pellecer had been arrested and jailed by the
Ubico government, and barely escaped execution.
Pellecer' s youth has been characterized as "rebellious:
tormented adolescence that lived under a dictatorship
that exhausted and asphyxiated," until the "boy-man

ii1 4
Quijote rose to fight.'

The young revolutionaries, sometimes called the

"generation of 1940" or the "generation of 1944," were

aided by an older group of men, especially the

"generation of 1920." The older generation had been

active in the fight against Manuel Estrada Cabrera (which

succeeded in 1920), and they remained proud of their

revolutionary past. Francisco Villagran (b.1897), a

member of the 1945 constituent assembly and one of

1 4
President Arevalo's ministers of government, had been an
important member of Club Unionista and first president of
the Asociacion de Estudiantes Universitarios , both
important anti-Estrada Cabrera student groups that also
worked for political and social reform in the 1920s.
Villagran could remember with pride a dangerous mission

he made to other Central American nations in search of

1 5
help in the fight against Estrada Cabrera. Clemente

Marroquin Rojas (b.1897) and Eugenic Silva Peha (b.1896),

both outstanding revolutionaries in 1920 and again

in 1944, may have delayed Ubico's initial rise to power

by four years, at great risk to their own safety.

Jorge Garcia Granados (b.1900), the "father" of the 1945

constitution, contributed to Estrada Cabrera's demise,

then was nearly executed for his fight, in 1920-1921,

against President Carlos Herrera, a wealthy landowner who

opposed reform. Asked why he conspired against Herrera,

1 7
he had replied, "for the love of liberty." By the time

the overthrow of Ubico and Ponce occurred, a number of
the "generation of 1920" had experienced years in jail
and exile.

The Indian population played a more ambiguous role
in the revolution. Geographically and culturally
isolated, the Indians remained largely outside of direct
participation in national political events. But the

15

Indian was feared and sought after by both
revolutionaries and anti-revolutionaries. Revolutionaries
proposed to liberate the Indian, yet feared that the
Ubico government might muster significant support from
the indigenous population, which at times had benefited
in small ways from Ubico' s paternalistic treatment, and

was said to have looked upon him with a "mystic

1 fi
reverence." Ponce, moreover, had some success in

getting several thousand Indians to make an armed march

in his favor through the streets of Guatemala City. But

the Indian population in general contributed extremely

little to the efforts of either the dictatorship or the

, ^. . 19
revolutionaries .

The revolution of 1944 was not a revolution

of any one class. True, the revolution was primarily

carried out in Guatemala City, and led primarily by

members of the middle class, but in spite of this

significant urban-middle class flavor, the revolution

remained a "popular," widely supported movement, with

popular goals. In the slightly exaggerated words of

Contreras, "bourgeois" elements "at no time propelled the

revolution." The revolutionaries came from, and

represented, many backgrounds, and their goals went

beyond narrow group interests. The majority of the

16

evolutionaries would become "Arevalistas , " and champion
Juan Jose Arevalo for President.

Notes

1. El Imparcial, Oct. 19, 1950.

2. Alvaro Contreras Velez, En el XXX
aniversario de la revoluci5n de octubre (Guatemala,
1975) , 123.

3. Prensa Libre, Feb. 19, 1970.

4. El Imparcial, Oct. 19, 1972.

5. Manuel Galich, Por que lucha Guatemala
(Buenos Aires, 1956), 74; Marco Antonio Villamar
Contreras, interview with author, Guatemala City, July
17, 1987.

6. Contreras Velez, Aniversario, 122.

7. Grieb, Guatemalan Caudillo, 46.

8. Ibid.

9. Richard Adams, Crucifixion by Power (Austin,
1970), 183; National Archives of the United States
(hereinafter cited as NAUS ) , Category 814.00 File Date
6-545 (June 5, 1945), Dispatch number 131. Archival
material will hereafter be cited by number only.

10. For an example of one industrial success
story under Ubico, see: Paul J. Dosal, "The Political
Economy of Guatemalan Industrialization, 1871-1948: the
Career of Carlos F. Novella," Hispanic American
Historical Review, 68:2 (May 1988), 321-358.

11. Leo A. Suslow, "Aspects of Social Reforms in
Guatemala, 1944-1949" (M.A. thesis, Colgate University,
1949) ,112.

12. Gonzalez Orellana, Historia, 367.

17

13. Tomas Herrera, Guatemala: revolucion de
octubre (San Jose, C.R., 1986), 67, 72; Alvaro Hugo
Salguero to Arevalo, August 20, 1946, Archivo General de
Centroamerica, Guatemala City (hereafter cited as AGC),
Correspondencia del Presidente de la Republica.

14. El Imparcial, August 14, 1965.

15. El Imparcial, Sept. 17, 1969.

16. La Hora, Oct. 5, 1966.

17. Prensa Libre, Oct. 29, 1974.

18. NAUS 814.00/1-1445 no. 1948.

19. Huberto Alvarado, "En torno a las clases
sociales en la revolucion de octubre," Alero, 8
(Sept. -Oct. 1974), 73.

20. Contreras Velez, Aniversario, 123.

CHAPTER 3
TRANSITION TO ELECTED GOVERNMENT, 1944-1945

From October 20, 1944, to March 15, 1945, the new
Guatemalan leaders moved with great speed, unity of
purpose, and efficiency. With the fall of Ponce, a
triumvirate consisting of Major Francisco Javier Arana ,
Captain Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, and Jorge Toriello Garrido,
took over the reins of government. The triumvirate
(the Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno) had two primary
duties: protect the reform movement from its enemies and
serve as a transitional government until popular
elections established a full-fledged democracy. In decree
number one, dated October 25, the Junta Revolucionaria
dissolved the national assembly that had served the
dictators, and called for new elections to take place
November 3, 4, and 5. The newly elected assembly
(Asamblea Legislativa de la Republica de Guatemala)
declared itself inaugurated December 3, 1944. A separate
assembly was elected December 28, 29, 30, to draft a
constitution. The constituent assembly, (Asamblea
Constituyente de 1945) held its first official session
January 10, 1945, and presented the finished constitution

19

on March 11, 1945. Presidential elections were held
December 17, 18, 19, 1944, and Juan Jose Arevalo, the
president-elect, took office March 15, 1945. The Junta
Revolucionaria then dissolved.

The Junta, working with a cabinet and with advice
from leading revolutionaries outside the government,
issued 86 decrees between October 25, 1944 and March 14,
1945. Nearly all of them were then approved by the
legislative assembly. Most of the new laws made minor
changes in taxation or governmental structure, regulating
among other things, money and banking, imports, alcohol
and cigarettes. More decrees directly treated rural
concerns than urban ones. Sometimes favoring wealthy
landowners, sometimes not, the Junta tried to minimize
the fears of the upper class while at the same time
establishing the basis of social-economic reform. Decree
number four, of October 26, made easier the importation
of pure-blood cattle stock. Decree number five
reorganized the advisory body of the Oficina Central
del Cafe, giving greater representation to the coffee
growers. Decree number seven abolished forced labor on
public roads, which had been unjust to the workers, and
also caused labor shortages for the landowners. Decree
nine deprived large landowners of the rights of arbitrary
punishment of thieves and trespassers, which they had

20

used for decades to coerce farm workers. Decree 74 called
for the development of a program of hygiene and
sanitation in the rural areas. Decree 75 established
comprehensive and just regulations concerning contracts
between landowners and agricultural workers, to "preserve
the minimum rights that should be guaranteed the workers,
in accordance with the modern tendencies to achieve
better social justice." Stating that agriculture
deserved "total protection, because it is the principal
source of national income," the Junta by Decree 83
established an agricultural experiment station, in order
to scientifically improve the nation's main industry.

Another topic to which the Junta gave its
attention was education. Decree 12 declared the
university autonomous. Of more general interest was
Decree 20, which acknowledged that ignorance was the
"primordial cause" that impeded the development of
democracy, and that the revolutionaries, "with profound
intensity," desired "a nation great because of its
culture, its civility and its liberty." Therefore, decree
20 created a national committee for literacy (Comite
Nacional de Alf abetizacion ) , with jurisdiction in all of
Guatemala. Said committee could consist of any Guatemalan
or foreigner who identified with the ideals of the
revolution. All things considered, U.S. Ambassador Boaz

21

Long was favorably impressed with the work of the Junta,
and reported that the triumvirate had "done much to
provide a basis for the assertion that it was a most
democratic' revolution."

The Asamblea Legislativa, during the transition to
elected government, passed 54 laws, the majority of them
being approvals of various Junta decrees. In the spirit
of world freedom and democracy, the assembly's first act
after it recognized its own inauguration was the approval
of Junta decree number 13, which recognized the
government of General Charles de Gaulle as the legitimate
government of France. The assembly did refuse to accept
a few of the Junta's less important decrees, and made
minor adjustments to some others. It also fell to the
assembly to name the president of the Poder Judicial and
members of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, who would begin
duties in March, 1945, at the same time that a new
President of Guatemala was inaugurated. But in the main
the assembly allowed the Junta to direct the pace of
affairs .

A grand occurrence for the Guatemalan public
during the transition period was the election of a
president. Political parties had formed before and after
Ponce's fall from power, although these were generally
small and inexperienced. Their party platforms did not

22

reflect plans of government in minute detail, but rather
called for broad goals of material and moral
amelioration, agrarian reform, and assimilation of the
Indian.^ Unions also began to form, and to become a
political force. "We can say that the syndicate
organizations emerged the day following the resignation
of Ubico," wrote Alfonso Solorzano with only slight
exaggeration.^ While the Junta governed, the young
political organizations expanded, strengthened, and
prepared for the elections. Junta decree 17 prohibited
the members of the Junta, their relatives, and the
members of the cabinet from becoming president for six

years .

Among the sixteen candidates for president. Dr.
Juan Jose Arevalo was the most popular choice. While
living in self-exile in Argentina, Arevalo received word
that he had been nominated for President of Guatemala.
The nomination surprised Arevalo, who had not been
involved with the anti-Ubico struggle since he left
Guatemala in 1935. He had in the meantime married an
Argentine woman, taken Argentine citizenship, and lost
much of his direct contact with Guatemala. He had not
demonstrated a strong political ambition. His life work
had been dedicated to the promotion and philosophy of
education, as a bureaucrat and a university instructor.

23
There remains some confusion over who first
suggested Dr. Arevalo for president, and how the
consensus spread, but most accounts mention Juan Jose
Orozco Posadas, a passionate idealist and future defender
of children's rights, as one of the men who began it all.
"We are not able to precisely remember the date," wrote
Contreras Velez , "when, one sunny morning, Juan Jose
Orozco Posadas entered the offices of Nuestro Diario, and
with melodramatic gestures and hands held high,
addressing those who were preparing the day's newspaper,
exclaimed with the enthusiasm of a boy who had just
obtained the toy of his dreams: 'Senores, I have the

manl The man with the clean handsl Juan Jose

4
Arevalo! ' "

The great majority of Guatemalans did not know
Arevalo. Only a small number of teachers, intellectuals,
and friends had known him personally, although many
educated people knew of his work. Indeed, throughout
Latin America, where his essays on philosophy and
education were highly respected, Arevalo had a reputation
as a serious intellectual.^ Mario Najera, a founder of
Renovacion Nacional ( RN ) , the first political party to
nominate Arevalo, noted that "Arevalo was not known by
the great majority of his followers. We had few facts on
his life in Buenos Aires . . . but we, at least I, had

24
faith in his capability, in his intelligence and in his
renowned reputation as an intellectual." Along with
Renovacion Nacional (RN), other parties joined the
support for Arevalo's candidacy, the most important being
Frente Popular Libertador (FPL), a large party comprised
mainly of university students.

Arevalo returned to Guatemala September 3, 1944,
after Ubico had resigned but before the overthrow of
Ponce. The Arevalo campaign already commanded a large
popular following, and many thousands of people took to
the streets and celebrated his return. "The people of
Guatemala had already elected him." Arevalo was well
aware that arriving in Guatemala under the rule of Ponce
put his life in danger, but it was an act that greatly
aided the momentum of revolution. For the many
Arevalistas who had never seen their candidate before, it
proved exciting and gratifying to find out that Arevalo
was a striking individual.^ He looked, sounded, and
acted like a president. Over six feet tall and weighing
about 200 pounds, a man with a booming voice, Arevalo was
handsome, charismatic, articulate, and passionate.

The Arevalistas constructed a coalition known as
Frente Unido de Partidos Politicos, and set forth a
campaign platform promising widespread political,
economic, and social reform. As of December 16, the

25
Frente included RN and FPL (which between them appealed
mainly to students, teachers, and young professionals);
Union Civica (consisting of older and business-oriented
members); Frente Nacional Revolucionario (a conservative
wing of the revolutionaries); Vanguardia Nacional
(tacitly Marxist oriented); and various other
associations, unions, and minor parties. The largest
groups were urban focused, but pro-Arevalista rural
organizations also existed J ° The actual number of
organizations fluctuated before the election, but the
Frente held together, and Arevalo won the presidency with
255,260 votes, or about 86% of the total. It was, by
general consensus, an honest election. Arevalistas had
already won over fifty of the sixty-eight congressional
seats in the elections of the previous month.

Opposition groups had made a frantic but vain
attempt to defeat Arevalo. Adrian Recinos, the
ambassador to the United States under Ubico, came in
second behind Arevalo with some 20,749 votes. The Church
had sided openly with conservative elements and did not
support Arevalo. A politically conservative sector of
the military officers' corps also opposed Arevalo and the
reformist ideals that he represented, but in the main

these officers kept a low profile and did not visibly

1 1
participate in the election.

26

As already noted, at the very end of December, the
Guatemalans also elected a constituent assembly, which
began work on January 10, 1945, and finished March 11,
1945. Great optimism and a desire to work together
prevailed. Clemente Marroquin Rojas, a member of the
assembly, described his coworkers as being as spirited

as raw recruits who anxiously awaited the first encounter

12 -f

with the enemy. Marroquin Rojas also thought the

assemblymen worked quickly out of fear that delay would

embolden the antirevolutionary forces.

The constituent assembly elected a special

drafting committee of fifteen men, who would draw up

preliminary drafts of articles for the constitution, and

then submit them to the assembly for debate, amendment,

and vote. According to Kalman Silvert, the commission

consisted of six "mainstream democrats," six "centrists"

(three slightly to the right, three to the left), and

three "social democrats." The drafting committee and

the assembly based the constitution on a number of

sources, including the principles enunciated by the Junta

and other Guatemalans, and sections of constitutions

drawn up in other countries, for example Spain (1931),

Bolivia (1938), and in particular Mexico (1917) and Cuba

(1940) ?^

27

The finished constitution provided for an amount

of reform unparalleled in Guatemalan history. The

assembly generally agreed on the need for a strong

legislature; for guarantees of social rights, and

effective political democracy; and as a reaction against

1 fi
the dictatorial past, a weak executive. Indians and

other low-income Guatemalans were offered safeguards

against past abuses. Article 82 promised education for

all Guatemalans. Article 83 provided for a comprehensive

program of protection and help for the indigenous

population. Literate women joined all males in obtaining

the vote. Articles 55 through 69 addressed labor reform

and included protection from debt peonage. Also, unions

were guaranteed the right to organize, female and child

workers obtained special rights, and work limits were set

for all laborers. Article 21 banned discrimination based

on sex, race, color, class, religious beliefs or

political ideas. Article 63 called for a social security

system. Article 91 flatly prohibited the existence of

latifundios, but neglected to define what " latif undios"

meant. Article 92 allowed expropriation of private

property in the national interest. Various provisions

guaranteed freedom of speech, assembly, and other

democratic rights.

28
Economic nationalism, the desire to have
Guatemalans control the economy, played an important part
in the constitution. Article 95 stipulated that
hydrocarbons could be exploited only by the Guatemalan
government, or private companies primarily owned by
Guatemalans. In the lumber industry, Guatemalans would
be given first preference.

Jorge Garcia Granados, the outstanding personality
and president of both the constitutional assembly and the
drafting committee, became known as the "father" of the
Guatemalan constitution. Garcia, a grandson of
ex-president Miguel Garcia Granados, had been a well
known political activist for many years before the
revolution. From 1937 to 1938 he headed the Latin

American arm of the Subsecretaria de Propaganda for the

1 7
Spanish Republican government. Garcia later described

himself as a non-Marxist socialist, with viewpoints close

1 R
to those of the British Labour Party. Garcia' s

leadership at the constitutional assembly helped make

some of the more advanced provisions possible. But

Garcia was not an extreme leftist or nationalist--f or

example he favored foreign participation in oil

1 9
exploration and exploitation.

Jorge Mario Garcia Laguardia, in a study of

Guatemalan constitutions, concluded that the 1945

29
constitution was superior to the two that followed, in
1954 and 1965, because all sectors of the society had
participated in its creation, including communists,
industrialists and merchants. It was a document of
political compromise. ^° Although the constitution had
provided the basis for substantial reform, it did not
immediately break down the old order. Conservatives and
moderates participated in the assembly, and as a result
of their efforts the constitution, according to

Marxist-oriented Guerra Borges, had been "interwoven with

„21
modern ideas and a bad aftertaste of obsolete ways.

Women revolutionaries would probably agree. Women's

groups, including the women's branch of Renovacion

Nacional, had asked the Constituent Assembly in vain to

grant suffrage rights to illiterate women as well as to

illiterate men.^^ Provisions which protected the

landowners included article 90, which guaranteed private

property, while conservative elements generally could

take reassurance from Article 32 which prohibited

political organizations of an international or foreign

character. Article 32 was meant to prohibit communism in

particular, and it thus gave added protection to the

existence of private property, as well as additional

clout to large landowners and others who traditionally

labeled their political opponents "communists."

30

Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo became president of
Guatemala on March 15, 1945. That month's Revista Azul,
a magazine for women, noted that the revolution had
brought "a fresh and renovating gust of wind," blowing
away apathy and discouragement. "We have a free
country," said the magazine, "a civic consciousness each
day grows deeper." Furthermore the revolution gave "new
respect to woman." Revista Azul also reported that
Arevalo' s inauguration caused such deep happiness that
"a good percentage of the spectators cried with sincere

.,24
emotion.

The revolutionaries accomplished the transition
from temporary rule to elected government quickly and
efficiently. They elected a president only two and
one-half months after the overthrow of Ponce; and an
elected constituent assembly worked fiercely and produced
a constitution in two months. The new President took
office less than five months after the victory of the
revolution. In order to achieve this rapid transfer
of power to a popularly elected government, the
revolutionaries had to cooperate with one another. They
did not always agree, but they proved willing to

compromise .

To be sure, not all Guatemalans supported the
revolutionary process and transition to democratic

31

government. Even though virtually no possibility existed
that Ubico or his cohorts would regain control of the
government, rumors abounded of plots being made by

conservatives unhappy with the populist, democratic

2 5
nature of the revolution. Those unhappy with the

revolution and with the newly elected government,

however, were indeed few. The great majority of

Guatemalans believed that the Junta and the assemblies

had constructed a solid foundation for democracy and

justice. A sense of historic importance permeated the

atmosphere, it seemed Guatemala was moving into the

modern age.

Notes

1. NAUS 814.00/1-445 no. 1948.

2. NAUS 814.00/3-2945 no. 2314.

3. Alfonso Solorzano, "Factores economicos y
corrientes ideologicas de octubre de 1944" in Historia de
una decada (Guatemala, n.d.), 50.

4. Prensa Libre, Feb. 3, 1970.

5. For a variety of positive opinions on
Arevalo, taken from across Latin America, see: Alberto

Ordonez Arqiiello, ed., Arevalo visto por America

(Guatemala, 1951).

6. Mario Efrain Najera Farfan, Los estafadores
de la democracia (Buenos Aires, 1956), 70-71.

7. Herrera, Guatemala, 70.

32

8. Clemente Marroquin Rojas, "Platicamos con el
Dr. Arevalo," La Hora, Sept. 13, 1972.

9 Ricardo Asturias Valenzuela, interview with
author, "Guatemala City, July 8, 1987; Oscar Barrios
Castillo, interview with author, Guatemala City, July 9,
1987.

10. Juan Jose Arevalo, Escritos politicos
y discursos (La Habana, 1953), 145-6.

11. NAUS 814.00/3-945 no. 2237.

12. Clemente Marroquin Rojas, Cronicas de la

constituyente de 1945, 2nd ed . (Guatemala, 1970), 47.

13. La Hora, June 8, 1970.

14. Silvert, A Study in Government, 14.

15 Luis Marinas Otero, Las constituciones de
Guatemala' (Madrid, 1958), 198-200; Silvert, A Study in
Government, 1 4 .

16. Silvert, A Study in Government, 17.

17. Ronald Hilton, ed.. Who's Who in Latin

America: Central America and Panama, 3rd ed. (Stanford,
1945) , 25.

18. Silvert, A Study in Government, 15.

19. Ibid., 14.

20 Jorge Mario Garcia Laguardia, "Politica y
constitucionalidad en Guatemala," El Imparcial, Sept.
21 , 1978.

21. Alfredo Guerra Borges, Pensamiento economico
social de'la revolucion de octubre (Guatemala, 1977), 15.

22. El Imparcial, Feb. 5, 1945; Feb. 6, 1945.

23 "Proteccion social: un logro fructifero de
la Revolucion Guatemalteca , " Revista Azul, 4 (March 1945),
1 8.

33

24. Gloria Mendez Mina, "Toma posesion el nuevo
Presidente de Guatemala," Revista Azul, 4 (March 1945),
1 4.

25

See for example: La Hora, Nov. 3, 1944

CHAPTER 4
DR. JUAN JOSfi ARfiVALO BERMEJO

Arevalo, as President of Guatemala, was a sincere

humanist. He did not leave the presidency a rich

man, nor did he spend his time in lavish splendor, as had

been the previous norm in Guatemala. Even Arevalo 's

critics, except for the most biased, recognized his

inherent honesty. Clemente Marroquin Rojas, a formidable

opponent of Arevalo, observed that Arevalo had the

1
opportunity to become wealthy but refused to do so.

It is true that as president he lawfully earned 2,400

Quetzales a month, that is, at least 24 times the salary

of most Guatemalans. Such disparity, however, was not

seen as unusual, and in any case it was hoped that with

the ensuing reforms of the post-Ubico era income

disparities in Guatemala would be reduced. In 1959,

eight years after his presidency and after he had written

several books, his fortune in Guatemala was valued at

300,000 Quetzales, which did not include two houses in

2

Argentina .

The young Doctor Arevalo had entered the Ministry
of Education in 1934, in the post of Oficial Mayor de
Educacion Publica, but quickly clashed with the Ubico

34

35

dictatorship, and left in self-imposed exile. Arevalo's
great frustration with the dictatorship is reflected in
his 1935 essay, "Istmania," where he argued that if
only Ubico could be deposed, and free government
established, the teachers would be able to guide the
nation's youth to modern civilization. Arevalo's
innovative ideas and efforts at educational reform in
Guatemala subsequently earned him the praise of El

Imparcial, which in 1939 recognized him as one of the

4
nation's greatest teachers.

Arevalo had never aspired to become a politician.

In a 1968 interview, Arevalo admitted his disgust for

politics. As a child, he dreamed of becoming a great poet

or novelist. From the age of 14, he wrote verse, and he

finished a novel when 15 years old. After entering the

university he began to favor philosophy over poems and

novels, and started to dream of being "a universal

thinker." Also at that time, he began to disdain

politics.^ Such an attitude he made clear in his early

writings, particularly with the following statement in

1935: "Politics is an inferior activity to which certain

individuals dedicate their lives when they are incapable

of being of service to a higher cause.

Arevalo did, however, develop a political

philosophy in several essays he wrote from 1935 to

36
1939. It was with these few pieces of work that the
Guatemalans had to judge their nominee for president.
Writing in the abstract style of a philosopher, he called
for the politicians to pass laws ending political and
economic exploitation. In Latin America, Arevalo
claimed, more than 50 million people were "subjected to
economic servitude, surrounded by a spiritual vacuum, and
obliterated by political incapacity." Legislators must,
therefore, "redeem the masses in servitude," and allow
the educators to "eliminate the spiritual remnants of
colonialism."^ Arevalo believed that the politicians, the
economists, and the technocrats would take care of the
nuts and bolts, i.e. the physical needs of the people;
while the educators would establish the spiritual
development of values and culture.

Throughout these pre-1940 writings can be found
words of hope and optimism. Arevalo saw great potential
in humanity, in all races, to achieve high culture and

good government. Culture was not something only a select

9
few could obtain, it was achievable for everyone. But

culture could not be obtained by accident. It was the

duty, the "mission" of responsible intellectuals who must

1 0
be the "bearers of the civilizing word." This duty was

historical, for "we are all heirs to the spiritual

37

legacy of the past, inevitably laboring for the future of

1 1
the species."

With proper guidance, Arevalo believed, the youth
of Central America would break away from the oppression

of the past. Moreover, only the young were capable of

1 2
forging a democratic structure in Central America,

because the young always vigorously believe in their high

1 3
potential and are never servile. It was the duty of

the educator to nurture the youth toward their

revolutionary goals, to instill in them a high spiritual

awareness, and put them on the road to social and

cultural excellence, before they could be spiritually

defeated by the oppressive systems of Central American

government. Once set in motion, youth would make

Central America great.

Arevalo retained concern and respect for Latin

America's indigenous people but felt that European

culture was superior. He wanted to preserve the wholesome

aspects of indigenous customs and traditions, but he

believed that the Indian people must be integrated into

1 fi

the dominant, European-oriented culture. "Our high

culture is from across the ocean, predominantly from

1 7
France and Spain," Arevalo claimed. But he was against

Franco's "Hispanidad , " and the colonial legacy of Spain.

"We desire to transform Guatemala into a modern state,"

38
he said,""^ and modern, for Arevalo, included freedom from
all forms of foreign domination. "From the hands of the
Spanish to the hands of the English, from English hands

to the hands of the Yankees," Central America had never

1 9
known true independence.

Arevalo also called for the union of Central

America. He believed that the failure to unify Central

America into a single nation, first tried after

independence from Spain, was a strong impediment to

cultural and economic development. Central American

provinces had fought among themselves and internally,

breaking into small states easily controlled by dictators

and strongmen. If the isthmus would form into one large

federation, it would be impossible for these dictators

to stay in power. In Arevalo" s idea of a united and

federated Central America, there would be institutional

and group autonomy within the society, e.g. for the

military, the press, and the university. These various

groups and institutions would work in harmony with the

nation as a whole, but with the freedom to best achieve

each one's highest potential. A united Central America,

democratic and free, would "finish automatically" the

20
egotistical and voracious strongmen.

Arevalo did not alter his political philosophy
when he received the nomination for president in July,

39
1944, but during the months of the presidential campaign,
and after, he further developed and defined his
pre-revolution ideas. Altogether, Arevalo's beliefs
constituted a philosophy he began to call "spiritual
socialism," in which "spiritual" signified the moral,
ethical, cultural aspects of humanity. "I am in favor of
an ethical or spiritual socialism," said Arevalo in
December 1944.^^ "Spiritual" also included the

congeniality and sympathy held by mankind for mankind,

22

and the concept of patriotism.

"Spiritual Socialism," as articulated by Arevalo
when presidential nominee and president elect, contained
as corollaries a number of direct promises to the people

of Guatemala. The legislative and judicial branches of

23 ^ - n
government, he promised, would be autonomous. Arevalo

would govern only as an advisor or a regulator; he would

"coordinate" the various forces in society. Spiritual

Socialism would be both a moral and an economic

liberation; a liberation and protection for the whole

25
society, not just for certain individuals or the rich.

"V7e will liberate and protect the worker, without

persecuting or hurting the employers," he said. Arevalo

praised the women for their participation in the

revolution, and promised: "We will liberate woman from

40

social serfdom," and put her in a "new relationship of

27
collaboration with man"

"Spiritual Socialism," which Arevalo described

piecemeal in various articles, speeches, and interviews,

in his esoteric and philosophical style, was perhaps most

unclear in regard to his stand on land reform. For

example, note the following remarks:

The dignity of the human being is even more
important than his material interests. Of course,
such a point of view does not imply that material
interests should be forgotten or neglected. We hope
to establish a different relation between the owner
or manager of the farm and the rural worker at his
service. This worker has to be treated like a human
being, not a slave. This is of maximum importance,
and, consequently, the worker's le^^^l of income and
manner of life have to be elevated.

Arevalo recognized that to achieve the promised
improvements for rural workers, changes in the land
tenure system must occur. He saw the need to "liberate
the land."^^ "Guatemala," Arevalo said, "is a country
with a semifeudal economy: agriculture, livestock,

latifundios, powerful foreign companies of the colonial

30
type, masses of men rented out for work, etc." He

promised a "greater distribution of land," but this did

not mean anyone would be deprived of his "legitimate

rights. "^''

On land reform, Arevalo exercised caution, knowing
the volatility of the land issue. Nor had he developed

41
detailed ideas for the future of Guatemala's overall
economic structure. His expertise, and his interest,
focused on education, and on his belief that with benign
government and the help of educators, Guatemala's
problems could be overcome. But Arevalo promised to work
for a modern and just economy in cooperation with
"capitalists, workers, towns, merchants, industrialists,
and professionals."^^ He promised he would not implement
economic policy autocratically, but would seek the help
of technicians, specialists, and professionals. Time
and effort would be expended, policy would not be made

offhandedly.

Concerning international economics, Arevalo
promised that Spiritual Socialism would "liberate the
nation from international servitude and from economic
slavery." The Republic of Guatemala must not stay "one
more day on its knees before the foreigners." At the
same time, Arevalo claimed that Spiritual Socialism was
much different from communism. "We are not materialist
socialists," he wrote. "We do not believe man is
primarily stomach. "^^ Communism, fascism, and nazism

"give food with the left hand, while the right hand

-36
destroys the essential laws and morals ot man.

Arevalo above all believed in education,
impartial justice, the value of each human, and

42

responsible government. Those who influenced Arevalo's
political formation were both Latin Americans and North
Americans, including Abraham Lincoln, Benito Juarez, and
Hipolito Yrigoyen; while he was especially inspired by
the policies of Franklin Roosevelt. In the 1920s and
1930s, Arevalo had been influenced by the ideas of Jose
Vasconcelos, and he profoundly admired the ideals of the

, ^ . 38
Mexican Revolution.

In many respects, Arevalo had seemed to be the

perfect candidate. His strong emphasis on the role of

education attracted the teachers. His equally strong

emphasis on the role of the young attracted the students.

His proposal for a strong legislature and judiciary

appealed to the politicians and judges. His promise to

keep the university and the military largely autonomous

pleased the members of these institutions. Political

conservatives were appeased or at least calmed by his

disdain for communism and his promises to protect the

rights of the employers. He also promised to consult all

groups on economic reforms, and enact such measures only

after careful study. Arevalo made clear his desire to

bring justice and modernization to Guatemala, not by

authoritarian means but by the participation of the whole

society. Moreover, the masses were to be helped, taught.

43
guided into the modern world, not permitted uncontrolled
rebellion .

For his supporters, Juan Jose Arevalo was even
more than the sum of the parts of his political platform.
His energy, optimism, sense of duty to society, pride
and dignity, all epitomized the highest ideals of the
revolution. The new Guatemala also yearned for
international respect, and Arevalo had, for himself
at least, already achieved a measure of this. All in all,
Arevalo could be seen as a worthy symbol of the educated,
humanistic, cultured image that Guatemala wanted for
itself .

Notes

1. Clemente Marroquin Rojas, "Devueltos los
bienes del Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo," La Hora , March 16,
1 959.

2. Prensa Libre, March 11, 1959.

3. "Istmania," not published until 1945, can be
found in Arevalo' s Escritos politicos.

4. El Imparcial, June 16, 1939.

5. "Entrevista a Juan Jose Arevalo," El libro y
el pueblo (Mexico City), June 1968.

6. Arevalo, Escritos Politicos, 18.

7. Juan Jose Arevalo, "Social Structure of
Education in our America" in Harold Eugene Davis, Latin
American Social Thought (Washington D.C., 1961), 491.

44

8. Ibid., 487.

9. Arevalo, Escritos politicos, 56.

10. Ibid. , 11, 17.

11. Arevalo, "Social Structure," 485

12. Arevalo, Escritos politicos, 18.

13. Ibid., 26.

14. Ibid., 30, 34, 44.

15. Ibid., 47; and throughout
writings .

Arevalo ' s

16. Juan Jose Arevalo, Escritos pedagoqicos y
f ilosof icos (Guatemala, 1945), 38-42, cited in Marie
Berthe Dion, "The Social and Political Ideas of Juan Jose
Arevalo and their Relationship to Contemporary Trends of
Latin American Thought" (M.A. thesis. The American
University, 1956), 43-44. Arevalo was strongly attracted
to Europe, he made his first trip there in 1927.

17. Juan Jose Arevalo, "Guatemala desea amistad
de Mexico," Excelsior (Mexico City), Feb. 15, 1945.

18. Juan Jose Arevalo, "Nosotros deseamos
transformar a Guatemala en un estado moderno," El Popular
(Mexico City), Nov. 12, 1944.

19. Arevalo, Escritos, 8.

20. Ibid., 59-60.

21. Arevalo, "Nosotros deseamos," El Popular
(Mexico City), Nov. 12, 1944.

22. Arevalo, Escritos politicos, 165-166.

23. Arevalo, "Guatemala desea
Excelsior (Mexico City), Feb. 15, 1945.

24. Arevalo, Escritos politicos, 168.

25. Ibid., 144.

26. Ibid.

amistad , "

45

27

Ibid.

28. Arevalo, "Nosotros deseamos," El Popular
(Mexico City), Nov. 12, 1944.

29. Arevalo, Escritos Politicos, 167.

30. Ibid., 165.

31 . Ibid.

32. Ibid., 167.

33. Ibid., 167-8.

34. Ibid., 143.

35. Ibid., 130.

36. Ibid., 132.

37. Juan Jose Arevalo, interview with author,
Guatemala City, July 14, 1986.

38 Pedro Guillen, "Charla con Juan Jose
Arevalo,"" El Imparcial, May 17, 1960; "Arevalo,"
Novedades (Mexico City), Nov. 29, 1961.

CHAPTER 5
POLICIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE
AREVALISTAS:
PART ONE

At the time of the presidential inauguration in
March, 1945, Juan Jose Arevalo, and the men who would
share with him the reins of government, had not yet
decided, in exact detail, what policies they would adopt
to transform their nation. They had not, for example,
developed plans on how they would alter the unjust
patterns in land ownership, or balance the needs and
demands of workers and employers. The main focus of
the revolution had been the overthrow of dictatorship,
not the formation of a specific step by step blueprint
for the future. They realized their inexperience in
politics and government, and recognized the need to
research, experiment, and learn; in this regard, they
were prepared to travel to other nations in search of
knowledge, and bring foreign advisors to their own
country. However, many of the reformers had already
developed firm convictions about the goals which
Guatemala should embrace and the means in general that
should be adopted to achieve these goals. They knew that,

46

47
to modernize and democratize Guatemala, they had to build
a human infrastructure of educated and skilled people.
The masses would have to be uplifted and brought into a
national economy; they would need modern technical
skills, personal management skills, political
sophistication, and physical health.

The Arevalistas agreed that they must create
programs and institutions capable of rationally directing
the economy and society. They believed it was crucial to
spend government funds on projects of industrialization,
agricultural diversification, and scientific and
technical modernization as well as mass education. They
must halt government malfeasance and not allow the
nation's wealth to end in the coffers of a wealthy few,
or rich foreign-owned companies. To a large degree,
the New Deal of President Franklin Roosevelt reflected
the kind of democracy they wanted. The New Dealers in the
United States, in the words of Eric Goldman, "talked of
uplifting the masses, fighting the businessmen,

establishing economic controls over the society,

111
questioning the traditional in every part of living."

The reformers achieved, or had begun to achieve by the

end of Arevalo's term in 1951, some of their goals. In

1951, Guatemala had become a better place to live, for

most people, than in 1944.

48

The revolution produced a political freedom far

more extensive than Guatemalans had ever known before. In

1948, Clemente Marroquin Rojas, a severe critic of the

government, had to admit that "one of the few victories

of the October 20 Revolution is individual liberty, very

2
limited in some ways, but liberty after all." Jose

Castro, a friend of the government, observed that

"everyone talks in a loud voice, gesticulates, and

argues, free from fear." Actually, political turmoil

and oppositionist threats resulted in some curbs on

freedom, but much less so than under previous

governments. The new administration's treatment of the

Church serves as an apt example. Although the Church

hierarchy opposed the reform movement with hostile verbal

attacks, it was not persecuted in return. The Church,

between 1944-1954, experienced more growth and more

freedom of religious and political expression than at any

4
time since 1871.

Education became a top priority of the Arevalo

government, and by 1951 educational services had

significantly increased. Social welfare and educational

expenditures under Ubico had remained rather constant,

and in the 1943-4 fiscal year reached their highest

level at 2,524,100 Quetzales; under Arevalo expenditures

for these services rose every year, and reached

49
15,506,600 Quetzales in fiscal 1948-9 (i.e. about one
third of the national budget). By 1951, public
education by itself had become the top priority in the
national budget.

According to Arevalo's annual message to Congress,
in March, 1951, there were 3,676 schools in Guatemala
(including industrial, technical, and special education
schools), 199,139 students, 10,198 teachers, and
1,109 students were studying with government
scholarships. In the last year, 40,990 children had
learned how to read, about 50 new schools had been
built, and more than 90 more were under construction. A
dance school, a commercial school, an art gallery, and
two museums had been built. Also, 204 new positions for
secondary school teachers had been created. Teaching
had become a higher paying profession soon after the
revolution: pay went from fourteen Quetzales a month to
seventy-five a month in villages, from twenty-two to
seventy-five in department capitals and from thirty to

Q

seventy-five in Guatemala City.

Close to Arevalo's heart was the education of the
masses. An executive decree of May 23, 1946, created the
Misiones Ambulantes de Cultura Inicial, to be directly
dependent on President Arevalo. The Misiones Ambulantes
were "moving schools," consisting of a small number of

50

government representatives who would move through the
countryside giving help and advice to campesinos.
Personnel would be limited to a licensed teacher, a
military officer, a last year medical student, an
agricultural expert, and a translator. These "moving
schools", according to plan, would teach patriotism, the
rights and duties of Guatemalan citizens, the origin and
goals of the revolution, and health and childcare. They
would also promote and oversee the construction of new
houses, improve health care, help solve labor problems
and improve the rural economy in general. Sports programs
would be established, and when possible, cinema, music,
and theater. All school-aged campesino children would be
taught to read and write and given a basic education, as
would adults under age 30. The use of footwear,
handcarts, and packmules would be encouraged. The
misiones were also instructed to compile "complete and
systematic information" on the local inhabitants and
the region, "from economic, cultural, military and
political points of view." The above cited guidelines,
however, were only part of the many detailed instructions
that were to direct the program. Five of these "moving
schools" were actually established, and during Arevalo's
period they moved over a wide area of the Guatemalan
countryside. The "schools" worked energetically to

51
comply with their guidelines. Among other things they
founded libraries, handed out educational material,
formed musical and theatrical groups, showed educational
films, and created schools that would continue the
educational work of the mission after it had moved on to
another place. In fiscal year 1948-1949, they treated
3,145 medical patients, and in 1950-1951, they treated
6,789 patients. They helped with agriculture and local
construction.'' ° They also became effective instruments of
government propaganda.

Arevalo himself devised plans for a unique system
of schools called Escuelas Federacion, that he hoped
would offer solutions to a number of existing problems.
Arevalo noted that under the traditional school system, a
school bell rang to cancel the class session, often at a
time when students and teacher were engaging in "premium
moments of fruitful discourse." Such moments came only
after careful cultivation by the teacher. The students
would then leave, to change class, recess, or go home,
and the teacher had the task of recreating a feeling
of harmony at the next class. The school bell, used in
this way, would therefore have to be eliminated. But the
school bell, according to Arevalo, was only symbolic of
greater difficulties. The entire educational system,
which dictated subjects to be covered, time allotted

52

for each, and even the physical environment, hampered the
best efforts of the educator. Arevalo believed that the
teacher was in fact an educational artist, who should
have the freedom to create each class in his or her own
style .

In order to give the teacher-artist complete
autonomy, even the school building would be constructed
in a new style. The schools should be outside of the
city center, and have ample space indoors and out. The
actual style of the buildings would vary according to
local needs, but the largest would consist of a large,
circular center core, with eight classrooms that
projected out from it like spokes on a wheel. Other
buildings erected on the school site would include
special technical training centers. Each teacher was to
be autonomous in his "spoke," free to arrange class

subjects and time, thus allowing the teacher and students

1 1
to achieve their highest potential.

The large center building would serve a number of

important roles. It could be used by sport groups,

political parties, agricultural societies, religious

groups, and others. It could be used as a theater,

conference hall, etc. Patriotic themes created by

Guatemalan artists should decorate the hall, and the

national flag should top the building. In short, the

53

center building would unite the school with local and
national organizations of government and society, thereby
making the school, in the highly abstract and
theoretical mind of Arevalo, a centerpoint in national
culture J ^ Education in these schools was generally
considered to be of high quality, during and after the
Arevalo period. ""^ Less than a dozen of the larger type
"federation schools" were constructed before the end of
Arevalo' s term;^^ new construction stopped under Arbenz
because of the high costs in relation to traditional
schools. However, the creation of the federation schools
demonstrates Arevalo' s and the Arevalistas' commitment to
education, and the place of central importance that they

gave it.

The reformers also believed they had a duty to
further educate themselves, when necessary, by
researching in other nations, and bringing foreign
experts to Guatemala to help guide the reform programs.
In creating a social security system, the government
sent Lie. Jose Rolz Bennet to the United States, Canada,
Cuba and Mexico to research their social security
programs,^ ^ and U.S. experts on social security were
brought to Guatemala. In the Ministry of Economy, a
large number of foreign specialists worked as advisors.
Juan Jose Orozco Posadas traveled to the United States,

54

Mexico, and Cuba, to study programs designed to protect
the rights of children, and to ameliorate the condition
of children born into poverty. In order to help
modernize the national police, in 1946 Edwin L. Sweet of
the united States was hired to teach at the police

academy.

Another goal of the Arevalo administration was
to reform the economy, and at the same time weaken the
power held by the elite groups and foreign businesses.
Although they largely failed in this last regard, the
reformers managed to run a generally successful economy
that brought many Guatemalans increased benefits, and
laid a framework of reform that should have eventually
provided some long term solutions to old economic
problems. The Arevalistas benefited from treasury
surpluses accumulated during World War II; and during
Arevalo' s presidency, Guatemalan exports (dominated by
coffee, bananas, and chicle) continued in strong demand
in the united States. ^^ The Arevalistas were thus able
to promote their reforms with very little foreign aid,
and at the end of fiscal year 1948-1949 owed an external
debt of only $670,000, making the interest and
amortization charges "of negligible size."^^ Government
income for fiscal 1950-1951 was 44,975,780 Quetzales, the
budget that year was 48,948,280 Quetzales. ^^ (Government

55

income in 1944 had been 18,200,000 Quetzales, and Ubico's
last approved budget had been 1 1 , 868 , 384 . ) ^^ The real

gross national product and real per capita income rose

22
significantly under Arevalo.

U.S. Embassy reports indicate a continued strength
in the Guatemalan economy. The annual economic report
for 1949 called the Guatemalan economy "reasonably
stable," and in spite of rainstorms that had caused
considerable damage, the year "ended in an atmosphere of
prosperity. "^^ Industrial production of sugar, matches,
electric power, alcoholic beverages, cement, cigarettes,
flour, private construction, and slaughterhouse output,
all increased. "On the whole, 1949 was a satisfactory
year for industry . "^"^ Guatemala City and vicinity
consumed 50,642,000 kilowatt hours in 1949, an increase
of some 5,000,000 kilowatts from 1948. Electric plant
facilities were significantly extended in other areas of
Guatemala, and at least nine rural villages received
electric light. ^^ Also in 1949, rural and urban bus
traffic strongly increased, and air service expanded, as

did the number of roads. Eleven bridges were built, and

. ., ^ 26
Guatemala City received an automatic telephone system.

For 1950, U.S. Embassy reports indicate that economic

27
expansion continued, and stability remained. Imports

for the first 10 months of 1950 were $59,598,000, with

56

exports of $54,178,000, resulting in a modest deficit of
$5,420,000.^^ Foreign exchange reserves on December 31,
1950, remained at $39,400,000. Reserves had increased
$1,333,000 in 1950, although there had been a decrease of
$9,286,000 in 1949. For the first month of 1951, the
Embassy reported that "business in general was good," and
"retail sales in most lines equaled or surpassed January
1950 and January 1949."^^ Jim Handy correctly noted that
the economy "was in significantly better shape in 1951
than it had been in 1944." From this he concluded
that "the economic policy of the Arevalo administration
proved to be a modest success," although it is
naturally difficult to determine what part governmental
actions played in the economy's overall performance.

Taking advantage of their strong economy, the
Arevalistas had enacted some important reforms. Among
other measures, new money and banking laws helped
modernize the monetary system, and a reorganized national
bank, the Banco de Guatemala, was inaugurated July 1 ,
1946.^'' The national bank would be autonomous from the
government, and its services open to all citizens and all
economic interests of Guatemala. Government policies
under Arevalo in general favored the expansion of
agricultural production, and the staples of the average
Guatemalan (corn, rice, and beans) increased. An

57
autonomous governmental development agency, the Institute
de Fomento de la Producci6n ( INFOP ) , began operations in
early 1949, working with an initial budget of 6.5 million
Quetzales. INFOP policies helped increase agricultural
production, stimulate industry, and raise the general
standard of living of the nation. INFOP, among other
things, had the authority to provide loans and farming
supplies to small farmers, begin projects of irrigation
and other improvements, buy and sell both crops and land,
colonize new land, establish industrial enterprises,
undergo programs of research, grant industrial loans,
improve transportation and promote low cost housing.

INFOP promoted a crop diversification program, which soon

33
began to have some successes, particularly with cotton.

The Departamento de la Vivienda Popular, a department of

INFOP, was entrusted to make investigations of the

housing problem, help plan and execute housing projects,

give loans, guarantee mortgages, etc. The department

received 2 million Quetzales for the first year, with the

promise of about 250,000 for a subsequent annual

budget. ^"^ To further alleviate the housing problems

of the Guatemalan poor, the Rent Control law of 1949

created rent ceilings, protected tenants from eviction,

and prohibited discrimination on grounds of race.

religion, and nationality, or against families with

children.

Students, professionals, and the middle class in
general received many benefits after the revolution. They
secured government positions, and when programs for
reform were enacted, they filled most of the leadership
posts. The Arevalo government devoted about one-third of
the state expenditures to education and social welfare,
including the construction of schools, hospitals, and
housing, all of which needed professional planning and
supervision. The university received autonomy, and went
into a period of bureaucratic and educational reform.
Educators, artists, and intellectuals also benefited from
the relative political freedom and the various government
programs. In five years, according to one source, more
books were imported and more bookstores founded than in

36
the previous 50 years.

The creative and artistic climate of the Arevalo
years was reflected in the appearance of numerous
publications of intellectual quality. The Revista de
Guatemala, founded in 1945, became one of the most
prestigious cultural magazines in the Hispanic world.
In the pages of the Revista, Guatemalans, Mexicans,
Spaniards, and others, many of them already well known,
published fiction, nonfiction, poetry, and book reviews.

59
The Revista emphasized artistic and literary themes, and
remained open to all writers of merit, no matter what
their political ideology. ^^ Politically, however, the
Revista supported the Arevalo government, and it retained
a Marxist tone in its articles and comments on politics.
The Revista de Economia, to name another example, devoted
itself exclusively to economic issues. In 1949, its
articles included a comparison of the social security
systems in Guatemala and the United States, and an
article on banking by Dr. Raul Prebisch, who would soon
become Latin America's best known economist. The
Universidad de San Carlos, established on the first
anniversary of the Revolution, dedicated itself to the
concerns of the university.

The Arevalo government contributed in a number of
ways to the creation of quality publications. In 1946,
for example, an Arevalo decree established "Los Clasicos
del Istmo," a program designed to publish the outstanding
literary works of the last 125 years, from the five
Central American nations. Also in 1946, Arivalo
established a monthly pension of 300 Quetzales for each
of three outstanding Guatemalan authors, based solely on
literary merit, in order to encourage the labor of
others. (One recipient was a political conservative.)
After five years of the literacy crusade, the Ministry of

60
Education noted that the people who could now read needed
books, cheaply and easily obtained. So, on 27 October,
1950, the Ministry created the Biblioteca de Cultura
Popular "20 de Octubre," which was to be a series of
works of educational and cultural merit, mass produced
and sold at a very low price. The first volume was:
Rafael Landivar, el poeta de Guatemala.

The Arevalista reform movement inspired some of
the artists to become politically involved. Working
through publications, exhibitions, concerts and lectures,
they felt it their duty to promote national reform
programs. A partial list of outstanding names would
include Otto Raul Gonzalez, Luis Cardoza y Aragon, Miguel
Angel Asturias, and Manuel Galich. Asturias, a later
Nobel prize winner, promoted pro-revolution themes in his
books Viento fuerte (1950), and El papa verde (1954).
Talented young writers and artists particularly attracted
to the political left formed themselves into the small
group called Saker-Ti (a Quiche word meaning "dawn"). A
typical Saker-Ti notice in the Diario de la Mahana
claimed, "We are carrying our force to the popular

,,39
classes .

One manner in which middle class reformers
exercised their leadership involved efforts to ameliorate
the condition of the Indian. The integration of the

61
Indian into the national culture was seen as "the
cornerstone of progress" for Guatemala, but the Indian

would be allowed to live free in his "particular

^ T . . ,,40
environment," and "conserve his authentic way of iite.

In order to assist in this endeavor, the Institute

Indigenista Nacional was created by the government in

August, 1945. It was placed officially under the

auspices of the Ministry of Education but had an advisory

board that included scholars, a representative from the

Asociacion Guatemalteca de Agricultores , and

representatives from the ministries of education,

economy, agriculture, public health, and government. The

Institute aimed to "elevate the cultural, social, and

,.41 ,
economic level of the indigenous groups by means

of research, the promotion of conferences and

discussions, and the publication of its findings. These

measures, of course, did little to immediately help the

Indian overcome poverty and oppression, but the work of

the Institute represented, and reinforced, a broad

commitment to justice and improvement.

A number of reform programs did in fact affect the

condition of the rural population in general and the

Indian in particular. Some Guatemalan towns received

roads, improved housing, water, electricity, and other

material aids. Political activity and social change were

62
promoted by the "misiones culturales," the political
parties, unions, and government propaganda in general.

New awareness resulted, and virtually all department

42
capitals of Guatemala underwent some political changes.

In San Antonio Sacatepequez , for example, the ladinos had

long excluded the Indians from power. During Arevalo's

term of office, the Indians became politicized and began

43
to openly challenge the ladinos. As early as 1945, the

Indians in San Luis Jilotepeque had become active in

44
local politics.

A new awareness of women's rights had also
surfaced with the revolution. Women had gained respect
from their active participation in the overthrow of Ubico
and Ponce, and their new involvement in the political
process. Although only literate women had been given the
vote, women activists continued to work for complete
suffrage. One group of women who identified with the
ideals of the Revolution formed the Alianza Democratica
Femenina Guatemalteca y Panamericana.

A number of specific programs for children began
under Arevalo. The Comedores Infantiles (children's
kitchens) provided food for a limited number of
disadvantaged children, and the Guarderias Nacionales
(day nurseries) provided care for the children of women
working in the market place. Income from pinball and slot

63

machines, private donations ^n^

v^uuctLxons, and government

appropriations funded these small scale programs/^ Leo
Suslow in 1949 found the children's kxtchens xn Guatemala
City neat and comfortable, and the children happy. "Lunch
at a kitchen center included a large portion of beef
stew, bread, and milk."^^ ^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ Ministry
of Education began a special national lottery, with the
profits reserved for children's education. One man who
deserves much credit for the establishment of children's
aid programs was Juan Jose Orozco Posadas, RN member and
early advocate of Ar^valo for President.

Penitentiary reform and other changes in the
Penal Code also concerned the Arevalo government. Just
7 days after his inauguration, Arevalo directed his
Minister of Government to "investigate the judicial
situation of all and each one of the prisoners, with the
goal to mitigate, as much as possible, their
conditions. "^7 The government also directed that anyone
who remained incarcerated for 5 or more months must be
taught how to read and write. '^^

It was characteristic of Arlvalo's style of
government that he was not willing to rely exclusively on
formal programs and legislation to change his promises
into reality. He thus demonstrated a willingness to give
personal and individual help to those in need. Arevalo,

64
from the beginning of his presidency, received large
numbers of letters and petitions from all parts of

Guatemala informing him of injustices and needs; requests

49
and complaints, Arevalo paid serious attention to

these letters, making his own suggestions and orders, or

passing them on to other officials to be investigated.

Many of the President's instructions were written in his

own handwriting, leaving no doubt of his personal

interest .

People expected the help of their new President in

numerous ways. They wanted his intervention in family

problems, between parents and offspring, among relatives.

Letters came from relatives of prison inmates. One

destitute old woman had relied on her daughter for life

support, but her daughter had been jailed for drinking "a

little corn beer." Villages requested water,

electricity, a cemetery. Ladinos expressed fear that

Indians were becoming too forward, and demanding too

much. Indians complained about the domination of ladinos,

and property disputes were common. Local officials were

sometimes unworthy. A village in the department of

Solola declared that the mayor sold public trees for

private profit, coerced local elections, and "in the

night entered the women's jail to make evil use of the

prisoners

„51

65
The documents often do not indicate how, or if,
the problems were resolved, but they do indicate that
Arevalo took his correspondence seriously, and that he
often gave orders to solve the issue in question. For
example, when the mother of an ill, eleven year old girl
wrote the President, complaining that the father had

refused to maintain or educate the child. President

52
Arevalo ordered that the man must help. The mayor of

Chiquimulilla asked for musical instruments; he was sure

that Guatemala City had extras not being used. Arevalo

wrote a memo to the Minister of Government, instructing

him to try to find the instruments. "I am interested,"

wrote Arevalo. ^^ In another case, a boy claimed to be

destitute, with a mother to take care of: he wanted a job

as office boy at the government palace, so he could

attend school. Arevalo directed that the boy be given a

54
job at the first opportunity.

A most pathetic letter came from Mrs. Kalksteen

Rombaut. She explained that she was of foreign birth,

and had immigrated to Guatemala in 1931. She and her

husband, with only five Quetzales in assets, found work

in a pastry shop. They lived poor, and worked sixteen

years without rest. Her husband never took her anywhere,

and finally began to beat her. Also, she had to work

harder than he did. She bore two children, but then her

66
husband forced her to have a sterilization operation.
Her husband was, after all, despotic and cruel. The
letter, three full pages of small type, went into great
detail. Arevalo directed the letter to Francisco Valdes,
the Minister of Government, and wrote: "Paco Valdes:
another drama! Let's see what we might do." Subsequent
pages attached to the letter in the archives, signed by
the national Chief of Police, show that the police were
busy finding out the facts, and trying to resolve the
women s problems.

In addition to the correspondence he received,
Arevalo sent investigative teams into the countryside to
find out the needs and desires, large and small, of the
people. On the basis of the reports of these teams,
Arevalo might send technocrats to specific villages, or
arrange a loan for developing a water supply. In one
case, a village requested three costumes for musicians in

the religious ceremony of a cofradia: Arevalo consented,

56
and directed that the bill be sent to his office.

Arevalo also made personal promises, face to face, v/hen

he traveled in the country. The President received a

couple of letters of follow-up, reminding him of his

promises, in one case to make a son take care of his

mother; in another case to free a woman's husband from

67

jail, that he might take care of the woman and her
children.

In spite of the commendable goals, and significant
successes, the reformers of the Arevalo period still
faced huge national problems in 1951. Beginnings had
been made, and life for many families had improved. But
"old Guatemala" had not yet transformed itself into a
"new Guatemala." In 1950, one economic study found
that, in spite of advances made under Arevalo, "limited
markets, inadequate agricultural production, high cost of
raw materials, lack of an integrated transportation
system, shortages of capital and credit, obsolete
technology, traditional policies of high profit margins
at the expense of sales volume, inadequate nutrition, and
poor education of workers," all conspired "to inhibit

C Q

the growth of industry." El Imparcial reported that
malnutrition, unsanitary housing, malaria, tuberculosis,
intestinal parasites, typhoid, and alcoholism remained
major health problems. Calorie intake stayed 20% below
minimal standards; total protein 15%; and animal protein
60%.^^ Despite literacy campaigns, the 1950 census
discovered that illiterates made up 71.9% of the
population over age seven. Although credible estimates
for the illiteracy rate under Ubico are unavailable, it
is unlikely that the Arevalistas had made great

68

progress. From the revolution to the end of Arevalo's
term in office, the total population increased about
400,000;^'' and people who learned to read only numbered
about 82,000.^^ Annual wages remained low, about 100 to
200 Quetzales for the rural worker and about 360 to 1200
in Guatemala City.^° Export earnings continued to rely
heavily on coffee.

In 1950, a Pan American Union study on housing in
Guatemala reported that the typical rural family still
lived in a primitive hut of one room, dirt floors, and
thatched roofs.^^ In the capital, which received about
3,000 rural families a year, thousands of families lived
in "flimsy shacks. "^^ The report noted that the
government was trying to mitigate the hardships, had made
some advances, and had passed new laws that were "well
framed and broad in scope. "^^ It calculated, however,
that in order to overcome present housing deficiencies
and meet the needs of the growing population, the

government would have to allocate about one quarter of

6 fi
its budget to housing for 25 years. This is something

Guatemala was clearly not in a position to do.

Some observers of the Arevalo period have pointed

out various problems within the government itself that

may have slowed progress. Suslow believed that

bureaucratic conflicts between the Institute Guatemalteco

69

de Seguridad Social and the Ministry of Public Health
delayed social security benefits, and that the "rapid
turnover" of public health ministers damaged UNICEF
efforts to promote health care programs for Guatemalan

children

57

:l Imparcial likewise complained of a lack

of coordination between branches of government, and the
lost time, lost energy, and "money invested in things
stupid and crazy. "^^ Arevalo has been criticized for
constructing a large expensive sports center, for the 6th
Caribbean Olympics of 1950, when so many needed housing
and basic care; one critic called the stadium "that white
elephant of the Revolution. "^^ Jorge Garcia Granados
claimed that the government put too much money into
education and political propaganda, when Guatemala

actually needed first of all an economic

70
infrastructure.

But many of the claims of the critics have been
poorly substantiated, and often they were politically
motivated. Certainly, the reformers deserve a measure
of blame, as in the many cases of working at cross
purposes among themselves. Policy mistakes were
indubitably made. But the reformers also had to contend
with vast poverty, ignorance, and general backwardness,
on a scale that solidly defied any short-term solutions.
At the same time, a strong opposition worked against

70
reform. All in all, in consideration of the obstacles,
the Arevalistas enacted praiseworthy reforms and made
some progress toward carrying them out. The social and
economic welfare of the "people" had become a government
priority.

Notes

1. Eric Goldman, The Crucial Decade (New York,
1956) , 121 .

2 Clemente Marroquin Rojas, "No hay que tener
miedo," '(leaflet) Nov. 24, 1948, AGC , Unfiled papers and
documents for 1949.

3. Jose Castro, La revolucion desde el poder:
viaie de'ida y vuelta a Guatemala (La Habana, 1948), 4.

4 Anita Frankel, "Political Development in
Guatemala, 1945-1954: The Impact of Foreign, Military,
and Religious Elites" (Ph.D. diss.. University of
Connecticut, 1969), 169. For particulars on the Church,
see Chapter 8.

5. Adler, Public Finance, 72-3.

6 Silvert, A Study in Government, 34;
Gonzalez', Historia, 370. Gonzalez notes that education
held fifth place in Ubico's budget.

7. Juan Jose Arevalo, Seis anos de gobierno,
vol.2 (Guatemala, 1987), 184-5.

8. Suslow, "Social Reforms," 45. One Quetzal
equalled one dollar.

9 Ministerio de Gobernacion to Gobernador
Departmental, June 4, 1946, AGC, Ministerio de
Gobernacion, Varios.

71

10.

Arevalo, Seis anos, II, 42, 103, 186

11 Juan Jose Arevalo, Que significan las

escuelas ' "f ederacion" ; solucion Guatemalteca en un

conflicto universal entre la arguitectura v la pedagogia
(Guatemala, 1949), passim.

12. Ibid.

13. Jorge Arriola, interview with author,
Guatemala City, June 20, 1987; Gonzalez, Historia, 370,
434. Some of these schools remain in existence, and they
retain a good reputation.

14. Arevalo, Seis anos, II, 182; Gonzalez,
Historia, 370, 434.

15. Juan Jose Arevalo, "El doctor Juan Jose
Arevalo habla sobre el regimen de Seguridad Social,"
Prensa Libre, Feb. 8, 1985, p. 5.

16. El Imparcial, April 3, 1979.

17. Memoria de Ministerio de Gobernacion, p. 52,
March 1, 1946, AGC, Ministerio de Gobernacion, Varies.

18. John Hans Adler, Eugene R. Schlesinger, and
Ernest C. Olson, Public Finance and Economic Development
in Guatemala (Stanford, 1952), 20, 32-33.

19. Ibid., 276.

20. Arevalo, Seis anos, II, 178-179.

21 Ibid., 178; Silvert, A Study in Government,
35; Adler, Public Finance, 29; Mario Monteforte Toledo,
Guatemala, monografia sociologia (Mexico, 1959), 551.
Some of the figures cited by the above authors do not
agree.

22. Adler, Public Finance, 28-30; Monteforte
Toledo, Monografia, 579-86.

23 Gilbert E. Larsen to Department of State,
"Annual Economic Report-1 949 , " p. 2, NAUS 814.00/4-1050.

24. Ibid., p. 4.

25. Ibid., p. 26.

72

26. Ibid., pp. 33-37.

27. NAUS 814.00/2-350; 3-350; 3-2950; 4-2750;
6-3050; 8-450; 8-850; 9-150; 9-2850; 11-350; 12-150;
1 2-2950.

28. NAUS 81 4.00/2-251 .

29. Ibid,

30. Jim Handy, "Revolution and Reaction:
National Policy and Rural Politics in Guatemala,
1944-1954" (Ph.D. diss.. University of Toronto, 1985),
106; see also: Alfonso Bauer Paiz, "La revolucion
Guatemalteca del 20 de octubre de 1944 y sus proyecciones
economico-sociales , " Alero, 8 (Sept. -Oct. 1974), 62-64.

31. Robert R. Hendon, Jr., "Some Recent Economic
Reforms in Guatemala" (M.A. thesis, 1949), 123; Adler,
Public Finance, 20; Monteforte Toledo, Monograf la, 568.

32. Handy, "Revolution," 103.

33. Monteforte Toledo, Monograf la, 450-1.

34. Anatole A. Solow, Housing in Guatemala
(Washington D.C., 1950), 34.

35. Ibid., 33.

36. Mario Monteforte Toledo, La Revolucion de
Guatemala 1944-1954 (Guatemala, 1975), 20.

37. Rodney T. Rodriguez, Revista de Guatemala:
Indice Literario (Guatemala, 1987), 1.

38. Ibid., 9.

39. "El grupo Saker-Ti," Diario de la Mahana,
Sunday Supplement, Jan. 15, 1950.

40 . Boletin del Institute Indigenista Nacional,
1:1 (Oct. -Dec. 1945), 3,41. See also: NAUS
81 4.01 1 /2-2645 no. 21 91 .

41 . Ibid. , 29.

42. Adams, Crucifixion, 187.

73

43. Robert Ewald, "San Antonio Sacatepequez
1932-1953," in Political Changes in Guatemalan Indian
Communities, ed . Richard Newbold Adams (Michigan, 1957),
20.

44. John Gillin, "San Luis Jilotepeque
1942-1955," in Adams, Political Changes, 25.

45. Leo A. Suslow, "Social Security in
Guatemala: A Case Study in Bureaucracy and Social Welfare
Planning" (Ph.D. diss.. University of Connecticut, 1954),
37.

46

Ibid.

47. Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro to Ministro de
Gobernacion, March 22, 1945, AGC , Correspondencia del
Presidente de la Republica.

48. Valdes to Gobernadores , Feb. 14, 1946, AGC,
Ministerio de Gobernacion, Varies.

49. Documents in AGC show that hundreds of
letters and petitions reached Arevalo's office before the
end of 1945, and continued to arrive thereafter.

50. No. 298 clas. 540, Ja^n. 1946, AGC,
Correspondencia del Presidente de la Republica.

51. No. 7320 clas. 42.7, Jan. 1946, AGC,
Correspondencia del Presidente de la Republica.

52. No. 2364 clas. 021-9-D, Feb. 1947, AGC,
Correspondencia del Presidente de la Republica.

53. No. 540, August 14, 1946, AGC,
Correspondencia del Presidente de la Republica.

54. No. 159 clas. 660-ch, Jan. 1946, AGC,
Correspondencia del Presidente de la Republica.

55. Angela Luisa Kalksteen Rombaut to Arevalo,
Sept. 1946, AGC, Correspondencia del Presidente de la
Republica .

56. No. 3685 Ref . 312.4, August 20, 1946, AGC,
Correspondencia del Presidente de la Republica.

57. No. 4932 ref. 102-fac., Feb. 4, 1947, AGC,
Correspondencia del Presidente de la Republica.

74

58. G.E. Britnell, "Problems of Economic and
Social Change in Guatemala," The Canadian Journal of
Economy and Political Science, 17:4 (Nov, 1951), 475.

59. El Imparcial, May 7, 1951, cited in Suslow,
"Social Security," 32.

60. Solow, Housing, 19; NAUS 814/4-2050, p. 10.
61 . Monteforte Toledo, Monograf la, 41 .

62. Manuel Chavarria Flores, Analf abetismo en
Guatemala (Guatemala, 1952), 85,98, cited in Gonzalez,
Historia, 404.

63. Solow, Housing, 13.

64. Ibid., 12, 15.

65. Ibid., 35.

66. Ibid., 3.

67. Suslow, "Social Security," 38,288.

68. El Imparcial, Oct. 19, 1948, p. 5.

69. Elly Rodriguez Gonzalez, "Silva Falla merece
mi respecto," La Hora, April 10, 1958.

70. El Imparcial, May 7, 1946; for the same
viewpoint, see Silvert, A Study in Government, 45.

CHAPTER 6
POLICIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE
AREVALISTAS:
PART TWO

The Arevalo period produced neither a "rural
revolution," nor an "urban revolution." It was instead a
"revolution" that embraced the entire nation in its
origin and in its unfolding. Certainly, in isolated areas
of the republic some people were unaware of the changes
taking place, and nearly all of the activity,
particularly in 1944, took place in Guatemala City. But
the revolution of October 1944 and the Arevalista
movement that grew out of it received impetus from both
rural and urban Guatemala, and the Arevalista government
included the entire nation in its reform policies.

In 1944, the political parties had endeavored to
promote revolt beyond Guatemala City, the center of
activities, and create a genuine national revolution.
The Frente Popular Libertador (FPL) and to a lesser
degree the Partido Renovacion Nacional (RN), had begun
working in 1944 to organize party chapters throughout the
nation, particularly with the help of rural-based
teachers.^ El Progreso, which received an FPL chapter on

75

76

July 25, 1944, experienced violence between Arevalistas

2

and Poncistas in September. Violence also occurred in

Mazatenango, Quetzaltenango, and Chiquimula , "^

Initial reforms would be obtained most easily in
urban areas, which could be more easily reached by the
national governmental apparatus, but the Arevalistas
believed that urban reform alone could not possibly
modernize Guatemala. The Arevalistas also understood
that any political party or group that wanted political
power needed to obtain the vote of the countryside, where
the majority of eligible voters lived. The power of the
rural vote was seen in 1950, when Arbenz failed to carry
the majority in Guatemala City, but won the presidential
elections based on his win in the rural areas.
Furthermore, the rural voters had to be released from the
domination of the large landholders, who in 1945, and in
many cases beyond, continued to retain much influence
over the workers and local officials.

Two great issues of the utmost controversy, labor
reform and land reform, would mark the Arevalo period.
The Arevalistas hoped that these reforms would transform
the nation, and destroy the traditional land and work
patterns that kept the majority of Guatemalans in a state
of exploitation and misery. The issue of labor reform

77
was treated first, and new laws and government policies
would greatly benefit the workers under Arevalo.

Unions began to form openly during the summer of
1944, and the Arevalo government and the Arevalista
political parties throughout the Arevalo period,
encouraged union growth and the promotion of workers'
rights. Increasingly, however, union members gained
political power and were able to advance their demands
autonomously. By 1950, more than 150 unions existed with
nearly 100,000 members. Unions helped their members
during periods of emergency, such as sickness or natural
disaster, and they helped formulate proposals for new
labor laws.^ Unions also served to watch for labor law
infractions by the employers.

New labor laws gave the workers many benefits.
The most far-reaching measure was the labor code of May
1, 1947, later expanded by amendments in 1948. Edwin
Bishop correctly noted that the code was "fairly drawn,
well-written and comprehensive." It established
provisions for severance pay for discharged workers,
collective bargaining, overtime pay, compulsory contracts
between labor and management, minimum wages, the right to
strike, guaranteed vacations and other rights recognized
by the 1945 constitution. The Inspeccion General de
Trabajo, charged with overseeing infractions of the code,

78
obtained extensive indemnities for the workers between
1947 and 1950.^ In 1949, the office worked on 4,016
disputes and directed employers to pay over $100,000 to

workers, most of which covered unjustified discharge from

9
employment. If the Inspeccion General could not settle

the complaint, it was passed on to another new agency,

the Tribunales de Trabajo.

Initially labor reform affected primarily urban

areas, but organized labor also made advances in the

agrarian sector. Labor activity took place early on

national fincas and on the relatively advanced farms of

the United Fruit Company. In 1949 there were forty-six

1 0
farm unions, and many more were being formed. In 1950,

the Confederacion Nacional Campesina de Guatemala ( CNCG )

was founded, and soon became an influential voice for

peasant labor.

Archer Bush concluded in 1 950 that the unions and

the labor codes had had a positive effect on the workers.

Wage increases, better working conditions, and job

security represented part of the advances. Self-respect

and "psychological satisfactions" resulted from the

working man's new status, along with feelings of

increased prestige and social unity. The unions, wrote

Bush, were "forming the backbone of a new social group,"

^ ^ ill
in Guatemala.

79

Workers also received benefits from the Instituto

Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social (IGSS), an autonomous

and nominally obligatory system which began operation on

January 2, 1948. IGSS benefits would eventually include

coverage for accidents, maternity, illness, old age, and

1 2
death. The IGSS planners realized they faced a lack of

trained personnel and medical facilities, public

ignorance, insufficient funds, and a lack of accurate

data; therefore they planned a gradual program that would

1 3
cover the entire nation only after ten years. Urban

workers received the first benefits, because an urban

infrastructure made the administrative tasks much easier.

After six months, the program insured 80,000 workers, and

after one year it insured 140,000 workers. During the

1 4
first year, it paid out Q498,382 in benefits. In

mid-1950, a U.S. Embassy economic report on the previous

six months noted that "the successful social security

,15

program continued to make gains

By March 31 , 1 951 ,

more than 170,000 received IGSS coverage, the majority

1 fi
being not urban but rural workers. Leo Suslow believed

that a significant improvement occurred in the well-being

of the covered workers. Although Suslow knew of no

specific studies that dealt with the effect which the

IGSS had on Guatemala's Indians, he noted that "one still

cannot ignore the direct observation of Indians in

80

hospitals, Indians in the rehabilitation centers, and

1 7
Indians receiving cash benefits and pensions."

Many reformers believed that it was crucial to

enact far-reaching land reform, meaning the partition and

redistribution of large land holdings, along with other

measures to aid the campesino. The Comite-Politico

Ferrocarrilero, a union political committee, defined the

importance of land reform in a manifesto of December

1949.

By means of agrarian reform our agricultural
production will be increased to new levels, new
horizons will be opened up to our industry, our
internal market will be expanded and new human
masses will be incorporated with the capacity of
consumers. To carry out agrarian reform means to
modernize and mechanize agricultural exploitation,
to develop a national industry based upon domestic
raw materials, to substantially improve the living
conditions of the working populat^i^n, elevating
its welfare and its cultural level.

In 1947, Max Ricardo Cuenca , writing in the Revista de

Guatemala, argued that without land reform Guatemala

would remain a weak, underdeveloped nation, unable to

achieve modernization and independence from the United

States and other world powers. "Only with agrarian

reform can democracy be consolidated, the country

industrialized, hunger and misery liquidated, culture

developed. Central America united, and Belize

recovered

,,19

81

Letters and petitions requesting new land, the
return of stolen land, and help with boundary disputes,
predated Arevalo's inauguration, and continued
thereafter. In some villages, people banded into
"Comites Pro-Tierras" to jointly fight for local land
rights, as they did in Ayarza, Santa Rosa.^° Examples of
the requests could include the petition from San
Sebastian Caotan, asking the President to help the

campesinos, and give them free land, "as has been done

2 1
for other people." A petition, signed in 1947 by 55 men

from San Agustin Acasaguastlan , claimed that the large

landowners and the mayor were stealing communal land,

crops, trees, and the labor of workers.

Arevalista political parties and unions included

land reform among their platform goals, and some of the

more zealous members, especially in PAR, began working in

1944 and 1945 for more equitable distribution of the

nation's land. In 1946, the second congress of the

Confederacion de Trabaj adores de Guatemala ( CTG ) demanded

"democratic agrarian reform." The first "great

convention" of the Federaci5n Sindical de Guatemala

(FSG), in June 1947, called the land reform problem

"urgent." Jim Handy noted that "every major economic

publication in the country not linked to the landowners'

82

associations argued periodically that the agrarian

1,24
structure of the country needed to be altered."

The Arevalo government, however, had to approach

the land reform issue with caution. The great

landholders retained much economic power, and opposed any

significant reform. But worry centered also on the

peasants themselves. Reformers wondered if an orderly

program of land reform could be devised that would not

degenerate into massive land takeovers by peasants

suddenly overwhelmed by greed and high expectations. The

countryside was indeed an area of potential rebellion,

and it appeared that "agitators," i.e. extremist leaders,

were preparing the campesinos for confrontation. Indeed,

a number of land invasions did occur. Arevalo himself

advocated a cautious route to land reform. In a January,

1945 interview, Arevalo stated that poor farmers needed

more land, cheap credit, and expert instruction, but

reforms would be made only after extensive and careful

study. ^^ Many reformers agreed with Arevalo. The FSG

political statement of 1947, for example, had noted the

"urgent" need for land reform, which must be implemented

to put an end to feudalism. All the people would have to

join together in the "revolutionary fight." But the

statement also declared that FSG opposed demagogues, who

misled the campesinos, and put the national economy in

danger. In Guatemala, "there is no need to provoke
difficult situations," because the nation possesses "land
in abundance."

In 1946, several large meetings took place between
department governors, town mayors, and representatives
from the central government. Those who attended approved
a number of "agreements" that would be reflective of
the government's initial caution, and the strong
local influence still retained by the large landowners.
Concern for peace and economic stability ranked high, and
the participants agreed on the "persecution and
elimination" of political agitators "who exploit and
incite the campesinos to rebellion." Also, vagrancy in
all forms must be prosecuted, and landowners who comply
with the humanitarian needs of the workers must be
protected. The participants offered a few minor
suggestions to improve the life of the worker; for
example, the promotion of sports and inexpensive work
tools, and the discouragement of drinking alcoholic
beverages. In sum, it was agreed that the needs of

landowners and workers had to be recognized; and rural

27
relations harmonized.

On July 2, 1947, a circular sent to all department

governors by the Ministry of Government ordered that

anyone who advocated the violent seizure of private land

84

must be punished severely. It must not be allowed that
agitators compel campesinos or workers to join or form
associations that work toward taking land from the
owners. The governors must "proceed with great energy
against the agitators, consigning them immediately to the
tribunals of justice." Victor Manuel Gutierrez and other
labor leaders protested to Arevalo, claiming that the
circular would be used to unjustly harass the workers and
campesinos, and protect the enemies of the revolution. ^^
These complaints were largely unjustified, for the
government continued to work for rural reform, even while
it tried to maintain rural peace.

Outbreaks of violence attributed to agitators were
not rare. For example, the Arevalo administration in
early 1946 forced CTG leader Amor Velasco from his post
in the municipality of Malacatan because of charges that

Velasco was inciting local Indians to seize private

29

landholdings. Also in 1946, in another case, the

government instructed the police in Malacatan to arrest
the campesino leaders of a local farm union. Several days
after the arrests, while the Malacatan Chief of Police
was driving to Guatemala City with his wife, a group of
campesinos attacked him, in reprisal for the arrest of
their leaders. The chief's wife received some
injuries. In early 1948, for another example,

85
political disturbances in El Tumbador, San Marcos,
culminated in the killing of the town mayor by Indians
from neighboring farms. Some local members of PAR had
allegedly incited the Indians with Marxist demagogy, and
spent several years in jail for their crimes.

Between 1945 and 1951, the Arevalo government
managed to enact only a few reforms that dealt with
land. The government was, however, able to experiment

with cooperatives, collectives, and land grants in the

32

farms under its control. The Arevalo administration

directly administered a number of lands and plantations,
some of which had been confiscated from the dictator and
his followers, while others had been confiscated from
Germans during World War II. In 1949, there were over
100 government controlled farms and plantations, which
supplied about 11% of government income. In one case,
Arevalo himself ordered that the entire farm "Yerba

Buena" be given to the campesinos of Cuilco,

II u 4- 34
Huehuetenango.

Outside of the government farms, the desire for

reform was expressed primarily by ongoing research

projects. Within the Arevalo administration, by February

1946, the Direcci5n General de Colonizaci5n y Tierras,

under the Ministry of Agriculture, was investigating

35
land reform projects. In 1947, Congress created the

86
Comisi5n de Estudios Agrarios , which began its own
investigations on land reform needs. In 1948, Congress
passed the Law of Expropriation, which permitted the
state to seize property, if compensated at a fair price,
in order to satisfy the public material or spiritual
welfare. On December 21, 1949, ostensibly in order to
overcome food shortages after extensive hurricane damage,
the government promulgated the "law of forced rental." It
was the first law to seriously affect landowners, and at
the time it caused great controversy. The law mandated
that landowners who had been renting land for the past
four years must continue renting those lands for two more
years, and rent to peasants at a fair price any land left
uncultivated. The rent could not exceed ten percent of
the farmer's products, paid in money or in kind. Fines
for violation were only 10 to 50 Quetzales, but the law
successfully benefited the renters, and directly led
into more extensive reforms under the next
administration. Other efforts at reform included
colonization programs that tried to mitigate land
problems with population resettlement. Because of

geographic and financial obstacles, few areas were

37
actually colonized.

The failure of the Arevalistas to enact profound

land reforms caused much unhappiness. Typical of the

87
complaints sent to Arevalo was one from the people of San
Miguel Duenas, who by August of 1947 had become
displeased with the government's handling of a local land
dispute. The matter had been passed from the Mi -.ister of
Government, to the Minister of Communications, to
Agriculture, and back to Government, without resolution.
The petitioners praised the President, but damned those
who worked for him. "But, Mr. President, your Ministers
have defrauded you," the petition claimed.

But the progress in bringing the nation
significant land reform went further than the laws
themselves would indicate. Increasing political awareness
in the rural areas resulted from official education
programs and the efforts of political parties and unions.
The land reform issue became widely discussed, in and out
of the government, and specific proposals on land reform
were increasingly made. When the Comite Nacional de
Unidad Sindical (GNUS) presented its detailed plan for
agrarian reform in September, 1949, the result of much
preparation, the nation went into open debate. In 1950, a
special committee in Congress began drawing up its own
comprehensive land reform proposal. The issue of land
reform, it became apparent, had reached maturity.

Arevalo was no wild-eyed radical, nor were the
great majority of the Arevalista reformers. They

dedicated themselves to modernization and social justice
while they rejected extreme measures. Persons of the
far political left find the Arevalista reforms minor,
which they certainly were, compared with, for example,
what Castro would eventually do in Cuba, But the
Arevalistas were serious about changing Guatemala in
major ways. Their goals were high: they expected to
accomplish a lot. They would become very frustrated, and
some would become increasingly radicalized, when success
seemed to elude them.

Notes

1. Herrera, Guatemala, 67.

2. Alvaro Hugo Salguero to Arevalo, August 20,
1946, AGC, Correspondencia del Presidente de la
Republica .

3. Herrera, Guatemala, 72.

4. Edwin W. Bishop, "The Guatemalan Labor
Movement, 1944-1959," (Ph.D. diss.. University of
Wisconsin, 1959), 73-4, 76.

5. Archer C. Bush, "Organized Labor in
Guatemala 1944-1949," (M.A. thesis, Colgate University,
1950) , part 3, pp.49, 53.

6. Ibid. , part 3, p. 38.

7. Bishop, "Guatemalan Labor," 74.

8. Bush, "Organized Labor," part 1, p. 42.

9. Ibid.

89

10. Gerrit Huizer, The Revolutionary Potential
of Peasants in Latin America (Massachusetts, 1972), 137.

11. Bush, "Organized Labor," part 3, pp. 77-78.

12. Suslow, "Social Security," 66.

13. Ibid., 70.

14. Suslow, "Social Reforms," 115.

15. Gilbert E. Larsen to Department of State,
"6-months economic report," NAUS 814,00/8-850.

16. Suslow, "Social Security," 77.

17. Ibid., 286.

18. Bush, "Organized Labor," Appendix B, 2.

19. Max Ricardo Cuenca, "La reforma agraria
democratica en Guatemala," Revista de Guatemala, 7 (March
1947) , 77.

20. No. 3264 clasif icacion 121.1, June 12, 1947,
AGC, Correspondencia del Presidente de la Republica.

21. No. 2832 clasificacion 240,^June, 1946, AGC,
Correspondencia del Presidente de la Republica.

22. No. 1882 clasificacion 42.1, April 12, 1947,
AGC, Correspondencia del Presidente de la Republica.

23. Bishop, "Guatemala Labor," 119.

24. Jim Handy, "The Most Precious Fruit of the
Revolution: The Guatemalan Agrarian Reform, 1952-1954,"
(Article to be published by the Hispanic American
Historical Review), 6.

25. El Popular (Mexico City), Jan. 29, 1945, in
NAUS 814.001/1-3145 no. 22847.

26. Primer Gran Convencion de la Federacion
Sindical de Guatemala, AGC, Ministerio de Gobernacion,
Varies .

27. No. 1690, Feb. 20, 1946, AGC, Ministerio de
Gobernacion, Varios.

90

28. CTG to Arevalo, July 17, 1947, AGC,
Correspondencia del Presidente de la Republica.

29. NAUS OIR5123, p. 52.

30. No. 601, June 4, 1946, AGC, Direcci5n General
de Policia.

31. NAUS 814.00/1-1348 no. 27.

32. Suslow, "£...cial Reforms," 49,68.

33. Gilbert E. Larsen to Department of State,
"6-months economic report," NAUS 814.00/8-850; Jose
M. Ayabar de Soto, Dependency and Intervention: The Case
of Guatemala in 1954 (Boulder, 1978), 128.

34. Acuerdo, May 3, 1947, AGC, Ministerio de
Gobernacion, Correspondencia.

35. No. 001521, Feb. 13, 1946, AGC, Ministerio de
Gobernacion, Varios.

36. Ayabar de Soto, Dependency, 126.

37. Suslow, "Social Reforms," 49,68.

38. Peticion, August 24, 1947, AGC,
Correspondencia del Presidente de la Republica.

CHAPTER 7
THE BREAKDOWN OF REVOLUTIONARY UNITY

The success of the revolutionaries of 1 944 in
destroying the dictatorship had produced much enthusiasm
and hope for a better future, but underneath the shared
desire for modernization and other general goals existed
serious disunity within the Guatemalan polity and
society. Conflict and divisions had long characterized
Guatemalan society, for example between Indians and
ladinos, and between great landlords and the peasants.
Even within rural Indian and peasant communities serious
class divisions had developed. Factional divisions in
Guatemalan national politics had also existed since
Guatemala become an independent nation in 1821. In the
1920s, a largely middle-class movement challenged the
status quo, but Ubico's dictatorship produced an
unwilling peace. Ubico, however, could neither solve
Guatemala's historical divisiveness , nor eliminate the
reformist challenge to the traditional order.

The "revolutionaries" who had united to overthrow
Ubico and Ponce would soon have to contend with serious
disagreement among themselves. Many of these differences

91

92
became sharply apparent during the Constitutional
Assembly of 1945, but hope remained that the various
factions would peacefully coexist, so that democracy
would prevail. However, as Alfonso Guerra Borges
observed, "the particular interests of various groups

became clear and their opposing positions hardened,

2

increasingly so, in the development of events'"

Some Guatemalans speculated that Guatemalan
culture contained an unusually high degree of inherent
contentiousness. In an editorial entitled "Brothers or
Wild Beasts?", El Imparcial claimed: "In other parts of
the world two or more people who are active in different
political groups, or profess different ideologies, can
discuss, fight verbally in the courts or in the press;
but in private or social matters are good friends, or at
least they respect each other." But not in Guatemala. All
points of contention become personal, a "matter of honor
and injured self-love." Prejudice and hate create
mountains out of mole hills. The reasoning behind the
argument loses importance, and reasoning "can go to the
devil," for the only matter that counts "is the quantity

of insults, affronts, or calumnies that one accumulates

3
against the adversary." Mary Holleran, a visitor to

Guatemala during Arevalo's presidency, had her own view.

"Perhaps because the ladino is a racial mixture, blended

93
of the old world and the new, possessing a split
personality, he suffers more from an inferiority complex
than anyone else, I think perhaps, in the world. He is an
extremist in everything. It is practically impossible to
carry on a reasonable argument with him, for, rather than
face the inevitable and logical conclusions, he will
change the subject and go off on a tangent." These
views are, of course, overly harsh. They reflect,
however, the volatility which characterized the breakdown
of revolutionary unity.

Age differences may have contributed to the
breakdown of revolutionary unity. Men and women of all
ages joined the revolution, and all ages could be found
all over the political spectrum. But it became clear
that a deep divide existed between some younger and older
revolutionaries; in particular between the so-called
"generation of 1920" and the "generation of 1944," with
the younger group demanding immediate changes and the
older group speaking for caution and restraint. Personal
ideology and political tactics played roles in this
"generation gap," but a struggle for leadership between
the two age groups was also inherent in the conflict.

The appellation, "generation of 1920," identified
the group that in their youth had contributed to the
overthrow of Estrada Cabrera in 1920, and then worked for

94
reform in the 1920s. Part of this generation had suffered
years of imprisonment and exile while some had managed to
fit in or co-exist with the Ubico dictatorship. In
general, the "generation of 1920" had been, and remained,
less zealous than the young of 1944. Clemente Marroquin
Rojas, an outstanding "1920" member, admitted in a
newspaper article in 1945 that the 1920 generation had
emphasized the concept of "liberty," but had not
developed deep patriotic notions about Guatemala as a
whole. The youth of 1944, however, embraced nationalism
and were "more penetrated with duty." Causes not
championed by the 1920 generation included the uplifting
of the Indian, land reform, and the readjustment of
wealth between the rich and poor. These older
revolutionaries, had, however, played a key role in
bringing down the dictator, and in creating the new
government. Eight members of the 1920 generation, for
example, had served on the Constituent Assembly's 15
member drafting committee: Francisco Villagran, Jorge
Garcia Granados, Jose Falla Aris, Manuel de Leon Cordona ,
Jorge Adan Serrano, Clemente Marroquin Rojas, David Vela,
and Luis Alberto Paz y Paz. The years of their births
were, respectively: 1897, 1900, 1897, 1896, 1897, 1897,
1901 , 1894.

95
Part of the "Generation of 1920," including
Guillermo Flores Avendano and Adan Manrique Rios, had
opposed the Arevalista movement from the beginning.
Indeed, whether members of the "Generation of 1920" or
not, the great majority of those who led the opposition
against Arevalo were of relatively advanced age. Adrian
Recinos, who placed second in the 1944 presidential race,
was 58 years old, and Manuel Maria Herrera (3rd place)
was about the same.

The greatest amount of zealous energy came from
the young; the "generation of 1944." The young, in
particular the university students and young
professionals, had given the revolution its overwhelming
numbers, in part because they themselves were many, in
part because they helped organize those workers who had
taken part in the fight. In the words of an El Imparcial
article, written 30 years after the October revolution,
"significant elements of the generation of 1920"
participated in the revolution and the "confusing chain"
of events that followed, but this generation was greatly
overshadowed by the Arevalismo of the young and the
popular masses, i.e. "that impressive phenomenon that
more than a political phenomenon was a social
phenomenon.

96
It had been the political parties primarily
consisting of young members, FPL and RN, that had
nominated Arevalo, and these parties had worked the
hardest to elect him. Arevalo, in truth, owed his
presidency to the young, and as President he did his best
to nurture and promote youth in the political process.
Even before his nomination, he wrote glowing opinions on
the potential of young leadership to bring culture and
modernization to Latin America. Marroquin Rojas, writing
15 years after the Revolution, noted Arevalo' s own
relative youth. "In those days Arevalo was a boy of
middle age, ambitious to make a difference, without
children to defend, with little in the way of family

Q

roots: in a nutshell, he epitomized the young." The
1944 generation, however, without Arevalo' s help, had
already carved out for itself a large section of the

political power structure. The first Congress had no

9
less than 44 students, out of 68 members in total, and

FPL and RN were Guatemala's largest and most powerful

political parties. By one count, the average age of

1 0
Congressmen in 1950 was still only 35 years.

Derisively labeled "los chiquilines" ("brash

youngsters" or "young idiots") by their critics, the

energetic youth that filled the new government angered

and irritated many of the 1920 generation. Marroquin

97

Rojas called the Arevalistas "a virgin youth,
passionate, blind, imbued with the liberty recently won
by the entire nation, and, of course, leftist."''^ "Los
chiquilines, " he claimed, would allov/ into their group
only those of the same generation, and they caused "first
Silva Peha, then Garcia Granados, then Jorge Toriello,
and finally Doctor Julio Bianchi and myself" to be
expelled from the Arevalo government.

The "generation of 1920" did not deny the extreme
importance of the youth movement in the overthrow of
Ubico and Ponce, but they believed that their own role
had also been instrumental. (Which it fact it had been.)

"Those of '20 were the soul of the movement of '44,"

1 3
wrote Epaminondas Quintana (b.1896). Members of the

1920 generation claimed that it had been their own

political party, Partido Social Democratico, that had

first organized to combat Ubico, and it had been they who

helped organize and finance the young. Carlos Samayoa

Chinchilla (b.1898) complained that the young's rejection

of the older generation, even those who had remained

honorable under Ubico and had helped in his overthrow,

caused the initial revolutionary front to divide into two

sections, one "formed by men who were older,

,15

This

older group of men often reached back to glorify their

98

own youthful revolutionary days of 1920, as they also
continually defended their role in the 1944 revolution.

Young revolutionaries felt themselves part of a
movement that was separate from the older, generally more
cautious reformers. Marco Antonio Villamar Contreras,
who was 18 years old in 1944, claims that the young had
great confidence in their cause and in their own purity,
while they found it difficult to trust the older
politicians, especially those "elders" who had not been

1 ft

exiled under Ubico. Arturo Cruz noted that "the old

1 7
politicians," were the enemies of the revolution.

Throughout the Arevalo period, the young received much

praise, from both government and private publications,

for their role in the overthrow of the dictatorship and

1 ft
their subsequent role in government. Many of the young

felt particularly proud of their overwhelming

participation in the October revolution. "VJe students

1 9
moved the first rock," wrote Mario Silva Jonama . Oscar

Benitez admits that his generation came to power with

innocence and immaturity, but believes that they

therefore had not developed arts of cunning and cajolery,

like older politicians. Instead, says Benitez, the young

were filled with deep patriotism, nationalism, and

exemplary honor.

20

99

Fear of the consequences of the participation of
Indians and workers in the revolution and the reform
movement caused additional conflict within the middle and
upper classes. Some reformers, particularly the far left
followers of Arevalo, advocated a large political role
for the masses, while more cautious Guatemalans feared
that Indians and workers who became politically active
could become overly demanding and violent. They believed
the masses were prone to unrealistic expectations and
class conflict, as demonstrated in several incidents just
before the Revolution. On September 14, 1944, for
example, thousands of campesinos, armed with clubs,
marched in the streets of the capital, cheering thi
Liberal party and General Ponce, who had promised land to
those who would support him. The fears of many came true
when, with the fall of Ponce, large numbers of Indians in
Patzicia, in the department of Chimaltenango, attacked
ladinos with hatchets, clubs, and machetes. As they
cheered for Ponce, the Indians knocked down the doors of
houses, and murdered women, children, and men. Great
potential for violence existed, claimed El_jmearcial ,
when demagogues used Indians as a "blind instrument" to
obtain political power. ^^ ^3 explained in the previous
chapter, "agitators" during the Arevalo period would

1 00
continue to rally the workers and caoipesinos to greater
political action, and sometimes violence.

Disagreements broke out most forcefully and
clearly over the differences xn professed political
ideology-which could be based on greed, ambition, social
and racial prejudice, or fear of turmoxl and change, as
well as on sincerely felt ideological beliefs, in the
political jargon of the day, terms labeling the
pro-government forces included ArevaUstas, communxsts,
the "official parties," and revolutionaries. Those who
did not support Arevalo might be called conservatives,
liberals, Falangists, cachurecos (members of the old
pro-church Conservative Party), and reactionaries. During
Arevalo 's presidency, the most commonly used terms were
"revolutionaries," i.e. Arevalista political parties
(FPL, RN, PAR), and "reactionaries," i.e. those opposed
to the government. An objective analysis of Guatemala's
political differences, however, should employ a larger
number of labels than revolutionary and reactionary.

Alfonso Sol5rzano has argued that at the end of
Ubico's dictatorship, the long-dominant Liberal Party
had divided into three wings, while remnants of the
Conservative Party still existed. One wing of Liberals
constituted the Ubico faction, another wing contained
conservative, traditionally minded men who had been

1 01
outside or only on the margin of Ubico's favored group.
The third wing, which Solorzano called "neoliberals , "

was made up largely of educated, middle-class people who

22
desired reforms leading to democracy. The remnants of

the old Conservative Party, although no longer grouped in

a political party of that name, had been enemies of Ubico

2 3
but were traditionally minded and fearful of change.

The anti-Ubico Liberals and the Conservative remnants

joined in opposition to Ubico, but only the

"neo-Liberals" largely supported Arevalo for President.

After the revolution, the problems between traditional

Liberals and Conservatives meant little in the face of

24
class conflict and the danger of uncontrolled change.

Guatemalans who never desired Arevalo for

President, and who refused (or were not allowed) to work

in his government, constituted the original opposition of

1944 and 1945. Arevalo' s opposition, however, did not

remain static, for a significant number of

revolutionaries who had supported Arevalo at first, or

had at least accepted Arevalo 's victory and were willing

to give the new government a chance, would eventually

become part of the opposition. The identification of

various political groupings, however, cannot make clear

the apparent mixing of disparate ideologies in certain

individuals, or the tendency of some individuals to

102
straddle categories. Some outstanding personalities would
fall between the cracks of any classification. The time
factor is also difficult to elucidate, but it is
important to remember that the opposition expanded
continuously between 1945 and 1951.

In the main, the original opposition group
represented the traditionally oriented, large landowners,
the Church, and conservative elements in the armed
forces. Some of them had signed their names to
anti-Ubico petitions, and had joined political groups
that voiced democratic ideas. Many, however, had joined
the revolution with trepidation, or not at all, and all
became worried when the young and the workers unleashed
the power of Arevalismo. Arevalo's original opposition
would include Manuel Cobos Batres, from a traditional
landowner family linked to the old Conservative Party.
Cobos Batres, born in 1878, had fought against
ex-Presidents Estrada Cabrera, Orellana, Ubico, and
finally, Arevalo and Arbenz.^^ Guillermo Flores Avendaho ,
a conservative ex-army colonel who finished fourth in the
1944 presidential elections, was a member of the
"generation of 1920" (b. 1898), had signed the famous
"311" petition asking for Ubico' s resignation, and had
advocated reform for the urban and rural workers. He
would suffer jail and exile under Arevalo, and he would

1 03
be second in command of the "Liberation" forces that
ousted Arbenz in 1954.

Arevalo's opposition, as noted above, continued to
grow as some who at first had supported or accepted his
government lost faith. Those who dropped out of the
government coalition continued to identify themselves
with the ideals of the revolution, only arguing that
Arevalo's policies had opened the nation to communist
infiltration. As explained by David Vela, editor of the
conservative El Imparcial; "We did not know" that the
civic movement of 1944 contained a nationalist tint
in the "political style of Mao-Tse-Tung. "^^ By 1949,
those revolutionaries who desired reform at a slower or
more controlled pace had left the pro-government forces,
and formed part of the opposition.

Eugenic Silva Peha was one such outstanding
revolutionary who dropped out of the Arevalo camp. One
of the "generation of 1920" (b. 1896), he had continued
with an active political career since 1920, and played an
important role in Ubico's downfall. He served on the
1945 Constituent Assembly, and was minister without
portfolio under the Junta. In 1947, he resigned his
position as minister of foreign relations because of
disagreements with Arevalo's foreign policy, especially

104
Arlvalo's decision to break relations with the
dictatorships in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic."

Arevalo's .ost prolific critic in the "drop-out"
category would be elements Marro,u£n Rojas, founder and
editor Of L^jiora. Originally a candidate for President
in 1944, Marroquin had admitted faUure before the
elections, and committed himself and h.s followers to
Arevalo. The alliance seemed natural enough, since
in 1944 ia_Jiora appeared to be sincerely revolutionary,
proposing national integration of the Indian and other
Changes. Soon, however, Marroguxn developed a fear of
Marxist trends in government. He warned in 1946 that
Marxism is an "octopus which sucks the life out of the
worker with more cruelty and harshness than the
traditional landowner." Mexico, he claimed, had not
embraced Marxism, but had "magnificent laws" to protect
the workers. Unfortunately in Guatemala, "The youngsters
Of PAR, Just babes in woods on political matters, have
unwittingly fallen under the Marxist spell, and will be
used in the Marxist ga^e."^^ „„,^g„,^ ^^^.^^^ ^^^^ ^^
had to give up the post of Minister of Agriculture
because Arevalo had bonded himself to a leftist ideology
that he "little understood."" Marrogurn and Lajora
would be Arevalo's constant critics; Marroguin himself
entered the Congress on an opposition ticket in 1949.

105
Not only older revolutionaries dropped out of the
Arevalo government. Mario Efrain Najera Farfan, just 20
years old in October, 1944, came from the well-to-do
landowning class and had been a founder of RN. He served
the Arevalo government in various capacities, including
high positions in the Ministerio de Hacienda and the
Ministerio de Gobierno. After 1947, he would work for
Arevalo no more, and eventually he would serve Castillo
Armas .

The majority of the revolutionaries who remained
pro-government, including Arevalo himself, fit in the
moderate leftist category, championing a new Guatemala
but neither Marxism nor unfettered expectations. Manuel
Galich expressed attitudes common to this group when he
warned against extremism and against those who harbored
an "impatience for progress." Education, he claimed,
"would solve the worst of Guatemala's problems. "^° In a
like manner, the FPL newspaper. El Libertador. cautioned
against expectations of immediate transformation, and in
one article of January 9, 1945, for example, claimed
that even a revolution cannot make a total change in
society overnight. ^^ These moderate leftists shared some
of the fears of the opposition, in the belief that too
much reform too quickly might bring about civil disorder
and economic turmoil, or even lead to communism. They

106
did not wish the masses to get out of control and
generate a revolution of their own. Examples of this
group were Oscar Barrios Castillo, Oscar Benitez, Raul
Osequeda, and Ricardo Asturias Valenzuela. The far left,
many of whom were attracted to various degrees of
Marxism, continued to support Arevalo, but always
demanded more rapid and more comprehensive changes and a
greater political role for the masses. Victor Manuel
Gutierrez, Enrique Muhoz Meany, Manuel Pinto Usaga, and
Jose Manuel Fortuny would be examples of this group.

The two great issues of the Arevalo period, labor
reform and land reform (explained in Chapter 6), became
very visible cruxes during the breakdown of revolutionary
unity. In the words of Manuel Galich, the issue of the
labor code "created the meridian"that divided the
political left from the political right: those in favor,

those opposed. All had been Revolutionaries, in the

32
main, "until one day before." The issue of land reform

also quickened the breakdown of unity, ultimately

prompting Jacobo Arbenz in 1952 to declare that "Agrarian

Reform has drawn the classic line in the sand: on one

side those who are definitely with the Revolution and on

the other side those who are definitely against the

Revolution." In fact, the process of revolutionary

breakdown occurred steadily, under both Arevalo and

107
Arbenz, with each of the two reforms causing great
conflict and disunity in the overall Guatemalan polity.

In sum, the Revolutionaries of 1944 soon had to
contend with their serious differences. The initial
revolutionary unity soon broke apart, mainly xnto two
large camps composed of pro- and anti-government forces,
but also into a myriad of smaller factions. The
political record and the ideological viewpoints of the
individual participants are not always clear, as personal
ambitions, and revolutionary "drop outs" tend to confuse
the picture. Viperous accusations and condemnations,
produced in great number and hurled in all directions,
further cloud the reality.

Who, then, were the "good guys" and the "bad
guys"? Who deserves the blame for the breakdown of
revolutionary unity? The position of each group was
clear: the "other side" deserved the blame. El
Ilimarcial, in an editorial of 1950, summed up the
opposition view. Demagogues had broken the hitherto good
relations between labor and management, which had been
bringing steady improvement for the workers, with the
bosses' blessing. Campesinos and workers came to believe
only forced social reform would succeed. The government
had fallen in line with these demagogues, and anyone who
did not agree with the demagogues was a "reactionary."

108
The government forces operated with threats, insults,
discriminations, which led to conflict, turmoil, and
violence. If the government had been reasonable and
fair, "all the internal problems would have been resolved
easily and the current situation would be dif f erent . "^'^
On their part, the groups that remained loyal to the
government simply claimed that their adversaries could
not be trusted to voluntarily accept any significant
reforms, and they blamed the new and old opposition for
constant intrigues that aimed to slow down or destroy the
reform movement.

Jorge Garcia Granados, with apparent
justification, castigated both the opposition and the
government. In a 1946 interview, Garcia stated that both
sides lacked "generosity and tolerance," and "when the
government stumbles or commits an error, no matter how
small, the opposition exaggerates that error," while "the

government itself abounds with men of thin skin, those

3 5
who accept absolutely no criticism." Garcia' s

criticism contained much truth, although he ignored the

fact that both sides defended deeply felt points of

view, on matters of tremendous importance for the future

of Guatemala. In any case, and in spite of the disunity

and political turmoil, most Guatemalans believed that the

current political reality was immensely better than under

109

Ubico. Only a few would have agreed with Ubxco himself,
who was currently living xn luxurious exxle, with his dog
"Indio," and continuing to expound on his favorite theme:
"Only I can govern Guatemala . "^^

Notes

Guatemala: P^sfnts a"„^d"Tol'ftTjs uZT'^^'.^ , . ^"

(ly/b), 457; Handy, "Revolution," 16-17, 32-33. ^■'

25, 1949,

"dHermanos o fieras?" El Imparcial. Oct

(New York, 1 949 ^ S!^""^"' ^^^^^^ and State 1 n_Guaternala

5. Clements Marroaufn Rn-i^o "t -, ~

920," La Hora. March 15, [9I5' p!?^ ' ^ ^^^eracion del

6. Mario Monteforte Toledo, La Revolucion, 8-9.
^- El Imparcial , July 27, 1974.

bienes ^de or'^^^'I'f^te Ma_^rroquin Rojas, "Devueltos los
t^ienes de Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo," La Hora . March ^6,

9. Silvert, A Study in Government. 131.
(Wilton!°Conne:ticut,'795lTT ^-^^^^^-^^^^-iiL_Guatema^

11. Marroquin, "La generacion," 5

nove„ai|-3.„o"L"I?rno";LXl?..-'S!|i^--,-f3rt??l?

1 10

13. Epaminondas Quintana, Historia de la
qeneracion de 1 920 (Guatemala), 367.

14. Ibid., 354; Derrocamiento de una tirania
(Guatemala, 1966), 11, 36.

15. Carlos Samayoa Chinchilla, El quetzal no es
rojo (Guatemala, 1956), 83-4.

16. Marco Antonio Villamar Contreras, interview
with author, Guatemala City, July 17, 1987.

17. Arturo Caniz "La Revolucion y sus enemigos,"
Accion, 9 (June 1949), 3.

18. E.g. Arevalo, Escritos politicos, 392-4;
Medardo Mejia, Juan Jose Arevalo o el humanismo en la
presidencia ( Guatemala, 1 951 ) , 6~; Luis Cardoza y Aragon,
foreword to El hombre y la encrucijada by Enrique Muhoz
Meany (Guatemala, 1950), ix.

19. Mario Silva Jonama , "Guatemala nina
rebelde," Diario de la Mariana, Oct. 23, 1949, p. 8.

20. Oscar Benitez, interview with author,
Guatemala City, July 1, 1987.

21. El Imparcial (Guatemala), Oct. 25, 1944,
p. 3; also Sept. 15, p.1; Oct 24, p. 3; Oct 26, p. 3.

22. Solorzano, "Factores economicos," 45-6.

23. Ibid., 48.

24. Ibid., 48-49.

25. "Brillante historial patriotico,"
Imparcial, April 6, 1953.

El

26. David Vela, foreword to Tacticas rojas en
las Americas, by Daniel James (Mexico City, 1955), v.

5, 1967

27. Ramon Blanco, "Galera," El Imparcial, Oct,

28. Clemente Marroquin Rojas, "El primer frenazo
en seco," La Hora, Jan. 28, 1946, p. 3.

1 1 1

29. Clemente Marroquin Rojas, "Francisco Valdes
Calderon," LaHora, April 13, 1977.

30
dispatch .

NAUS 814,00/4-2445. Quotes in Embassy

31 . "Una revolucion es obra del tiempo y el
esfuerzo incesante," El Libertador, Jan. 9, 1945, p. 3.

32

33

Galich, Por que lucha, 73.

Arbenz ,

Inf orme

al

conqreso--1 953 ,

(Guatemala City, 1953), p. 6; quoted in Jim Handy, "Most
Precious," 17-18.

34. El Imparcial, Oct. 19, 1950.

35. "Garcia Granados deja en el enigma los
motivos de su llegada al pais," El Imparcial, March 9,
1946, p.1 .

36

El Imparcial, March 12, 1946, p.1.

CHAPTER 8
AREVALISTAS VS. THE OPPOSITION,
1 945-1949

Between 1945 and 1949, as the reformers advanced
on their path to transform the economic and social
structure of Guatemala, the forces of conservatism grew
larger and more organized. Two significant
characteristics of the conflict between the government
and opposition stand out: one, the conflict would be,
from the beginning, bitter, intransigent, and often
violent; and, two, the size of the opposition, and the
intensity of it, would increase over time. These years
demonstrated little desire for compromise as violence
and the threat of violence continued to characterize
political events. The government and the opposition both
blamed each other for first precipitating the malice and
fury that marked Arevalo's presidency. Many of the
political events during the Arevalo period,
however, remain tainted with mystery because of the many
conflicting accusations, the large numbers of rumors,
lies, exaggerations, secret agreements and pacts. In
fact, the "first shot" had been fired long ago, before
the time of Ubico, and the firing had never stopped. The

112

113
revolution of October 20, and the Arevalo era, were
the continuation of Guatemala's long struggle to discard
the colonial past. The tradition of authoritarianism, xn
growing conflict with the developing tradition of reform
and modernization, had spawned an intense conflict that
allowed for little recognition of legitimate rule, except
that rule which sustained itself by power.

The Arevalistas often called those who opposed the
government "reactionaries." m its strongest sense,
"reactionaries" indicated the groups and individuals who
"reacted" to the Arevalo reform movement with intrigue
and violence, in an effort to throw out the Arevalistas
and regain a style of government closer to the Ubico
standard. But the term "reactionary" became commonly
used to depict all of Arevalo's opposition, even if such
opposition eschewed violence, or simply wanted a halt to
reform (rather than a return to Ubico), or agreed to
continued reform but insisted on gradual implementation.
AS already noted, Arevalo's principal opposition included
many of the great landowners and the wealthy class in
general, the Church hierarchy, and some conservative
members of the military. The United States should also be
considered a part of the extreme opposition, but the U.S.
role in Guatemala will be treated in Chapters 11 and 14.
Eventually, many or the revolutionaries who dropped out

11 4
of the Arevalo camp and joined the opposition would also
be termed "reactionaries," even though they continued to
advocate reforms. It would be a mistake, of course, to
consider the opposition a united, monolithic force.

The opposition would never achieve a strong
solidarity, for the various groups had a variety of aims,
tactics, and leaders. Political organizations often
remained for only a short duration. Opposition groups by
1948, however, would become somewhat larger and better
organized.^ In 1948, wealthy landowners and business
leaders founded three anti-Arevalo groups: the Liga
Democratica Guatemalteca Contra el Comunismo, the
Asociacion Civica Anti-Comunista , and the Uni5n Nacional
Electoral. A United States intelligence report of 1950
noted that available information on these groups was "far
too sketchy to permit an evaluation of their strength,
influence, or relationship, "^ but it is unlikely they
had a large membership; they certainly had very little
popular appeal. One of the more successful opposition
parties, the Union Civica, which represented both staunch
conservatives and disillusioned moderates, claimed a
20,000 membership;^ most likely an inflated number. Also
in 1948, two management organizations, the Camara de
Comercio y Industria (CCI) and the Asociacion General de
Agricultores (AGA) became at least nominally allied. The

115
AGA represented conservative landowners, and the CCI,
which consisted of the c£mara de Comercio and the
Asociaci5n General de Industrias (AGI), endeavored to
guard the interests of Guatemalan industry. In July
1949, in preparation for the upcoming Presidential
elections, several opposition parties, including the
Partido Unificaci5n Anticomunista ( PUA ) and Union
Patri5tica (UP), joined in the Bloque Politico de
Oposici5n. However, the opposition parties all together
failed to attract a large following, and could not elect
more than about 20% of the total congressmen during the
Arevalo period.

Part of the wealthy landowning and business class
found a measure of unity with the Falange Espanola en
Guatemala, the Guatemalan arm of the Spanish Falange.
The Falange was prohibited legal status under ArSvalo,
but continued to be an influence among the opposition.
While compiling a list of possible enemies, Arevalo's
police found that over 100 persons had given money to the
Falange in 1938 and 1939.^ According to Rafael Delgado,
about 1000 Spaniards lived in Guatemala, 600 of whom were
Falangistas.

The Church, meaning primarily the upper hierarchy,
and about 120 priests, remained closely allied with the
wealthy opposition and the Falange.^ Led by Archbishop

1 16
Mariano Rossell Arellano, appointed to his office on
the recommendation of Jorge Ubico, the Church actively
worked to undermine the Arevalo regime. The laws of
Guatemala prohibited Church participation in politics,
but the Arevalo government's occasional weak efforts to
silence Church criticism met with little success. The

official Church publication Verbum, founded in 1942,

7
immediately adopted a solid pro-Franco stance, and after

the revolution bitterly opposed the Arevalo government.

Accion Social Cristiana, a semi-official Church political

weekly published from 1945 by Church supporters, "was

devoted to advancing the position and prestige of the

Q

Church and to defending the economic status quo." The

first issue bemoaned the plight of the Church, and warned

9
that world communism was spreading. In February, 1945,

the weekly claimed that a "dangerous beast" walked the

streets of Guatemala, and that religious freedom was in

1 0
peril. Politics also became apart of the Sunday

service, as the pulpit often served the clergy as a soap

box from which to criticize the government. When

ex-dictator Jorge Ubico died, the Archbishop conducted a

1 1
very elaborate Requiem mass. Considering that Ubico was

the symbol of everything the Arevalistas fought to

displace, a special mass at his death could be

interpreted as a tacit protest against the Revolution.

117
The Church, however, commanded an uncertain degree
of influence in Guatemala and the actual effect Church
propaganda had in weakening or slowing the reform
movement remains unknown. The vast riches once held by
the Church had been lost during the nineteenth century,

and by 1944 the Church had been reduced to a state of

1 2
near poverty. The hierarchy had little influence over

the Indian population, and in the urban centers,

1 3
generally only women were deeply affected by religion.

Church pressure on women voters may have been responsible

for the election of the conservative candidate, Martin

1 4
Prado Velez, as the mayor of Guatemala City in 1949.

At the very least, the Church gave the opposition a

rallying point based in the morality and tradition of

religion; an important point by itself.

The forces of the opposition, in total,

constituted a formidable obstacle to the Arevalo reform

movement. The most recalcitrant elements had tried from

the beginning to overthrow the Arevalo government; in

fact, plots and coup attempts had been made against the

Junta. ^^ In 1945, the U.S. Federal Bureau of

1 fi
Investigation reported that Arevalo faced true danger.

Estimates of attempted coups against Arevalo

usually vary between 28 and 32, although Arevalo' s

enemies claimed that the government invented most of

1 18
them, as an excuse to eliminate political opponents.
Ram5n Blanco, of El Imparcial. claimed that during

Arevalo's term, no more than five actual coup attempts

1 7
were made. Mario Monteforte Toledo believed there

were 27 coup attempts, but that only four of them were

serious enough to bring out both the army and the

civilian Arevalista supporters .'' ^ One of the major

abortive plots against the government ended on June 24,

1946, when the police arrested eighty to one hundred

persons, including political party leaders and an

ex-presidential candidate, Col. Guillermo Flores

1 9
Avendano. The most serious event was the small civil

war in July 1949, caused by the killing of the Chief of
the Armed Forces.

Extremist civilian leaders of the opposition put
most of their hope for a successful coup in the
conservative elements of the armed forces, who were the
only Guatemalans capable of defeating the Arevalo
government by military force. The wealthy classes
therefore used their power and influence to recruit
military officers to the opposition cause. Military men,
some of whom had been discharged after the fall of the
dictatorship, often had leadership roles in opposition
schemes and maneuvers, including ex-Col. Mariano Casado
who failed in a coup attempt in December, 1948. The

1 19
opposition forces also beseeched the U.S. government to
help. In the words of Arevalo, "They have pounded on the
doors of the Department of State in Washington, "^°
although in fact all recorded contact found by this
author took place at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala . ^ ""

The Arevalistas did everything in their power to
counter the opposition, and thus continue their programs
of reform. Arevalista response to the opposition was
immediate. In April 1945, the government forced at
least 22 men into exile including former presidential
candidates Manuel Maria Herrera and Adrian Recinos; in

June, 20 men. In July, Arevalo banned three opposition

22

political parties. At the end of the year, the

Ministry of Government reported that 72 men in total had

been sent into exile in 1945, which included exiles

2 3
decreed by the Junta. The Arevalo government often

curbed constitutional guarantees in order to combat the

opposition. A legal restriction of guarantees was made

possible by Article 138 of the Constitution, which

stipulated that the President must issue a decree, signed

by the entire cabinet, to be approved by the Congress. ^"^

On April 9, 1945, Constitution Articles 25, 35, 37, 43,

and 48 were suspended for 30 days, justified by coup

attempts against the government. These articles had,

among other things, prohibited exile, censorship of

120
private mail and papers, arbitrary entry of private
domain, and arbitrary arrest. The government again
suspended some constitutional guarantees for the months
of October and November. Indeed, during approximately
one-half of the total presidential period, i.e. three

years, the Arevalo government put restrictions on

2 S
constitutional guarantees.

Also in 1945, Arevalo undertook some in-house

cleaning, in a struggle to establish himself as the

2 ft
executive in charge. His struggle would result in the

elimination of some key conservative revolutionaries, and

produce the first group of "drop outs" that would expand

the forces of the opposition. Arevalo, of course, had

from the beginning a strong base of power. Besides the

powers of the presidential office, Arevalo had a Congress

that was roughly 2/3 Arevalista, plus the largest and

best organized of the political parties and unions

which strongly backed the President, as did the

Guatemalan electorate in general. But in March 1945,

no one knew if the untried, inexperienced president would

prove to be an effective head of state, or if he could

overcome the strong influences of the ex-Junta members

and other outstanding leaders of the Revolution.

The Arevalo administration, as set up in March,

represented a compromise between the various political

121
forces. Ar^valo's first cabinet, as had the cabinet under
the Junta, consisted of moderate revolutionaries, leftist
revolutionaries, and conservative revolutionaries. The
leftists, in general, wanted far-reaching reforms
implemented at a fast pace; the conservatives wanted only
minor, well controlled reforms; and the moderates looked
to long-term goals and reforms with gradual
implementation. Adolfo Almengor, a political
conservative, filled the post of minister of government.
Enrique Muhoz Meany, a highly capable, respected, and
sincere reformist of the political left, became minister
of foreign relations. Manuel Noriega Morales, Guatemala's
outstanding economist, a technocrat and largely
apolitical, was named minister of economy. Rafael Perez
de Leon, a moderate and a technocrat, took the
post of minister of communications and public works.
Manuel Galich, a charismatic member of the FPL and a
leftist, became minister of education. Dr. Julio
Bianchi, an FPL moderate and one of the "generation of
1920," received the ministerial post of public health and
social assistance. Roberto Guirola, a young member of the
constitutional assembly, and a successful finca owner and
operator, became minister of agriculture. Ex-Junta
members Jorge Toriello and Jacobo Arbenz became,
respectively, minister of finance and minister of

defense. The Supreme Court judges also represented a „ix
Of political views. ^'^

Arevalo's first in-house hurdle would be Jorge
Toriello. AS minister of finance, Jorge Toriello took a
conservative stance, and he soon openly opposed the
reformist rntentions of the ne« president. As one
observer described it, "fro. the very first, Arevalo and
Torlello declared war."^^ Toriello established his own
political party, the Partido de la Revoluci5n, supported
by a party newspaper named La Revolucinn on May 16,
1945, the first issue of La_Reyolucion called tor an end

to labor demands. ^^ Bv AnauQi- ^Q^K

ay August 1945 rumors grew that

Jorge Toriello would soon attf.mr.i-

soon attempt a coup against

Arevalo ^°

Jorge's ambition to destroy Arevalo gradually lost

favor amongst even his fellow conservatives, who

perceived in him an extreme personal desire for power.

Many became offended by his extremist and hard-nosed

attitudes, as did officials at the United States

Embassy.31 Toriello reportedly asked Chief of the Armed

Forces Francisco Arana for help but diH r,^^

utixp, Dut aid not succeed in

obtaining it. Without the military's backing, Toriello
had little hope of success, and Arevalo obtained his
resignation nearly a month later, on January 10, 1946.
Arivalo would continue to name conservatives to his

123
cabinet, but none so dangerous as Jorge Toriello, who
would regain after his resignation Arevalo's constant

enemy .

Arevalo also succeeded in ousting Col. Miguel

Angel Mendoza, chiet of the national poUce, who had been

an important .ember of the revolution, but was not fond

of the leftists. Mendoza entangled himself rn a scandal

"hen a policeman beat up Minister ot Education Manuel

Galich, in August ,945. Supporters of the popular Galich

strongly protested and accused the police chief of using

his power to intimidate his enemies. As a result,

Arevalo gained the grounds to force Mendoza 's resignation

in September. Arevalo was, after all th=

, aiL«r ail, the supreme

commander of the police chiet, „ho worked for the
minister of government. Arevalo thereafter approved only
trusted Arevalistas for the police command, ensuring that
the police would remain a constant source of power for
the President. Mendoza joined the growing ranks of the
opposition, and would be jailed in May 1948, for his
participation in a plot against the government.

under Arevalo, the structure of the national
police became more elaborate, as the government tried to
™ake the police force stronger, more efficient and
modern. The force, which in early ,946 consisted of
2,355 national policemen, ^^ had been divided into two

124
iT^ain organizatxons: the Guardia Civil and the Guardia
Judicial, both of which were then divided into a number
of sub-sections with particular duties. withm the
Guard.a Judicial, there existed the security poUce
(Guardia de Seguridad), which was "absolutely secret,"
with the duties to investigate and arrest anyone
dangerous to Guatemalan security. These officers would
only identify themselves when makxng an arrest, and daily
reports would be made to the Ministry of Government and
the President. 33 The ministry did not want the
post-revolution secret police confused with that of
Ubico, which had been a hated instrument of the
d.ctator-s repress£on.34 ;,,4,,i,.3 opposition, however,
accused Arevalo's police of using similar, Ubico-style
tactics, and they continued to call the police "ears," as
had been done under Ubico, to signify the spying aspects

of police duty. Some opponents of ^-h^

wjjpunents of the government

furthermore accused the government of physical
mistreatment and even torture, including ice torture and
electric shock, ^= although this author found no evidence
or strong indications of police abuse of such magnitude.

Police archives for 1945 and 1946 record the
arrests of dozens of citizens, charged with insulting or
denigrating the government or the police. It remains
unclear if they were subsequently convicted in court, and

125
it remains unclear if these arrests continued after 1946.
Exact reasons for the arrests, as reported on the police
forms, vary from case to case, but the following cases,
taken from October, November, and December of 1945, are
typical: October 15, drunk and saying bad things about
the government; October 13, insulted the police; October

17, insulted the President and the government; October

18, insulted the President; October 22, lamented that the
previous month's plot failed to overthrow the government,
and said, among other things, "it is a lie that there is
liberty in Guatemala"; November 4, insulted the President
and said other untrue things; November 17, called the
police "wretched ears"; November 19, insulted the police;
December 19, a policeman had suddenly come across him, as
he insulted the President with dirty words.

The men arrested in the above cases apparently
were common men, with no outstanding political
importance. The arrests usually appear to have been
spontaneous, and not the result of previous
investigation, although this was not always the case:
Dr. Miguel Angel Muhoz Ochoa , a prominent physician
listed in Guatemala's "Who is Who" of 1944, was arrested
only after he had criticized the government for several
days.^^ Some have called such arrests "stupid doings" of
the individual policemen. And certainly many were not

o

g

p

126
arrested who criticized Arevalo and the government, in
public and in the press.

The police watched, or "spied," on a great number
f people, and their reports were sent to the minister of
overnment and the President. In particular, the police
watched men and women who had participated in subversion
or rebellion, or seemed to show a likelihood of doing so
in the future. In the summer of 1946, for example, the
olice carefully watched, and followed, Abraham Cabrera
Cruz, Francisco Montenegro, Alejandro Arenales, and Adan
Manrique Rios, all of whom were important, and dangerous,
political opponents of Arevalo. ^^

It was not uncommon, however, for the police to

report on persons who only spoke ill of the government,

or who had joined political parties of the opposition.

Any show of pro-Ubico sentiment caused the government

alarm. Once, the police reported that at a mass given for

Jorge Ubico, the priest had been "very sentimental"

during the sermon, "extolling" Ubico, and calling him "a

true friend." The priest had said that "ears" were

probably present, but he did not care.''^ ^ocal police

reported everything that might indicate the existence of

government enemies. When the Juez de Paz and the

Intendente of Morales, Izabal, argued in favor of Jorge

Ubico, while drunk, they were reported by the sub-chief

127
of the Morales Guardia Civil, to the director of police.
The director then reported the matter to the Ministry of
Government/^ People did, of course, occasionally
complain about the "ears." A group of citizens of San
Juan Ostuncalco complained to the government that the
police always watched everyone, and asked that they be
ordered to stop. Arlvalo himself wrote "Nol" on the
margin of their request.

Any government employee or public official not on
the Arevalista bandwagon stood the possibility of losing
his or her position. The Arevalo government, the
Arevalista political parties, and pro-Arevalo citizens,
all took an interest in eliminating real and potential
political enemies from their jobs. In 1945, in the early
months of the Arevalo presidency, investigative teams
were already touring the country, listening to the
people, asking questions, and finding the local officials
and employees, high and low, who were inept, corrupt, or
anti-Arevalo. At least some of these officials, and
possibly all of them, were replaced. ^"^

Quite often, the government relied on information
sent by the local Arevalista parties, or by individual
citizens. For example, in December of 1945, a group of
Arevalistas from San Cristobal Totonicapan sent the
President a list of names of the men who had supported

128
Ubico and Ponce, and who still retained their positions
in local government. The chief of the Guardia Civil in
Totonicapan was instructed to investigate. One of the
accused was a penitentiary guard, one a municipal
secretary, another a city treasurer, and so on. Some had
already lost their positions, including two school
teachers, for their anti-Arevalo views. The archival

sources consulted do not indicate if those still working

44
were replaced.

In May 1946, Arevalo received the testimony of the
pro-Arevalo ex-guardalmacen fiscal of Quezaltenango, who
claimed that he had been unjustly fired from his job, and
replaced by a man who had been a founder of a pro-Ponce
political party in Totonicapan. Arevalo directed that
the information be sent to Julio Cesar Mendez, the chief
of PAR, "to order an investigation about the matter of
Totonicapan." The PAR branch in Totonicapan concurred
that, indeed, the man in question had been one of the
principal founders of a branch of Partido Liberal,
pro-Ponce, in Totonicapan, in 1944. The PAR report went
on to list 16 other leaders of the Ponce group, claiming
that the Poncistas were still outspoken enemies of the
Arevalo government. Also, many of them still held offices
in the local Totonicapan government, which, according to
the PAR report, should not be allowed. The PAR

129
information, in turn, was sent to the Ministry of
Government, under Arivalo's instructions, "para los
efectos procedentes en el caso de los Poncistas
empleados." The documents do not disclose the final fate
of pro-Ponce workers, but Justo Armas, the pro-Ar4valo
guardalmacen fiscal who started the investigations with
his testimony to the President, did obtain his old job
back, plus an additional position as well."^^

On September 17, 1946, in another typical case, a
letter arrived at the President's office from the
ex-treasurer of San Crist5bal, Totonicapan. The man
charged that he had been dismissed from his job and
replaced by an "enemy of the present government." The
Guardia Judicial received notification from the
President's office the same day, asking the police to
investigate the matter. On September 24, the chief of the
Guardia Judicial reported that the suspect had been
employed during the whole regime of Ubico, had also
supported Ponce, and "it was rumored" he had expressed
"unfavorable" remarks about the Arevalo government, "but
no one could firmly support it." The report further
explained that the town council majority (all ladinos)
had supported Ponce. The three Indian members of the
council were Arevalistas, but because they were Indians
"almost had neither voice nor vote in municipal

130
decisions." On September 25, "with instructions from the
president," these documents were sent to the PAR
headquarters, "in order to take note," with instructions
to return the documents. On October 2, Mario Monteforte
Toledo, secretary general of PAR, "having taken note,"
returned everything to the President. On October 5,
Arevalo ordered the minister of government to replace the
suspect treasurer with someone "worthy and with a clear
record." The Ministry relayed this order to the governor
of Totonicapan on October 10.'^^

In another facet of the conflict, newspapers,
books, magazines, pamphlets, fliers, were all employed in
a widespread war of words waged between the
pro-government forces and the opposition. The government
occasionally closed or censored the opposition
periodicals, and hindered the dissemination of opposition
viewpoints, but all during Arevalo' s term a constant
supply of extremely anti-government publications remained
available to the public. In reply, both the government
and the pro-government parties produced a plethora of
their own publications. Discussion on both sides could
be rational, and convincingly presented, but a good many
attacks contained insult and evident malice.

Pro-government publications included, among
°*^^^^^' Diario de Centro America. MediodJa. Diario de la

131
Manana, and Accion. The Diario de Centro AmPr.r-.
published by the government since 1931, contained two
sections; one section to report official acts, new laws,
etc., and the other section covering general news. (The
official section ceased publication January 31, 1950, to
be superseded by El Guatemalteco . ) Mediodia, created by
Arevalo and his staff and published by the Ministry of
Government, had its first issue on May 15, 1945. Diario
de la Manana began publication in 1949, and joined
^^^^°^^^ ^^ ^"^ outspoken government defender. The
opposition daily La Hora, for example, was accused by
the Diario of representing "backward ideologies,"
"traitors" to the nation, and "cowards. "^^ Marroquin
Rojas, the owner and editor, was portrayed as having the
"nature of soda water, that is, effervescent," producing
tirades on the level of comic book characters. Also, in
an affront with a machista ring, it was alleged that he
could not stop talking any more successfully than some
women. ^8 The Diario likewise happily reported the words
of Minister of Agriculture Guerra Morales, who claimed
the quality of writing in the opposition newspaper El
Imparcial remained on the level of cheap Western
novels. ^^ Accion, edited by the Escuela Normal Central
para Varones, began publication in 1948, with a far left,
Marxist, and anti-clerical slant. Accion, for example,

132
attacked the church with a cartoon that accused the
clerics of serving imperialism, while saying "amen to
Wall Street's acts of usurpation."

Opposition publications included La Hora, El
Imparcial , La Revoluci5n, El Pueblo, and El Mundo Libre.
The first two were both directed by outstanding members
of the "generation of 1920," Marroquin Rojas and David
Vela; both newspapers had contributed to Ubico's fall;
and both continually criticized the Arevalo government.
Ramon Blanco, a manager of El Imparcial, was exiled for
several months in 1949, and again in 1950. Both
newspapers, between 1945 and 1951, published a large
number of editorials that attacked the government and its
young, zealous advocates. In a typical example of
January 1946, El Imparcial complained that certain
eager revolutionaries suffered from "juvenile
self-love." Do they wish to construct a new Guatemala,
asked El Imparcial? "No; this is secondary. They wish
to destroy, blow off steam, squander our abundant life in
sterile discussions, to satisfy vengeful feelings, to
annihilate or try to annihilate all that does not

unconditionally kneel before the new idols and the new

52
despotisms that they are forming and feeding."

La Revolucion, on its part, promoted the political

party of ex-Junta member Jorge Toriello. El Pueblo was

133
the party newspaper of the Partido del Pueblo, which from
late 1949 denounced the government while it promoted the
presidential candidacy of the "father of the
Constitution," Jorge Garcia Granados. The small and
independently owned E^i^undo_^ibre , however, surpassed
all other newspapers in its damnations; and m
falsehoods. Directed by Jose A. Miranda of the old
Liberal Party, the newspaper began publishing in May
1949, and continued into the Arbenz presidency. Among
other things, _E1 Mundo falsely accused Arevalo of
amassing great wealth, and of tyranny on the level of
Estrada Cabrera. ^^

As already noted, opposition newspapers from time
to time were suppressed or censored, m one case, a
decree of May 20, 1946 suppressed all newspapers
established after June 13, 1945-a provision that
served to close two opposition papers, the Mercurio and
La Verdad.^^ (Other opposition papers, however, were
allowed to begin after the date of the decree.) The
government claimed that Mercurio and La Verdad had abused
the right of free expression, and that the government's
literacy campaign needed paper. The opposition, of
course, claimed the decree discriminatory. Mercurio
later reopened, but its continued hard campaign against
the government led to its forced closure again in 1947,

134
and the deportation of its editor-in-chief. Reopened in
1948, Mercurio resumed its attacks. ^^

The Arevalo government put further curbs on the
free expression of opposition viewpoints with the Ley de
Emision del Pensamiento, passed by the Congress on April
24, 1947. The law was designed to curtail the slanderous
criticism of public officials, and mandated fines or
incarceration for the guilty. Arevalo strongly approved
of this law, for it would protect "the reputations of
honorable persons." In a newspaper article of January
1947, he explained that liberty of speech and liberty of
opinion must be allowed in matters such as religion,
politics, philosophy, morality, art, and science; but
liberty of speech and opinion must not allow malicious
slander. Malicious statements to be prohibited would
include "Pablo doesn't like Pedro; Pedro doesn't please
him; or he is afraid of Pedro, or he 'thinks' Pedro is a
driveling fool, or a thief; or that Maria is a low class
washerwoman, or a prostitute, or that she stinks, or
snores when she sleeps, etc." Arevalo called these types
of thoughts "psychological," and he proclaimed that "this

type of psychological thought cannot be emitted

5 7
freely." The Ley de Emision would punish those who did

not "respect popularly elected functionaries," and make

it "each day more impossible for unpopular rulers to come

135
back into power. "58 "The parrots of dictatorship,"
said Arevalo, "cannot stick their beaks in the waters of
the new political society that was born in October. "^^
It IS not clear, however, to what extent this law was
consistently applied; and certaxnly it did not stop
public criticism of the Arevalo government.

As a further response to opposition attacks, and
operating under a budget approved by Congress, the
Departamento de Publicidad of the office of the President
aided a large number of activities that promoted the
ideals of the revolution and pro-government sentiment,
and combated the allegations of the opposition. Over a
two-month period in 1946, for example, publicity expenses
included the following: on November 5, four hundred
Quetzales paid to the Asociacion de Estudiantes
Universitarios; and, "to finance in part, the expenses
needed to advance the Revolution," one thousand Quetzales
were paid to the Conf ederaci5n de Trabaj adores de
Guatemala ( CTG ) , and five hundred to Federacion Sindical
de Guatemala (FSG). On November 6, 290 Quetzales went to
Arevalo 's general secretary, "for pro-Revolutionary
expenses," 500 Quetzales went to the Sindicato de Accion
y Mejoramiento Ferrocarrilero, and 200 Quetzales went to
Abelardo Estrada to help with the pro-government
newspaper El Popular. On December 2, Q3000 was paid by

136
Publicidad to the President's general secretary, for
"confidential" expenses, of a pro-government nature.
Similarly, on December 2, the Guatemalan Embassy m
iMexico received Q3,500.00, for "confidential" expenses in
favor of the Arevalo Government. The President's general
secretary received another Q1,000.00 on December 21,

Q1,300.00 on January 3, 1947, and Q2,000.00 on January

7 60 ^

/. From the government's standpoint, these were

expenses in "education," and formed part of an overall
policy to fortify the public with the truth as perceived
by the Arevalo administration, and to combat the plots
and lies of the opposition.

The Arevalo administration, and the Arevalista
Congress and political parties, had countered the
opposition with strong determination. The opposition,
because of its own divisiveness , and the power of the
government, never succeeded to stop the Arevalista reform
movement. But as will be made more clear in succeeding
chapters, the opposition forces would remain a constant
and profound threat; substantially undermining the goals
of the revolution.

1 37

Notes

1 .

NAUS 814.00/6-2248 no. 319; NAUS, State

Department Papers, Office of Intelligence Research, Oct.
23, 1950, OIR Report 5123, 76-77.

2. NAUS OIR 5123, 76.

3. Ibid.

4. Jefe de la Guardia Judicial to Arevalo,
August 12, 1946, AGC, Direcci5n General de Policia.

5. Rafael Delgado, Falange en Guatemala
(Mexico, 1948), 75. For a summary of the Falange in
Guatemala, see Frankel, "Political Development," 182-191.

235

6. The number 120 comes from Holleran, Church,

7. Frankel, "Political Development," 190.

8. Ibid., 192.

9. Accion Social Cristiana, Jan. 11, 1945.

10. Ibid., Feb. 8, 1945.

11. Holleran, Church, 210.

12. Ibid., 60.

13. Ibid., 223; Suslow, "Social Reforms," 123.

1 4. NAUS OIR 5123, 73.

1 5. NAUS 81 4.00/2-945.

16. NAUS 81 4.00B/8-31 45.

17. "Galera," El Imparcial, Nov. 4, 1959.

18. Monteforte Toledo, La Revolucion, 16.

19. NAUS 814.00/6-2646; 814.00/7-146 No. 1501.

20. Arevalo, Escritos politicos, 406.

21. NAUS 814.00/2-945; 814.00/6-1445.

138

22. Copia de acuerdo, July JO, 1945, AGC,
Correspondencia del Presidente de la Republica.

23. Memoria de Ministerio de Gobernaci5n, March
1, 1946, AGC, Ministerio de Gobernaci5n, Varies, 52-54.

24. Silvert, A Study in Government, 16.

25. Ibid.

26. La Hora, Sept. 13, 1972.

27. Congress decree number 48 includes the names
of the judges. The Supreme Court under Arevalo played a
much less dynamic role in the polity than the Congress.

28
27, 1956.

29

30

31

Ramon Blanco, "Galera," EL Imparcial, March

NAUS 814.00/6-545 no. 131.
NAUS 814.00/8-1545.
NAUS 814.00/4-2445.

32. Memoria de Ministerio de Gobernacion, p. 52,
March 1, 1946, AGC, Ministerio de Gobernacion, Varies.

33. Reglamento de la Guardia Judicial, June 13,
1946, AGC, Direccion General de Policia; Documento no.
787, July 27, 1946, AGC, Direccion General de Policia.

34

Ibid

35. La Hora, May 17, 1958; Ibid., Feb. 27, 1963.
In his column "Galera," Elly Rodriguez Gonzalez gives a
long list of people allegedly exiled, tortured, and
killed under Arevalo.

36. Jefe de la Guardia Judicial to Ministro de
Gobernacion, Oct., Nov., Dec, 1945, AGC, Direcci5n
General de Policia.

37. Memorandum al Sehor Presidente,^ Nov. 2,
1945, AGC, Direccion General de Policia; J. Victor ^Soto
de Avila, Quien es Quien: diccionario biografico
centroamericano (Guatemala, 1944), 387.

139

38. Jorge Arriola, interview with author
Guatemala City, June 20, 1987; Ricardo Asturias
Valenzuela, interview with author, Guatemala City, July
15, 1987. Direct quote belongs to Arriola.

39. Movimiento observado a las personas que
fueron vigilados--, June, August, 1946, AGC, Direcci5n
General de Policia.

40. No. 4028,
General de Policia.

41 . No. 2502,
General de Policia.

July 19, 1946, AGC, Direcci5n
Dec. 19, 1945, AGC, Direccion

42. Subsecretario de Gobernacion to Arevalo, May
9, 1946, AGC, Ministerio de Gobernacion, Varies.

43. Secretario General de la Presidencia, June
4, 1, 1945, AGC, Correspondencia del Presidente de la
Republica; Sociedad de Empleados Municipales al Sehor
Secretario Privado de la Presidencia, Dec. 21, 1945, AGC
Correspondencia del Presidente de la Republica. ' '

44. Registro de Correspondencia, no. 661 9 (and
attached documents), Dec. 7, 1945, AGC, Correspondencia
del Presidente de la Republica.

45. Audiencia de 10 de mayo de 1946 (and
attached documents). May 10, 1946, AGC, Correspondencia
del Presidente de la Republica.

46. No. 4436, clasif icacion 131 (and attached
documents), Sept. 17, 1946, AGC, Correspondencia del
Presidente de la Republica.

^~' • "La Hora. diario oficial de la
antmacionalidad, ' Diario de la Mahana . Oct. 7 1949
p.1 .

48. "Buenos dias, Don Clemente," Diario de la
Manana, Oct. 8., 1949, p.1.

49,
50,
51 ,
52,

Diario de la Manana. Jan. 14., p.1.

Accion, Sept, 1949, p. 6.

El Imparcial, April 8, 1975.

El Imparcial, Jan. 9., 1946, p.1.

140

53
1951 , p.1

54,

55,

56,

57.

58.

59.

60.

El Mundo Libre, Jan. 5., 1951; and May 25,

NAUS 814.00/5-2246 no. 1396.

NAUS OIR 5123, 75.

Arevalo, Escritos politicos, 394.

Ibid. , 1 80-1 81 .

Ibid., 191.

Ibid., 190.

Departamento de Publicidad, Feb. 21, 1947,

AGC, Correspondencia del Presidente de la Republica

CHAPTER 9

AREVALISMO: UNITY AND DISUNITY,

1 945-1 949

As noted in chapter 7, the revolutionary forces
that overthrew Ubico and Ponce failed to remain united,
and splintered into a general divide of anti-government
(opposition) and pro-government (Arevalista) groups. The
Arevalistas themselves suffered from serious conflict,
created by ideological differences and by points of
self-interest, such as competition for public posts and
for influence over the electorate. Ex-President of
Congress Mario Monteforte Toledo, in a statement that
exaggerated but contained truth, stated that the
Arevalista parties suffered from conflict "more rancorous
than between the reformers and the opposition." In
fact, the Arevalistas remained united in most of the
general, long term goals that included human rights,
modernization, and democracy. The successes they
achieved in the social, economic and political spheres
attest to the measure of unity they retained. But by
1949, disagreements and disunity were leading to a
conflict that would profoundly and irrevocably alter the

1 41

1 42
character of Arevalista parties and Guater^alan political
reality as a whole.

In general, the same personal and ideological
forces that caused the breakdown of revolutionary unity
also caused internal conflict for those groups that
remained within the Arevalista camp. Although all of the
Arevalistas championed labor and land reform, they did
not always agree on the desired speed of change, or the
exact nature of the reforms. In essence, the Arevalistas
themselves were divided into leftists, moderates, and
conservatives, although taken as a group they clearly
remained to the political left of the opposition.

Marxist participation in the reform movement
became a major source of conflict. Monteforte Toledo, a
moderate FPL member, went so far as to claim that only
one ideological difference divided the Arevalistas: "the
participation of the communists in the movement. "^
Communism in Guatemala had grown in the 1920s, but had
been smashed under the dictatorship, m 1944, a small
number of communists took part in the revolution and the
formation of the Arevalo government, but they cautiously
remained silent about their beliefs, realizing that
communism was highly unpopular.^ Communists, however,
became increasingly influential in the following years,
and, as already stated, a source of conflict.

143
In 1945, the Arevalistas tried to overcome their
political differences by forming one, inclusive political
party. On October 17, Frente Popular Libertador (FPL) and
Partido Renovacion Nacional (RN) combined to form the
Union Revolucionaria, and on November 24, they changed
the name to Partido Accion Revolucionaria (PAR) when the
Partido Social Democratico joined the merger. On
November 18, 1946, the PAR national convention produced a
manifesto of principles designed to be broad enough to
insure the agreement of all factions. The program called
for the transformation of Guatemala's society, politics,
economy and spirit. It also demanded international
peace, economic sovereignty. Central American unity,
suppression of latifundium, protection of private
property, free organization of labor, social improvements
and education of the masses.^ In essence, the manifesto
voiced all of the hopes and goals of the revolution. But
beyond these broad objectives, the leaders of the
previously independent parties within PAR "could not
reach mutual understanding nor work in harmony."^

In 1947, the intra-PAR conflict reached the
breaking point. In February, moderate reformers including
Julio Mendez Montenegro demanded the ouster of PAR ' s
Secretary General, Jose Manuel Fortuny, who was a far
leftist and a future leading Marxist.^ When leftist PAR

144
extremists allegedly led a group of workers in a violent
attack on a peaceful anti-labor demonstration in March,
PAR moderates and conservatives became particularly
incensed. In May significant numbers of non-leftists
resigned, protesting that radical PAR labor leaders were
"rabble rousers. PAR moderates and conservatives
re-established the Frente Popular Libertador (FPL), under
the leadership of Ricardo Asturias Valenzuela. The
members of FPL did not oppose profound reform, but openly
abhorred what they called extremism. The FPL party
manifesto declared support for Arevalo, advancement of
labor rights and working conditions, and agricultural
reform after careful study. The manifesto also spoke out
against communism. Another faction of the PAR split off
to regroup the Partido Renovaci5n Nacional (RN). The RN,

under Secretary General Carlos Acevedo, a personal friend

9
of Arevalo, continued to act largely in accord with the

remnants of PAR, Not a large party, RN had fewer members
in the Congress than FPL or PAR. After the split, PAR,
RN, FPL, continued to be the three largest parties which
supported the Arevalo government, but no longer did so as
a united front.

Within the PAR, the communists formed another
faction, and in September 1947, they established an
underground organization called the Vanguardia

1 45

Democratica Guatemalteca ( VDG ) . As communists were not
allowed by the government to establish their own party,
they worked under the aegis of the PAR. Important
members of the PAR who were also members of the VDG
included Carlos Manuel Pellecer, once editor of the PAR
newspaper El Libertador; and the PAR Secretary General
Jose Fortuny. Other notable PAR-VDG members were Victor
Manuel Gutierrez, Bernardo Alvarado Monz5n, Alfonso
Guerra Borges, Mario Silva Jonama , and Luis Cardoza y
Aragon.

The relative conservatism of FPL, seen through the
eyes of the far leftists, was manifested in a petition
sent to Arevalo in July 1947, signed by members of the
Comite Salvadoreno de Liberacion Nacional, the Frente
Revolucionario Hondureno, and the Comite Patri5tico
Nicaraguense. These committees represented Central
Americans of the political left who lived in Guatemala.
The petition claimed that the FPL served Yankee
imperialism, violated the Constitution, and pursued
dictatorial policies that made a farce of the October 20
revolution. Also, if the FPL disagreed with someone, the
FPL would accuse him of communism. The FPL was said to
have drawn up a list of workers and professionals that it
so accused, and was trying to have expelled. The signers
of the petition had faith, however, that Arevalo would

1 46

protect them. They had, after all, fought side by side

1 1
with the Guatemalans to free the working classes.

Fortuny, Secretary General of PAR, explained his

view of the differences in a private letter to Julio

Estrada de la Hoz , on September 4, 1947. In the letter

Fortuny called FPL members Manuel Galich, the Mendez

brothers, Alfonso Bauer Paiz and others "populists."

Populists, he wrote, believe that revolutionary movements

are enacted from the top elements of society and not from

the masses. They underestimate the knowledge and ability

of the rural masses. He called FPL "petty bourgeois

without doctrinaire direction," afraid of the "hollow

threats" of imperialism and the advance of the Guatemalan

people.''^ PAR, implied Fortuny, believed in the

potential of the common people to lead their own

revolution. An anonymous PAR member, during a party

meeting, advanced another reason why moderates did not

champion the people. Moderates, he said, did not desire

close contact with farmers and laborers, who "smell like

1 3
goats because they work."

After the breakup of PAR, the FPL became the

strongest of the Arevalista parties. The FPL held a

majority of lower level government offices and nearly a

two-thirds majority in congress. FPL power in Congress

caused PAR and Labor many moments of anguish, for example

147
in October 1947, when FPL sided with the conservative
Minister of Government, Francisco Villagran. The minister
had issued a circular to local governments which ordered
the officials to stop labor "agitators" who promised land
to workers and Indians. Labor and PAR protested that the
order would restrict unionization J ^

In 1945 and 1946, President Arevalo's stand on the
inter-party conflict had remained in doubt for some
observers, although Arivalo's public speeches and
promises to the people continuously suggested a leftist
posture. In his May Day speech of 1946, for example, he
publicly criticized former leaders who had given the
"blood and soul of Guatemala" to foreign interests. He
then called for the liberation of wealth from the rich.^^
In his visits around the country, Arevalo promised water,
electricity, schools, roads, jobs, and, according to one
observer, "all that the people would ask for."^^

But many actions taken by the Arevalo government
demonstrated a measured approach to reform. In January
of 1946, Arevalo ordered closed the far leftist labor
school Escuela Claridad, on grounds that it taught an
international doctrine, which violated article thirty-two
of the constitution. Arevalo also slowed his promises to
labor when serious labor disputes proliferated at the end
of 1946. The Army, with Arevalo's approval, forcefully

1 48
put down some labor strikes, and in January 1947, the
government declared a "no strike" policy until officials
enacted a pending labor code. Andrew E. Donovan, 1st
Secretary of the U.S. Embassy, declared that Arevalo's
"present course" was "more to the right than to the
left."^"^

Arevalo had from his first cabinet named
conservatives, moderates, and leftists, and in 1947
the Arevalo cabinet retained a rough balance. Eugenio
Silva Pena of the conservative Frente Nacional
Revolucionario (FNR) headed the Foreign Ministry.
Francisco Villagran, another conservative, served as
Minister of Government. FPL held three cabinet posts;
Health, Economy, and Education. RN men led the
Ministries of Finance and Communication. PAR headed
Agriculture. The Minister of Defense, Jacobo Arbenz ,
though officially apolitical, favored the PAR. In sum,
Arbenz and the PAR and RN members totaled four leftists.
Moderates numbered three and conservatives two.

Some observers accused Arevalo of weakness, and
saw in him an inability to stand firm on reform issues.

He "rarely seemed to have a mind of his own," claimed 1st

1 ft
secretary Donovan. Arevalo commented on his alleged

lack of forcefulness during an interview with a

journalist of Nuestro Diario. "An ideal country is that

1 49
in which the official passes unnoticed and what stands
out are the institutions." This is, he said, the mark of
highly civilized nations such as the United States. He
claimed not to care what the critics said about his lack

of forcefulness, as his actions were in Guatemala's best

1 9

interests .

In fact, Arevalo feared instability, and he
remained adamantly opposed to communism. In a speech
read over the radio in September of 1947, Arevalo spoke
out strongly against communism and the recent formation
of Vanguardia, an unofficial organization that did not
publicly proclaim its Marxism, but whose members' extreme
left inclinations were obvious. This "communist" party,
said Arevalo, is "dangerous" and "fundamentally
anti-democratic." Arevalo described in some detail the
evils and shortcomings of communism in general, and in
Russia. "Communism as a doctrine remains innocuous, but
the communists as a political force are already dangerous

in Europe and a shadow over the future of the American

20
continent." The communists were also denounced by the

president of congress, Mario Monteforte Toledo, a member

of FPL. Soon after these condemnations, fifteen alleged

communists were deported to Mexico, for several months.

150
Arevalo nevertheless remained strongly committed
to reform, and by the end of 1947 he proved that his
true sympathies lay primarily with the leftist demands
for change. When Silva Peha resigned on July 30, m
protest agaxnst leftism in government, Arevalo appointed
the prominent leftist Enrique Muhoz Meany as new Minister
of Foreign Affairs. ^^ At the same time, Arevalo named
PAR leader Augusto Charnaud McDonald to replace the FPL
member in the Ministry of Economy and Labor. ^2 During
August, leftists (not communists) thus held six cabinet
positions while moderates and conservatives were reduced
to two and one respectively. Villagran, the last
conservative in the cabinet, resigned in disgust shortly
thereafter and an FPL member took his place. m
November, Arevalo vetoed a bill passed by the FPL
majority that might have slowed down labor advances. The
bill, according to the U.S. Embassy, had been
controversial enough to cause fist fights and a near gun
fight in congress. 2^ The Embassy claimed that Arevalo's
sympathy for the PAR and the RN had become "taken for

granted. "2'*

At the end of 1947, the revolutionaries in
government had become polarized. At one end, the
moderates of the FPL held much sway in congress, with
nearly a two-thirds majority. On the other hand, the

151
leftists had great influence in the administration, and
counted on the President as an ally. Jose Manuel Fortuny
felt optimistic about the future. In a letter to Alvaro
Hugo Salguero, dated September 4, 1947, Fortuny predicted
the ultimate defeat of the moderates. He wrote that "the
populists hide themselves in congress in a state of
expectancy, nervous, restless, without knowing whence or
at what hour their vanquishers will come."^^

In March, 1948, the political duel between the
divided Arevalistas reached a new peak, but ended in
somewhat of a draw. Arlvalo removed the last FPL member
from his cabinet, and went on to weed out FPL members who

served as sub-secretaries and in other official

2 fi
positions. In a public interview, he said he dismissed

FPL members from his government because they had been

working against him.^^ When FPL members in congress

threatened to obstruct the budget, Arevalo backed down

slightly and named FPL member Alfonso Bauer Paiz to the

key position of Minister of Economy and Labor. ^^

In preparation for the congressional elections of

December 1948, political leaders of the three Arevalista

parties tried to curb their bitter disagreements, leading

PAR and RN, which had combined in a loose union called

the Victory Bloc, to make a non-aggression pact with FPL.

But efforts at inter-party reconciliation were not

152
successful. The last months of 1948 witnessed a high
level of pre-election strife, so much so that election
day had to be postponed. When the election finally took
place, vote fraud apparently occurred on all sides, and
many results were disputed. When the final results were
determined in April 1949, FPL received twenty-eight
seats, the Victory Block twenty-five, and the opposition
parties fourteen. The FPL had lost some of its former
strength, and the opposition had gained.

FPL, in spite of its problems with the other
Arevalista parties and with Arevalo himself, remained
pro-government, and continued to support the general
goals of the reform movement. With most members of the
FPL, Arevalo remained popular and highly respected. Like
Arevalo, they abhorred communism and feared that
unbridled reform could create dangerous instability, a
milieu where communism could grow. The "seventeen
principles" of the FPL, published in 1949, claimed
continued adherence to revolutionary goals, including
final eradication of the traditional political parties
(the Liberals and the Conservatives), free organization
of the workers, democratic agrarian reform and an end to

latifundios. As usual, the FPL manifesto also proclaimed

29
itself against communism.

1 53
Disunity had also developed within the particular
membership of each party. By 1949, internal discord
centered on splits between factions which advocated no
compromise with the other Arevalista parties, and
factions more committed to inter-party unity. In the
FPL, in April 1949, those members who advocated
inter-party harmony gained control of the executive
committee, and elected Manuel Galich as Secretary

General. Those led by Mario Mendez Montenegro, who were

30
unwilling to work with PAR and RN, had been defeated.

PAR members experienced a similar crisis in early 1949.

Jose Fortuny, with other far leftists and communists,

championed an uncompromising position against the FPL.

Fortuny 's group favored a full commitment to the radical

demands of labor. The new Secretary General of PAR,

Roberto Alvarado Fuentes, headed a faction that desired

better relations with FPL. The struggle emerged in the

open at the PAR national convention in March over which

faction would lead the executive committee. Alvarado 's

group, led by Charnaud McDonald, proved to be the most

numerous and mustered 382 votes, whereas Fortuny produced

only 120.^^

Important members of the labor leadership did not

approve of the Alvarado faction's willingness to work

with moderates. In May 1949 the most influential labor

154
leader, CNUS and FSG Secretary General Manuel Pinto
Usaga, expressed unhappiness v/ith the FPL in a letter
to Alvarado dated May 6, and praised a small bloc of
deputies that he identified as the Bloque Obrero de

Diputados; Pinto threatened to change labor's political

32
tactics, but gave no specific details. Alvarado

explained PAR ' s position in a reply to Pinto dated May

16. He agreed that elements of FPL had not treated labor

well, but stated that the FPL had at least been

interested in dealing with reforms. PAR, he said, had a

pact of democratic collaboration with FPL, through which

they hoped to deal successfully with the problems of the

nation even though the hard-liners of the labor movement

said it was "absurd and childish" to form alliances with

such elements as the FPL. Alvarado expressed unhappiness

that a labor bloc might form independently from the PAR,

and warned that such tactics might place the revolution

m danger.

Pinto's counter-reply on May 18 refrained from the

strong language of the first letter, but he did not show

a change of heart. He agreed with the need for

revolutionary unity between PAR, RN, and labor, but not

FPL. He did not mention again his threat to change labor

tactics, but apparently remained unhappy with the PAR

leadership.

155
While disunity grew more serious for the
Arevalista parties, organized labor succeeded to become
larger, stronger, and more cohesive. As noted in chapter
6, by 1950 there were more than 150 unions, with nearly
100,000 members. There existed at times strong conflict
within and between the various unions, which weakened the
overall labor movement. In the words of one labor
leader, Arcadio Ruiz Franco, "The ideological enemy
of the working class is the capitalist extortionist, but
the enemy who is more real and palpable within the
organizations of the workers, is the calumnies, gossip
and the insidiousness of all humanity, provoked by envy
and egoism. "3^ But labor would largely rise above this
divisiveness, and "by 1949 the labor movement stood as
the strongest and best organized popular group supporting
the administration.""^^

Efforts to overcome conflict between the unions
occurred early. On December 19, 1944, the major unions
established Guatemala's first labor confederation, the
Confederacion de Trabaj adores de Guatemala ( CTG ) , but in
November 1945 ten of the thirty-one affiliated unions
withdrew in protest over the Marxist propaganda school,
the Escuela Claridad. The school had been established in
July, 1945, within the CTG organization, and the school
leadership, as a body, had been given one vote on the CTG

156
executive committee. Antonio Obando Sanchez, the first
^^^'^ °^ Escuela Claridad and a long time Marxist, had
spent 13 years in jail under Ubico. Ostensibly an adult
education school for union members, it mainly taught
Marxist doctrine. The CTG executive committee debated
the school's existence on November 4, 1945: 15 unions
voted that Claridad should remain in the CTG, 13 unions
voted no, 3 abstained. Accusing the CTG of communist
inclinations, ten unions founded a rival confederation,
the Fedracion Sindical de Guatemala (FSG).^^ The FSG
remained the largest labor organization, with its
strength based upon urban labor, while the CTG received
its major impetus from the teachers union, the Sociedad
de Trabaj adores en Educacion en Guatemala (STEG). The
FSG initially proved somewhat less impatient for social
and economic changes, and resolved to oppose communism,
which had become an influential force in the CTG.^^

PAR, however, helped to bring the two labor
federations back together. After the split in January
1946, FSG had tried to promote its own candidates for
Congress without help from the political parties, while
CTG worked closely with PAR. When the FSG failed to do
well, it accepted an invitation by PAR to begin talks,
and soon thereafter both FSG and CTG were cooperating
with PAR.^^ The federations also received the help and

157
advice of a number of foreigners, including the Cuban

communist Bias Roca, with the design of uniting the labor

, 40
movement .

In December 1946, the FSG, CTG, and one smaller

and less significant federation, the Federacion Regional

Central de Trabajadores (FRCT), formed a loose union

named the Comite Nacional de Unidad Sindical ( CNUS ) .

CNUS actively voiced labor demands and guarded against

inter-union clashes. It also helped develop political

committees designed to advance labor's political goals

41
and to support candidates for political office. As

political activity by unions had been banned in the

Provisional Labor Law of March 1946, the committees

claimed to be independent of the unions, although in

practice, little had been done to enforce the provision.

With the formation of CNUS, the confidence and

power of organized labor grew. Labor leaders retained

close ties to PAR-RN, but they increasingly became

independent of the political parties. In the words of

Jose Cardoza, "We workers obtained by sheer exertion our

greatest social and economic conquests," and it was a

"daily fight" to obtain justice, by court room battles,

42
strikes, and armed defense. The workers sometimes

earned their advances in spite of the politicians. Still,

Arevalo himself greatly helped organized labor through

158
his application of the labor code of May 1947. The labor
code provided measures to control the unions,
establishing strict regulations over internal union
affairs and membership; moreover, strikes could be
undertaken only after procedures of conciliation and
arbitration failed. A strict application of the code
would thus have weakened organized labor, but Arevalo
chose to emphasize those provisions of the code of
benefit to labor.

By mid-1949, communists as individuals and Marxism
as an ideology had become highly influential in organized
labor. This was less true of the FSG than CTG, but in
fact the differences between the two were minor. In a
dispatch of June 30, 1949, the U.S. Embassy noted that
FSG international policies had become, especially during
the previous six months, increasingly similar to those of
CTG. Both organizations supported the Conf ederaci5n de
Trabajadores de America Latina ( CTAL) , and at the time
the Embassy dispatch was being written, the Secretary
General of GNUS and FSG, Manuel Pinto Usaga, and the
Secretary General of CTG, Victor Manuel Gutierrez, were
both en route to a World Federation of Trade Unions
(WFTU) meeting at Milan. '^'^

As the workers movement solidified and grew more
powerful, and Marxism refused to go away, the Arevalista

159
political parties had divided into factions. On the
whole, the Arevalista split reflected a general divide by
1949, between those who championed more rapid and
vigorous change of social and economic structures, often
accepting Marxist influences; and those who took a
gradualist approach and sought to minimize or eliminate
Marxist influence.

Notes

1. Monteforte Toledo, La Revoluci6n . 16.

2. Ibid.

r'.r^^ ^\ ^°^^ /ortuny, "Testimonio, " in Carlos
^^'^^^^^' Aproximacion a Guatemala (Guatemala, 1980), !^4K

4

LCMD/GD^'PAR-Bofy"""" "" P"""Pi°=' "°v. 18, 1946,

814. 00/?:e45 nr'9?6. *'""""'■ ^^-auetzal, 106; NAUS

6. NAUS 814.00/2-747 AGM.
no.249o!' ''''"' 814.00/7-3147 Tele; 814.00/6-347

8. La Hora. June 13, 1947, p. 2.

9. NAUS 814.00/10-247 Memo.

10. Carlos Manuel Pellecer, "Respuesta al
cuestionario de Alan V. LeBaron a CM. "^eHecer "
Houston, January 16, 1978, p. 3; Ronald M. Schneide^
Communism in Guatemala: 1Q44-1Q^. (New York, 1 958 ) 57

160

1 1 . "Memorial dirigido por las emigraciones
Centroamericanos al Presidente de la Republica de
Guatemala," July 2^, 1947, AGC, Correspondencia del
Presidente de la Republica.

Sept

12. Jose Fortuny to Julio Estrada de la Hoz ,
4, 1947, LCMD/GD, PAR-Box 7.

13
1 4

15,

Antecedentes, 1947, LCMD/GD, PAR-Box 7

NAUS 814.00/10-247 Memo.

Arevalo, Escritos politicos, 310-311.

1 6 . Najera ,
814.00/1-247 Memo.

Estaf adores ,

n-82;

NAUS

17
18

NAUS 814.00/1-247; 814.00/1-247 Memo.
Ibid.

19. Nuestro Diario, March 8, 1947, p.1; NAUS
814.20/3-2547"! Arevalo did not invent this doctrine for
the 1947 political situation; he had fully developed it
in the 1937 article "Istmania." See: Arevalo,
Escritos politicos, 6-21 .

20

Arevalo, Escritos politicos, 411-414

21. According to article 137 of the
constitution, the President could appoint and remove
ministers at will. He could only be checked with a
two-thirds vote in congress.

22. A United States Embassy report called
Charnaud "leftist" and "irresponsible." Written in
pencil on the dispatch document was "a bad egg." NAUS
814.00/10-247 Memo.

23. NAUS 814.00/11-2847 ARG.

24. Ibid; 814.00/3-1948 no. 144.

25. Jose Fortuny to Julio Estrada de la Hoz,
Sept. 4, 1947, LCMD/GD, PAR-Box 7.

26. NAUS 814.00/3-1948 no. 144.

27. NAUS 814.00/4-2748 no. 203.

161

28. NAUS 814.00/3-1948 no. 144

29. Publicaciones del Frente Popular Libertador,
"El partido: sus principios f undamentales" (Guatemala,
1 949) .

30. NAUS 814.00/4-549 no. 179.

31. NAUS 814.00/3-2249 no. 152.

32. GNUS to PAR, May 6, 1949, LGMD/GD, GPNT-Box
15.

33. GNUS to PAR, May 16, 1949, LGMD/GD,
GPNT-Box 1 5.

34. GNUS to PAR, May 18, 1949, LGMD/GD,
GPNT-Box 15.

35. Arcadio Ruiz Franco, Hambre y miseria
(Guatemala, 1950)

36. Bush, "Organized Labor, " iii.

37. Bishop, "Guatemalan Labor," 16-25; NAUS
OIR 5123, 14-17.

38. Schneider, Communism, 130.

39. Bishop, "Guatemalan Labor," 112.

40. Ibid., 42.

41 . NAUS OIR 5123, 17.

42. Jose Gardoza, "A treinta anos de la
revoluci5n de octubre de 1944," Alero (Guatemala), 8
(Sept. -Oct. 1974) , 91 .

43. Bush, "Organized Labor," part 4, pp. 65-66.

44. NAUS 711.1 4/6-3049.

CHAPTER 1 0
THE MILITARY AND THE ARANA-ARBENZ FEUD,
1 945-1 949

The armed forces had long defended the Guatemalan
status quo, but in October 1944, the military
majority gave its crucially important help to the forces
of the revolution. From that time, the military became
"heroes of the people," and in official propaganda
remained so until the overthrow of Arbenz in 1954. The
military had become a strong and well organized
institution by 1944, and after the revolution it

continued to modernize, organize, acquire greater

1
economic benefits, and become largely autonomous. It

remained a key power in Guatemalan politics.

Military leaders claimed that they had no desire

to rule or control the government, but only wished for

reasonable salaries, a chance to modernize, and freedom

2
from civilian manipulation. As a typical editorial of

Revista Militar claimed, "The army is from and for the

people. The army today and tomorrow will be loyal to the

3
laws of the country and never again to one individual"

The military officers, however, continued to retain

162

163
strong political views, and in spite of the middle and

lower class origins of most of them, the majority

4
remained inclined toward moderate conservatism. Many of

the officers, including Francisco Arana, had firmly

committed themselves to the overthrow of Ponce only in

the last few weeks before the revolution. According to

Kalman Silvert, the political parties initially

distrusted the democratic intentions of both Arana and

Arbenz. In testimony of civilian uneasiness, article

1 54 of the Constitution mandated the Chief of the Armed

Forces to swear an annual oath, which began with the

words: "We swear that the armed forces never will be an

instrument of arbitrariness nor of oppression," and ended

with the words: "we will maintain the Army as a

professional institution, worthy and absolutely

apolitical." Although some officers would remain firmly

committed to the goals of the revolution, a large segment

of the military became unhappy with trends of reform

under Arevalo. Overall, the military acted as a strong

moderating influence on Arevalo and the leftists.

During Arevalo' s term in office, the military

became split into two main factions, one group led by the

Chief of the Armed Forces, Col. Francisco Arana, and the

other group led by the Minister of Defense, Col. Jacobo

Arbenz. Both Arana and Arbenz wanted to be President in

164
1951, and the nature of the split in the military
centered on the ideals and political ambitions of these
two men. Arana remained dominant until his death in
1949. As Chief of the Armed Forces he was the military's
most powerful commander, in control of armaments,
installations, and appointments, and he also retained the
loyalty of the large majority of officers.

Some observers have believed that the Arbenz and
Arana split was influenced by a traditional animosity

between graduates of the military academy and the "line

9
officers" promoted from the ranks. Arbenz had

graduated from the academy, Arana had not. Certainly,

school graduates often maintained some prejudice against

the less educated officers of the line, who often came

from a rural and Indian background. On one occasion,

Julio Bonilla, a leader of the FPL, told a representative

of the U.S. Embassy that line officers were

1 1
"uncultured." Col. Rodolfo Mendoza claimed that line

1 2
officers feared being discriminated against. Arana

tried to control this conflict. In February 1945, he

promised there would be equality and security of rank for

all. He also recommended that graduates remove their

school insignias in order to demonstrate commitment to

Army equality, and he encouraged line officers to attend

1 3
school. However, it has not been demonstrated that

165

this traditional animosity greatly influenced the
Arbenz-Arana conflict. Some of the most ardent Aranistas
were school graduates, including Col. Jorge Barrios
Solares, Col. Albert Bone Solis and Col. Juan Francisco
Chajon. "The friction between the officers of the line

and those of the school has more fame than profundity,"

1 4
Arbenz said in 1968.

A division between the younger and older officers

may have become a more important factor in the

Arbenz-Arana split. Younger officers more often

championed Arbenz. "Young Military" was the phrase used

by contemporaries to identify the Arbenz faction. For

example, Istmania called Carlos Paz Tejada "one of the

young military," Carlos Diaz "a young military," and Jose

Angel Sanchez "a member of the youngest of today's

1 5
army." But there were significant exceptions. Many

officers of opposing groups shared nearly the same age,

including Col. Jorge Barrios Solares of the Arana camp

and Col. Carlos Aldana Sandoval of the Arbenz faction.

Col. Carlos Castillo Armas, an Aranista, was slightly

younger than Arbenz. Arana himself was only about 7 years

older than Arbenz.

Arana desired the presidency from an early date,

possibly from the time he first experienced executive

power as a member of the Junta. In December, 1945, an

166
automobile accident seriously injured President Arevalo.
In these difficult times, while Arevalo lay in the
hospital and the violent opposition tried to take
advantage of the situation, Arana, Arevalo, and a group
of political leaders entered into the secret "pacto de la
barranca." The pact promised support to Arana in the
next presidential elections if Arana guaranteed the
continuation of the Arevalo presidency until its legal
end, in March 1951. Arevalo completely recovered in
the early months of 1946, and according to an Arana

supporter, Arana ' s personal desire to become president

1 7
steadily increased after 1946.

Arana came from a simple, rural background, had

first entered the Army as an enlisted man, and had become

an officer and a leader by his outstanding natural

abilities. Often described as a calm and modest man, who

could also be amiable and jovial, he was considered well

1 R
read and admirably self-educated by those who knew him.

He remained humble about his abilities, and retained

some habits of speech that revealed his uneducated, rural

1 9
origins. Arana ' s political views, in relation to the

extremes in Guatemalan politics, remained moderate. He

counted among his most loyal civilian supporters Mario

Mendez Montenegro, who in 1944 had been an FPL founder

but from 1947 began distancing himself from the more

167

20 <

extreme leftist leaders. Clemente Marroqum Rojas of

LA Hora , a dedicated reformer but an opponent of

21
Arevalo, also supported Arana . Other important

civilians loyal to Arana were Juan Jose Orozco Posadas,

Oscar Benitez Bone, and Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro,

all three of whom belonged to the Arevalista parties.

Orozco Posadas and Benitez were especially strong

supporters of Arevalo. Arana appealed to people who

wanted to continue the democratic principles of the

revolution, but who wanted a strong president to control

the demands of the masses and halt the growth of Marxism.

The arch-conservatives sometimes saw Arana as their best

hope, but generally considered him a weak opponent of

2 2

communists and leftists. The leftists were Arana ' s

harshest critics. They habitually labeled him as
reactionary and opportunistic. Pellecer thought Arana

"tried to obstruct all social and economic progress in

2 3

the country." Jorge Arriola said that Arana "did not

24
understand the ideals of the revolution." In his own

defense, Arana claimed that he was for the ideals of the

revolution and stability, and placed himself "left of

moderate." He claimed to be "not extremist, nor of the

"25

right .

In 1948, Col. Francisco Arana began to seek the
presidency openly; while never officially declaring his

1 68
candidacy. Among the three Arevalista parties, only
in the FPL did Arana have significant support, but FPL
party members were divided. By late 1948 the majority of
the FPL leadership had decided to endorse one of their
own members for the presidency. In November of 1948, FPL
congressmen joined PAR and RN congressmen in passing a
resolution which protested Army political activities in
the 1948 congressional campaigns. The resolution
ostensibly meant to remind the Army to remain apolitical,
but close observers felt it was an attempt to dim Arana ' s
presidential hopes. A minority of FPL members still

strongly favored Arana for president, and they organized

27
pro-Arana groups throughout Guatemala. Mundo Libre

identified one such group, led by FPL member Hector

Espaha in Chiquimula. Arana encouraged this movement,

helping establish the Partido Social Revolucionario to

29
further advance his candidacy.

Arbenz also wanted to be President. The son of

a Swiss immigrant and a ladino mother, Arbenz excelled

at academics and sports. His distinguished work at the

military academy Escuela Politecnica earned him

promotions equaled only by six other cadets in the

academy's history. After graduation, he taught

physics, chemistry, the art of war, and history at the

academy. Arbenz became an enemy of the dictators earlier

169
than Arana, and he spent some time in exile before the

1 4- • 31

revolution.

Arbenz came to lead those officers who were
commonly called "the young military," designating a
progressive, often idealistic group; in the main young
graduates of the military academy. Although they
numbered only about 10% of the officers, their influence
exceeded the size of their group, because of Arbenz ' s
presence in the cabinet and their good relations with
other young Arevalistas. When Arevalista newspapers and
politicians referred to the heroic new revolutionary
military, they spoke in general to include the entire
military institution, but most often they praised in
particular the "Young Military," the phrase used by
contemporaries to identify the Arbenz faction. The CTG,
for example, claimed an alliance with the "Young and
Democratic Soldiers."

PAR, RN, and organized labor came to champion
Arbenz to become the next president, a decision probably
made early but only slowly made public. The Guatemalan
ambassador to Mexico, Juan Cordova Cerna, claimed that
since about 1947 rumors surfaced saying that at election
time the FPL would support Arana and that the PAR would
go with Arbenz. ^^ Schneider found that at least as early

170

as September 1948, PAR leaders and most labor leaders had

34
agreed on Arbenz for president.

Despite the fact that Arbenz had PAR and labor

support, he claimed to the United States Embassy that he

was a non-leftist. In 1944, in private conversation with

United States Ambassador Boaz Long, he warned that

Mexican leftists might help organize Guatemalan unions.

If labor ruled, he said, the United States stood to lose

its investments. According to Boaz Long, Arbenz hoped

"that something might be thought out whereby we would be

sympathetic when those in control of affairs in Guatemala

(presumedly to include Arbenz) sought to liberate

themselves from the skillful impositions" of labor

35
organizers. In effect, Arbenz had asked for aid to

combat leftism if needed. In April of 1945, Arbenz

said he opposed sending military officers to Mexico for

he abhorred the leftist Mexican influence. Instead he

wanted to organize the entire Guatemalan Army along the

3 fi
lines of that of the United States. Arbenz would

continue his overtures to the United States while an

active presidential candidate in 1949 and 1950, as will

be seen in chapter twelve.

Arbenz may have misrepresented himself to the

Embassy, but truly his lifestyle did not reflect a

leftist ideology or a special concern for the masses. On

171

August 18, 1947, the Guatemalan property registry

recorded the sale of the large finca "El Caj5n" to Jacobo

37
Arbenz for 125,000 dollars. El Cajon, located in the

rich farm area of Esquintla, stretched over 3,898

manzanas. A close business associate of Arbenz, Minor

Keilhauer, owned a 5 , 470-manzana farm called "Los

3 8
Cerritos." Nuestro Diario claimed that these fincas.

El Cajon and Los Cerritos, were two of the best in

39
Central America. Other Arbenz cronies had large

landholdings , for the most part recently acquired.

Because of their involvement in cotton production, Jaime

Diaz called this group "the new cotton bourgeoisie."

Some Arbenz supporters had reputations as anti-leftists

and anti-communists, including Carlos Aldana and Victor
Sandoval .

In essence, Arbenz was a progressive nationalist
and a capitalist. He wanted Guatemala to be a modern
capitalist country: he himself claimed to be not a

"spiritual socialist, nor a socialist of any other

ii42
type. Like most Guatemalans, Arbenz was also an

economic nationalist. In 1946, an official of the U.S.

Embassy witnessed a revealing reaction from Arbenz at one

of Guatemala's nightclubs. Once, as the music started,

a man asked Mrs. Arbenz to dance. As she headed for the

floor, Arbenz "partly rose from the table and said that

172

he would be damned if he would let his wife dance with
the United Fruit Company." The U.S. official asked who
the man was, and Arbenz admitted he did know his name,
but that he worked for the United Fruit Company. Arbenz

said "he did not like his wife even to be seen in the

43
company of "'those people.'"

Arbenz, in a 1949 private conversation with

Ambassador Patterson would speak for a long time, "with

obvious sincerity and clarity of language," about the

economic, social, and democratic goals of the revolution.

Arbenz complained about landowners who blocked reform,

and said that a decent wage must be paid to agricultural

workers, although he was careful to add, "there is no

intention to discriminate against foreign firms, and

there is no desire on the part of the Arevalo

44
administration to communize the country." Friends of

Arbenz demonstrated similar reformist and modernizing

tendencies. For example. Minor Kelhauer allowed his

workers on Los Cerritos a modern union and a chance to

buy land. Kelhauer also had a large experiment underway

45
to make paper pulp from plant products.

Arbenz shared common interests with leftists in

such areas as labor and agrarian reform and he proved

willing to work with them. "Almost from the start of the

revolution," wrote Pellecer, "Arbenz was a friend, or

173

friendly, with those of us who would later be leading

46
Communists." But he was neither a Marxist, nor just an

idealist. He wished to modernize and enrich Guatemala,

and as capitalists everywhere, planned to enrich himself

along the way. "Arbenz had ideas, not ideology," claimed

nil 47

Pellecer .

The U.S. Embassy officials, whose dispatch reports

often suggest a personal dislike for him, considered

48
Arbenz to be an ambitious opportunist. They thought

that while he presented himself as a foe of leftism, he

in fact meant to prime the United States in order to

receive substantial aid, for himself and for Guatemala.

Certainly, Arbenz did seek the favor of the United

States, to help insure a continuation of U.S.

investment, aid, and capital loans which he knew

Guatemala needed. But, as a progressive interested

in Guatemala's future, Arbenz was more than an ambitious

opportunist. Also, in addition to a desire for aid,

Arbenz probably tried to sweet-talk Embassy officials

because he agreed with the first rule of the

ex-Guatemalan dictator Manuel Estrada Cabrera: to stay in

power one should never fall out of favor with the United

49
States.

The division in the military thus largely

corresponded to the division in civilian politics. The

174
officers led by Arbenz shared common goals with the
civilian progressives and leftists, and the officers
under Arana allied with the civilian moderates and
conservatives. The "pacto de la barranca" and the
desires to be President demonstrated the continuing
involvement of the military in politics. Meanwhile, with
Arana remaining the most powerful military leader, the
reform movement had a strong moderating hand which helped
hold back leftist advances.

Notes

1. American University, Case Studies in
Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Guatemala 1944-1954
(Washington D.C., 1964), 82; Frankel, "Political
Development," 122, 131, 134.

2. NAUS 814.002/3-1745 no. 2271.

3. "El nuevo ejercito," Revista Militar, 3:4
(March and April 1945), 6-7.

4. NAUS 814.00/2-945; 814.00/3-945 no. 2237;
814.00/6-545 no. 131 .

5. Silvert, A Study in Government, 8.

6. Ibid., 10.

7. NAUS 814.00/6-745 no. 386; 814.00/6-845
no. 153; 814.00/6-1445; 814.00/6-1845 Memo; 814.00/7-1345
no. 37 .

8. Marta Cehelsky, "Habla Arbenz," Alero,
8 (Sept. -Oct. 1974), 119, 121; American University,
Studies , 5 .

175

9. See for example: Clemente Marroquin Rojas,
"Dejo de existir el coronal Saturnine Barrera," La Hora,
May 18, 1976; Frankel, "Political Development," 124.

10. Monteforte Toledo, Monograf la , 360.

11. NAUS 814.00/3-945 no. 2237.

12. Ibid.

13. NAUS 814.20/2-1945 no. 2155.

14. Cehelsky, "Habla Arbenz , " 121.

15. "Nuevo gabinete," Istmania, March 24,1951,
6-9. All three became prominent members of the Arbenz
administration.

16. Najera, Estafadores, 106; Miguel Ydigoras
Fuentes, My War with Communism (New Jersey, 1963), 225;
NAUS 814.00/1-1647; Manuel Galich, Replica a Garcia
Granados (Guatemala, 1950), 18; Ramon Blanco, "Galera,"
El Imparcial, March 27, 1956; Schneider, Communism, 28;
Oscar Barrios Castillo, interview with author, Guatemala
City, July 14, 1987; Francisco Villagran Kramer, "Los
pactos," Prensa Libre Domingo, July 5, 1987, p. 11.
Exactly who attended the secret meeting, and what was
agreed upon, remains controversial. According to
Villagran Kramer, the pact (which was never made public)
was written on a page in a notebook and now lies in the
archives of Carlos Paz Tejada, in Mexico.

17. Najera, Estafadores, 106.

18. NAUS 814.002/3-1745 no. 2271; Alvaro
Contreras Velez , "Cacto," Prensa Libre, Feb. 23, 1984;
Oscar Barrios Castillo, interview with author, Guatemala
City, July 14, 1987; Marco Antonio Villamar Contreras,
interview with author, Guatemala City, July 17, 1987;
Oscar Benitez Bone, interview with author, Guatemala
City, July 1 , 1 987.

19. Clemente Marroquin Rojas, "Me piden terciar
en cierta discordia," La Hora, August 19, 1976.

176

20. El Imparcial, Jan. 18, 1958. Mendez would
become an outstanding politician again after 1954, in a
political climate that would make him appear to the left
of the mainstream--although his views remained
essentially unchanged. The same could be said for his
brother, Julio Cesar (President of Guatemala 1966-1970),
who had also supported Francisco Arana .

21. Manuel Maria Avila Ayala, "El Col. Arana
murio de rauerte natural," Nuestro Diario, August 2, 1949,
p. 3.

22. Ydigoras Fuentes, My War, 226; NAUS
814.00/2-747 AGM; 814.00/6-349 no. 267.

23. Pellecer, "Respuesta," 1.

24. Jorge Arriola, interview with author,
Guatemala City, June 27, 1986.

25. Nuestro Diario, June 19, 1949.

26. NAUS 814.00/11-1048.

27. Najera, Estaf adores, 107.

28. Mundo Libre, Jan. 21, 1950.

29. Schneider, Communism, 29.

30. El Imparcial, Jan. 27, 1971. See also:
Francisco Armando Samayoa Coronado , La Escuela
Politecnica a traves de su historia, vol.2 (Guatemala,
1964), 127, 343.

31. Curriculum del Coronel Jacobo Arbenz G.,
LCMD/GD, Armed Forces and Defense-Box 1 .

32. "Manifesto del Comite de Accion Politica de
la clase trabaj adora , " LCMD/GD, CAP-Box 15. For an
example of revolutionary enthusiasm from a young
army captain who idealized the role of Guatemalan
youth--military and civilian--see Jorge Medina Coronado,
"iLlego la hora ! , " Revista Militar, (March-April 1945),
3.

33. Istmania, June 19, 1950, 7.

34. Schneider, Communism, 134.

177

35. NAUS 814.00/12-1644 no. 1886.

36. NAUS 814.00/4-2445.

3443, FoUo 76?'Llbro 4o''der"'''^'' ^-^-^^a, Pinca
Folders-'Box 4?°"'"" ^" Fincas," LCMD/GD, President's

39. Nuestr^_Diario, August 3, 1949, p. 6.

41- NAUS 814.00/7846 no. 1529; OIR 5123, 72.

President's Fo^derT-'-Box 4 ^\i ^^^^^ionario, " LCMD/GD,
Arbenz," 116. ^' ^^^° ^^^'' Celhelsky, "Habla

43
44,
45.

46.

47.

48.

NAUS 814.00/8-146 Memo.
NAUS 711.14/8-1249 no. 435.
Suslow, "Social Reforms," 89,
Pellecer, "Respuesta," 3.
Ibid.

814.00/7!i949T™o/"-°'''"'-'"^ ""^H'- 8,4.00/8-146;

m

CHAPTER 1 1
THE USA AND GUATEMALA,
1 945-1 949

Two obstacles that troubled the reform movement
have already been described: the conflict and disunity
within the pro-government forces; and the tactics of the
opposition groups. The United States government and U.S.
companies, working in tandem to protect their perceived
interests, would constitute a third obstacle. United
States policy in Guatemala was based on a defense of U.S.
business interests, and on the elimination of communis
and "near-communism," even though U.S. companies often
worked contrary to the just needs of the Guatemalans , and
communism (in Guatemala) remained a minor threat to
United States interests.

Initially, official governmental relations between
the United States and post-revolution Guatemala were
cordial. During State Department deliberations after the
fall of Ponce, some officials worried that the Arevalista
movement might eventually run counter to U.S. interests,
but majority opinion held that the new government would
remain friendly and not threaten U.S. interests.^ The
legal status of the triumvirate government was recognized

178

1 79

after a few weeks. In fact, many United States officials
demonstrated sympathy with Guatemala's hope to win
freedom and democracy, and well they should have, for it
was obv.ous that the revolutionaries looked to the United
States for the style of democracy they wished to develop
in Guatemala. Guatemalan newspapers in general depicted
the united States as a world democratic leader. The
first post-revolution government, the triumvirate Junta,
consisted of two members of the historically conservative
military, and the third man represented the conservative
landowners class. Boaz Long, the U.S. ambassador to
Guatemala since March 1943, reported that steps taken by
the Junta appeared "quite moderate and middle of the
road. "2 Moreover, the actions of the Junta had been
popular, and seemed in the best interests of the nation,
providing "a basis for the assertion that it was a most
'democratic' revolution."^

Initial reports on Juan Jose Arivalo appeared
favorable. Arevalo, although he spoke against foreign
economic domination, praised the United States for its
high level of democracy and its role in World War II. ^
The united States Embassy in Argentina investxgated
Arevalo' s Argentine record, and found him "satisfactory
from a United States viewpoint. "^ john F. Griffiths, an

180

officer at the embassy and a "close friend and confidant

of Dr. Arevalo", wrote:

I am so sure of Arevalo' s honesty, sincerity and
intelligence that I feel bound to surmise that if,
as president of his country, he places obstacles
in the way of friendly and cooperative relations
with the United States it will be because of real
disillusionment or because of circumstance beyond
his control.

Boaz Long believed that Juan Jose Arevalo was

a sincere educator, concerned for the Indians and poor

ladinos, but he thought Arevalo would be a cautious and

not a radical president; a president who realized

"progress will undoubtedly be painfully slow." The

ambassador further believed that a need for capital and

technology would influence the Guatemalan government to

overlook laws made to protect economic sovereignty.

Although much enthusiasm had been expressed by the

revolutionaries, the Embassy expected them to move in a

"conventional way" toward democratic government. The

Embassy, however, did perceive a number of potential

enemies to United States interests. These individuals

they watched carefully. FBI reports made in early 1945

reflected a fear that communists might try to establish a

1 0
base in Guatemala.

In spite of their attraction to a U.S. style

democracy, many Guatemalans made a clear distinction

between the democratic government enjoyed by U.S.

181

citizens, and the imperialist actions of U.S. owned
businesses in Guatemala. Not unusual was the January 13,
1945, issue of El Libertador, which criticized
International Railways of Central America (IRCA) for its

connections to Ubico and its fight against "the just

1 1
demands" of the workers. The newly formed unions made

wide use of labor strikes, and U.S. owned companies were

affected earlier than most Guatemalan companies. In

January 1946, the railway union Sindicato Accion y

Mejoramiento Ferrocarrilero (SAMF) wrote a letter to the

manager of IRCA, declaring "we will not tolerate more

1 2

despotism on your part." SAMF proved to be an

extremely aggressive union, and caused IRCA many

1 3
difficulties. Much of the criticism directed to

foreign companies came from political leftists, but

critics included moderates and conservatives, among them

Manuel Cobos Batres, a strong Catholic and far right

conservative, who in 1945 published handbills that

condemned U.S. imperialism and political intervention in

Guatemala.

The U.S. companies, the largest being United Fruit

Company ( UFCO ) , International Railways of Central

America, Empresa Electrica, and Pan American World

Airways, had become an integral part of the Guatemalan

economic status quo. When the reformist revolution

182

swept Guatemala, UFCO and othpr ri q

otner U.S. companies joined the

opposition in an all-out effort to halt ohange and secure
a continuation of the benefits of the past. All of the™
faced serious labor difficulties under Arevalo. United
States citrzens had invested 90 to ,00 milUon dollars in
Guatemala by ,944,'= and „bico had ".ranted so ™any
-nopolies that, by the ti.e of the ,944 revolution,
united states companies virtually dictated Guatemala's

economic life "'^ ri c

"■^- companies dominated land

transportation, shipping and port facilities, airways,
electric power, and communications. United Fruit (which
also owned a controlling interest in IRCA, monopolized
the banana trade and a majority of the production, and
also monopolized Guatemala's shipping and port
facilities.

The united Fruit also used corrupt tactics in
order to make excessive profits. For example, in order to
escape^ taxes and accrue larger profits, UFCO juggled its
books. ^7 In fact, UFCO paid almost no taxes at all and
overcharged its Guatemalan transportation customers. ^«
The Guatemalan Minister of Economy and Labor, Alfonso
Bauer Paiz, figured that UFCO earned about 10 million
dollars a year more than its yearly expenditures. The
profits stayed in the United States and did not return,
which resulted in a net loss for Guatemala. ^^

183

Guatemalan reformers saw the U.S. companies and
the U.S. government as part of the same imperialist camp.
Ambassador Boaz Long, who had cultivated chummy relations
with Ubico and the wealthy landowners, had won for
himself deep-seated animosity. Jacobo Arbenz admitted to

an embassy official in 1946 that he had hated Boaz

20
Long. President Arevalo had only contempt for Long, who

with other previous ambassadors had been the "instrument

of American companies.

Edwin J. Kyle, an agriculturist and educator who

became ambassador in February 1945, managed to be more

popular, as he demonstrated a true respect for

22
Guatemala. President Arevalo expressed great admiration

for Kyle, and said that "Ambassador Kyle was the first

really decent diplomat that the United States had had in

23 '

Guatemala." Kyle, in return, held Arevalo in high

24 ,

esteem. Kyle claimed that he used the embassy s

25
influence to promote stability and democracy, and one

incident that shows his attitude is documented. During

Arevalo' s row with Jorge Toriello in 1945, the United

States quietly gave the president support. Kyle

instructed U.S. Chiefs of Military and Military Aviation

Missions to "unofficially" comment to Guatemalan military

officers that U.S. did not favor Arevalo' s overthrow.

Violent or unconstitutional actions, they were instructed

184
to say, might hinder further military aid co-operation.
U.S. officials thought this maneuver would curb Francisco
Arana if he decided to stop protecting the new government
and join Jorge Toriello. What effect, if any, this
warning had on Arana is not known, although he did not,
of course, join Toriello.

In 1946, despite the obvious potential for
increased conflict, and the enmity between reformers and
U.S. business, official relations between the two nations
remained cordial. Arevalo himself remained in good favor
with the United States. In November, Rodolfo Rivera, the
United States Cultural Attache, called President Arevalo
"definitely friendly to the U.S. and inspired by the

democratic principles to which he would like to

27
adhere. But the United States of course continued to

exhibit concern over the actions of leftist politicians

and labor leaders. For example, the Embassy thought

(wrongly) that Jorge Garcia Granados (the ex-President of

the Constitutional Assembly) was a far leftist who might

favor expropriation of IRCA with inadequate

2 8

compensation.

In January of 1947, the U.S. Embassy noted that
much of labor had become angry at Arevalo, for using army
troops to break up strikes, and declaring all strikes
illegal until Congress passed a labor code. The Embassy

185

thought that the Arevalo government would continue to
steer a middle ground political course, believing that

Arevalo would not last long in office if he tried

2 9
otherwise. As the year progressed, however, with the

passage of the Labor Code, the increasing growth and

radicalization of the labor unions, and the increasing

leftist nature of the Arevalo government (see chapter 9)

governmental relations between the U.S.A. and Guatemala

would become increasingly bad.

May 1, 1947, the day of promulgation for the Labor

Code, marks a watershed event in US-Guatemalan relations.

UFCO, with U.S. government backing, would become a

leading opponent of the new code. The company claimed

that some of the provisions, especially article 13 and

article 243, directly discriminated against foreign

companies. Article 13 set limits on the numbers of

foreign employees that could work in Guatemala, while

article 243 permitted, among other things, harvesttime

strikes against companies with 500 or more agricultural

workers; and against companies which operated in more

than one department or economic area and employed 1000 or

more workers. UFCO representatives were especially angry

over article 243, for they claimed that only U.S.

companies had such a high number of employees; a claim

disputed by the Guatemalan government. The company

186
warned that the labor code would weaken Guatemala's
economy, and openly speculated on the cutting back of
UFCO's operations. ^^

The U.S. government would quickly become allied to
the U.S. companies' point of view, and 1947 would thus
become a year of worsening governmental relations between
the United States and Guatemala. In May 1947, U.S. labor
leader Serafino Romualdi, with U.S. government approval
and possibly its financial help, visited Guatemala, in

vain, to drum up pro-U.S. support within Guatemalan

., 32

labor. In July and August, 1947, the State

Department's Chief of Division of Central American and
Panama Affairs, Robert Newbegin, visited Guatemala to
voice the Department's opposition to the aforementioned
labor code articles. ^^ United States officials in the
main apparently accepted the U.S. businessmen's points of
view with obvious ease, and demonstrated little empathy
for the labor movement.

Fears of communism grew in 1947. In September,
the Embassy reported that it had "no doubt that
communist organization exists in Guatemala and that kn
communists have received support from the president
himself." The Embassy speculated that Arevalo's publicly
professed dislike for communism might be "simply to pull
wool over the eyes of the U.S."^^ U.S. government

a

own

187
officials also increasingly suspected Arevalo of
international activities beneficial to the communist
cause, including his support of the so called Caribbean
Legion, a small military group formed to combat Caribbean
dictators. ^^

in October, 1947, the State Department requested
the Embassy to make an in-depth report on communism in
Guatemala. The report still had not been finished in
April of 1948, prompting the State Department to make a
follow up request, because "an urgent need has developed"
for the report on communism. ^^ Milton K. Wells, First
secretary of the Embassy, finished his report, "Communism
in Guatemala," in May, 1948. ^^ According to Wells,
communism had made "startling progress" between 1944 and
1947, and had reached "dangerous proportions . "^8 The
PAR platform on social, labor, and economic issues
exhibited a "strong Marxist influence. "^^ Although
communists numbered "probably not more than two hundred,"
in all of Guatemala, their influence reached a level "far
out of proportion to their numbers," partly because thev
remained undercover; and partly because some of them held
key positions. ^0 a few suspects remained in FPL and RN,
but most were in PAR, while communism had made "serious
headway" in labor. ^^ m the international field,
government policy "all too frequently coincides with

188

Soviet policy" "Strong overtones" of class warfare
existed, and a "strong current of class consciousness...
prevails in the present revolutionary regime." Arevalo
"is an open and vociferous champion of labor," and

communists occupy "positions of importance" in Arevalo' s

44
presidential office. Arevalo was "a political

opportunist of the extreme left, who admits the fallacies

of Marxism, but who believes that the chief function of

the State is to champion the underprivileged and force

needed social and economic reforms upon the intransigent

45
conservatives and the reaction.'"

However, Wells believed that the trend toward

communism "seemingly has been reversed by the forces for

moderation and unless unforeseeable developments check

46
this trend, communism should be contained. An attempt

in 1947 to establish a Marxist party had failed, "and

there is no evidence which would indicate that plans

47
in that direction now exist." The current political

trend, in early 1948, was moving more toward the center,

48
as indicated by FPL displeasure with PAR. The

opposition of the "propertied classes" had become

49
stronger and better organized. Guatemala remained

an agricultural country, not industrialized, with a

50
"relatively sound" economy and no extreme misery.

The armed forces retained a privileged and powerful role

189
in Guatemala, and communist influence within the military
remained "non consequential . "51 The recent rioting at
Bogota had had "a sobering influence upon all but the
extremist elements in Guatemala."" Russian world
expansionist plans had recently become better understood
in Guatemala, also producing a sobering influence. '^
Finally, "persistent rumors" continued to indicate that a

military coup would soon eradicate Arevalo and the

54
co^xsts. All in all, united States security was not

in danger. The "chief concern" for the .o.ent was the
possible harrr, that communist influences might inflict
upon UFCo and IRCA.^^ The State Department rated the
wells report on communism an "outstanding despatch."
Wells received a letter of commendation from the Director
of the Office of the Foreign Service, noting that his
report had been "rated EXCELLENT. "^^

Fears for U.S. national security would remain for
a time a relatively minor factor in Guatemalan relations.
Only occasionally was the subject directly treated. A
State Department Policy Statement on Guatemala, dated
August 17, 1948, for example, recognized security
concerns, but found little over which to be alarmed. The
polxcy statement noted that leftist activity could
endanger the United States' use during a future war of
military aviation bases in Guatemala which during World

190

War II had served as a link with the Canal Zone and for
long distance patrol, but which they were not in use in
1948. In case of war, the writers of the policy statement

speculated that Guatemalan support for the United States

57
would probably be prompt.

Relations between the two nations, howev.;r,

worsened. In 1948, Col. Mark A. Devine, Jr., military

attache to the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, was charged

with interfering in the internal affairs of Guatemala,

C Q

and declared persona non grata. The State Department
demonstrated its resolve to get tough when Richard C.
Patterson replaced Ambassador Kyle in September 1948.
Patterson was a business impresario and former chairman
of the board of Radio Keith Orpheum, from 1940 to 1944.
According to Cole Blasier, "promotion was his specialty

and U.S. business interests in Guatemala were his major

S 9
concern." Patterson had served as ambassador to

Yugoslavia from late 1944 to May 1947, had proven himself

to be an enthusiastic and fearless anti-communist. As

expected, Patterson sided completely with U.S.

V. • 60
business .

During the remainder of 1948, the labor movement

continued to gain strength, and serious conflicts between

unions and U.S. companies occurred. A large Puerto

Barrios dockworkers strike against UFCO in late 1948 led

1 91
to a confrontation with Arevalo. Both UFCO and the
unions refused to compromise or accept arbitration,
eventually causing a cutback in the UFCO shipping
operations. National imports and exports were affected,
and the Guatemalan economy slowed down. On January 28,
1949, an executive decree from Arlvalo declared the port
and UFCO plantation facilities to be "public utilities,"
which then gave the government the right to suspend the
strike and order arbitration. UFCO defied the order,
and twenty-four hours later shut down Puerto Barrios
completely. UFCO escaped unpunished, and a new contract
reached in March 1949, cut out many of the workers'
demands. 6^ However, UFCO pointed out that it had lost
time and money combating labor strikes, and claimed that
the new reform laws had begun to drain company coffers.
UFCO financial reports for 1948 indicated that labor
rights and benefits established by the Labor Code cost
the company $1,080,193, and social security dues and wage
increases cost another $83,697.^^

A Policy Statement of May, 1949, expressed an
increased displeasure with Guatemalan developments.
Anti-United States propaganda in Guatemala continued, and
the government had a "hostile attitude toward U.S.
capital." Guatemala must "correct their unfair
legislative and administrative treatment of American

192

enterprises."" m Central American affairs, Guatemala

had joined "with a group of self-righteous democratic

governments" which advocated the overthrow of dictators,

thus leading to instability in the region. ^^ No

confidence could be demonstrated for the future. Four

years of experience with Arevalo proved that little would

change these attitudes, which were "injurious to the

broad interest of Guatemala, of the United States, and of

the world democratic cause."" The United States had

failed to change these "inimical Guatemalan attitudes,"

in part because "the harmful nature and far-reaching

effects of those attitudes have only recently become

evident in all their extent."" The United States,

however, remained confident that the situation would

improve, because it was expected the pending end of

Guatemala's wartime boom would make clear to the

Guatemalans "the injurious nature of some of the extreme

and ill-formed policies they have been following."

Furthermore, the United States would not support

Arevalo's overthrow. Although his policies were

injurious to the democratic cause, "at the same time it

must be recognized that Arevalo was popularly elected,

appears to enjoy the support of the Guatemalan people,

and on the whole is democratic in spirit and in

fi 7
action." But relations between the countries continued

193
to worsen during 1949, and in June, shortly before the
assassination of Francisco Arana, a State Department
office memo noted that, especially during the previous
few months, "things in Guatemala have not been going well
for our national interests . "^^

Arevalo and the vast majority of the Arevalistas
disbelieved that Guatemala was or could be a threat
to U.S. national security, or world democracy, and they
strongly believed that the United States, in turning
against their reform movement, was defending selfish
economic interests. Labor leader Manuel Pinto Usaga
claimed that the Embassy and the U.S. -owned companies
misinformed both Washington and the U.S. public about the
true nature of the Guatemalan reform movement. ^^ Arevalo
himself advised Wells, just two weeks before Arana ' s
death, that the situation in Guatemala was a part of "the
worldwide struggle between capitalism and labor." m
order to conquer communism, said Arevalo, injustice and
the conditions that breed poverty (the "fertile soil for
communist ideas,") must be eliminated. Furthermore, said
Arevalo, U.S. policy added fuel to the cause of
extremists.

Guatemalans suspected the U.S. government and U.S.
companies of contributing money and advice to rebellious
factions of the opposition, ^^ which could well have been

1 94
the truth; but hard evidence Is lacking. Arevalo
believed that urco helped finance the opposition: he
called UFCO his "worst ene.y."'^ ,,,,,,, „^ ^^ ^^.^^^^^
UFCO „ade "a very strong campaign to pull .e out of

power. "'^ U.S. archival records sh„w th ^

lecoras show that conspirators

against Arevalo did si- ^n^~

aid at times contact United States

Officials, asking for aid or in one case the United
States' "blessing, "^^ but the records ,if they can be
believed) indicate that aid was not given.

By July, ,8, 1949, the day of Arana's death, th
united states government had completely given up on
Arevalo, and had developed only enmity for the reform
movement in general. It had hoped that with time, and
U.S. pressure, Guatemala would back away from its
revolutionary ideology, but with Arana's death and the
rise of Arbenz just the opposite would occur.

Notes

1. NAUS 814.00/11-1346 Memo.

2. NAUS 814.00/1-445 no. 1948.

3. Ibid.

4. Arevalo, Escritos poHMnoe, 65.

5. NAUS 814.00/1-945 tel.

6. NAUS 814.00/1-1345 no. 17049.

e

195

7. NAUS 814.002/3-1745 no. 2271.

8. NAUS 814.011/3-2945 no. 2315.

9. NAUS 81 4.00/4-2445.

1 0. NAUS 81 4.00B/8-2345.

^ '' • El Libertador^ Jan. 13, 1945, p.i,

de Gobe^ciorvarlosf"' """• "' ''«' ''^' «-isterio

13. Handy, "Revolution," 108.

14. NAUS 711 .14/1-1945 no. 1995.

15. Richard Immerman, The CIA in Guatpm;^!^- th^
.Foreign Policy of Interv.ni- .- .n -..„.... /^^^^f^-^^^^-J^^

t974;:^'?0 "'""'' °" ""^^^ ^"^^-^^-' Guatemala ^n': York'

Paiz roL ^^1^^' Public Finance. 34; Alfonso Bauer

!!'!^ llll!? ?' ""^^'"^ ^^^""' "" ^^ntroamerica:^y
caso de Guatemala (Mexico, 1956), 331; Handy, Gift, 82;

18. Immerman, The CIA. 72.

19. Bauer Paiz, Como opera. 360.

20. NAUS 814.00/8-146 Memo.

21. NAUS 814.00/9-1246 no. 1736.

^t-.^ e^^- .,,^yl^'s letter to Assistant Secretary of
State Spruille Braden, dated October 1945, demonstrates
Kyle s feelings. Kyle wrote: "l desire to state that I
Success7uTbnS'™'"'^ acquainted with many of the most
successful businessmen and finca owners. They are the
balance wheels" of this country, i am in hope that I
can convince them that it takes time to develop and build
a Democracy, but that the final result is so much to be

196

desired, as is so well demonstrated in the effort and the
patience which are essential in accomplishing such a
desirable end. This is truly a wonderful country. There
are many fine people here. They have all been so kind
and friendly to me and Mrs. Kyle. I am now terribly
anxious to help them not only in the development of their
natural resources but in building a real Democracy."
NAUS 814.00/10-145 no. 681.

23. NAUS 814.00/9-1246 no. 1736.

24. NAUS 71 1 .1 4/12-1 745.

25. NAUS 814.00/10-145 no. 681.

26. NAUS 814.00/8-3045 no. 682.

27. NAUS 814.00/11-1346 Memo.

28. NAUS 711.14/12-246 Memo.

29. NAUS 81 4.00/1-247.

30. NAUS 814.6156/11-2247 tele. Guatemala
claimed that seven native companies were also affected.

31. Ibid.

32. Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant (Pittsburg,
1976), 57.

33. NAUS 814.00/7-1547. For details on
Department reaction to the labor code, see United States
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States 1947: The American Republics (Washington, 1972),
705-719.

34. NAUS 814.00/10-247 Memo.

35. Frankel, "Political Development," 68-78;
Charles Ameringer, The Democratic Left in Exile (Miami,
1974), 66-67. "

36. NAUS 81 4.00B/4-1 348 no.A-74.

37. NAUS 81 4.00B/5-648 no . 2 1 7 .

38. Ibid., 1.

39. Ibid., 3.

197

40. Ibid., 4.

41. Ibid., 5.

42. Ibid., 13.

43. Ibid., 14.

44. Ibid., 15.

45. Ibid., 16.

46. Ibid., 1.

47. Ibid., 3.

48. Ibid., 19.

49. Ibid., 20.

50. Ibid., 19.

51. Ibid., 20.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., 21.

54. Ibid., 22.

55. Ibid.

56. NAUS 814.00B/5-648 CS/A.

57. NAUS 711.14/8-1748 Policy Statement,
NAUS OIR 5123, 65.
Blasier, Hovering Giant. 59.

58
59

60,

For more detail on Patterson, see Ir

The CIA. 98-99. -auu«xt=on, see immerman,

61. Bush, "Organized Labor," part 2, pp. 27-28.

62. Ibid., part 3, p. 35.

63. NAUS 711.14/5-1349 Policy Statement , 1 -2 .

198

64. Ibid., 9,

65. Ibid., 14.

66. Ibid., 3.

67. Ibid., 14.

68. 71 1 .14/6-749 Memo.

69. Manuel Pinto Usaga, "Dos embajadores , "
Diario de la Manana . p. 5.

70

71

NAUS 711.14/6-3049

Baur Paiz, Como opera. 322-323; NAUS
814.00/5-2846 no. 1412; 814.00/1-1149 no 23-
814.00/10-748 no. 511; Celhelsky, "Habla Arbenz , " 12o! '

72. Juan Jose Arevalo, interview with author,
Guatemala City, July 14, 1986.

73. Juan Jose Arevalo, letter to author, April
15, 1984.

74. NAUS 814.00/4-846; 814.00/10-946 no 1483-
814.00/4-1046; 814.00/3-2647; 814.00/7-2749 no. 397.

CHAPTER 12
ELIMINATION OF ARANA, 1949

Colonel Francisco Arana, chief of the Armed Forces
and ex-member of the post-revolution Junta, met his death
in July, 1949, killed by men who supported Jacobo Arbenz
and President Arivalo. A small civil war then broke out
between forces loyal to the Guatemalan government and
Arbenz, and the forces which remained loyal to Arana.
The Arana forces lost; the leftist political elements,
in particular the Partido Accion Revolucionaria (PAR),
Renovaci5n Nacional (RN), and the Marxists, gained
greater political power. Arbenz had his road to the
presidency nearly guaranteed, while Arevalista moderates,
in particular the Frente Popular Libertador (FPL),
continued to lose power and influence in 1950. Arana ' s
death would greatly alter Guatemalan political reality.

The story of Arana ' s death has remained
controversial up to the present day. By best accounts,
however, on July 18, 1949, Col. Arana drove to the chalet
Morion in Amatitlan to inspect a recently discovered
cache of 500 rifles, accompanied by Col. Felipe Antonio
Gir5n (Chief of the Presidential Staff), Major Absalon
Peralta (Arana's aide), and Francisco Palacio (Arana's

199

driver). Chief of poUce Col. victor Sandoval followed
Arana in another car. On the return trip Arana and the
three men in his car traveled alone, because Col.
Sandoval had driven back earUer. Approaching the bridge
La Gloria, Arana found his path blocked by a vehicle, and
he stepped from his car to investigate the trouble,
suddenly a group of men, including congressman Alfonso
Martinez Estevez and others assocrated wxth the
government and Arbenz, emerged from a vehxcle positioned
behind Arana. Shooting started from somewhere, possibly
several places, and Arana fell to the ground dead . ^

When news of the killing reached Arana ' s followers
in the capital, they reacted with an attack on the
National Palace which launched a two day civil war
between Arana ' s followers and government forces. Officers
and civilians loyal to Arana commanded the important Army
barracks Guardia de Honor and possibly ninety percent of
the soldiers. 2 The government forces consisted of the
Arbenz faction in the Army, the Air Force, the police,
members of the so-called Caribbean Legion, and armed
units of workers. The civilian forces proved to be
especially valuable.^ The cadets of the Escuela
Politecnica also joined the government troops.^ Aerial
strafings, bombings, and ground combat marked the
fighting, all of which took place in Guatemala City, and

201
several hundred people were killed. In the evening of
the 19th, the leaders of the Arana forces agreed to a
nearly unconditional surrender.^

During the months before Arana ' s death, his
relations with the leftists had worsened, and grown
critical. In addition, Arana and Arivalo had long known
astrained relationship over their political differences.
According to General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, President
Arevalo once said of his relationship with Arana that
"there are two presidents in Guatemala, and one (Arana)
IS constantly pointing a machine gun at the other. "^
Apocryphal or not, the statement reflects both Arana ' s
great power as head of the military and his political
differences with Arevalo. Rumors of an Arana-led coup
d'etat became increasingly prevalent in 1948, rumors
which suggested that the colonel only awaited the right
opportunity and a reasonable excuse to overthrow
Arevalo.^ In February of 1949, a United States Embassy
report stated that Arana and Arevalo had completely
broken off what remained of their working relationship.^

Arana gave no open indication that his relations
with the government had degenerated, but he worked to
strengthen his hold over the military. Under the
Constitution, to be a candidate for president Arana had
to resign his military post six months before the

202
elections, which were to be held on November 10, 11, and
12 of 1950. Arana most of all needed to gain control of
the next Consejo Superior de Guerra. The council would
be elected in July of 1949, by the top military leaders
in secret ballot. Council members would then have the
responsibility of sending the names of three men to
Congress, of whom one would be elected the Chief of
Armed Forces to serve under the next prp-ident. The
Embassy reported that Arana successfully arranged and won
the election but that Arbenz demanded another election.
According to the report, Arana ' s men also won the second
election, but the Embassy could not be sure that it had
obtained the correct information. Ronald Schneider
claims the second vote had not been taken, but rather had
been scheduled for late July.''° Arbenz later claimed
final voting had been scheduled for the day that Arana
died. In any case, it was crucial that Arana control
the Supreme War Council in order to retain his command
over the military, and the Council elections caused much
turmoil .

Arana also sought to secure power in other ways.
On July 16, he replaced the head of the Air Force, Col.
Francisco Consenza, with an Aranista, Lt. Col. Arturo
Altolaguirre. On the same day Arana ordered a full
confiscation of arms held by the Caribbean Legion. Arana

203
did not trust the Legion, and feared that they might
become involved in internal politics. ^^

The official report of the Arevalo government
claimed that Col. Arana had been killed by unknown
criminals. The report praised Arana, and noted that
although many enemies of the Arevalo government had tried
to persuade Arana to lead a coup d'etat, Arana had always
remained a loyal revolutionary. But the official version
also noted that Col. Arana had steadfastly refused a
friendly alliance with the President. ^^

Another version of the killing held that Arana ' s
own followers had assassinated Arana in order to promote
a rebellion against Arevalo.''^ According to this
version, Arana ' s supporters had grown tired of the
colonel's refusal to overthrow Arevalo. Arbenz and
Arevalo would receive the blame for Arana ' s murder, and
the Aranistas could proceed with their desired coup.

The official report and also the second version
can be discounted. Too many witnesses saw the killers,
and recognized some as having connections with Arbenz or
Arevalo. Men who reportedly had a hand in the killing
were Col. Victor Sandoval (Director of National Police
and Arevalo's brother-in-law), Lt. Col. Enrique Blanco
(sub-director of the police), Alfonso Martinez and
Caribbean Legion Commander Francisco Morazan (both

204
confidants and later private secretaries of Arbenz ) , Lt.
Carlos Bracamonte (an aide to Arbenz), Carlos A. Palmieri
(friend of Arbenz), and the Minister of Communications
Col. Carlos Aldana Sandoval. ^^ Although proof is lacking,
and some of these men may have been wrongly accused, it
is clear that associates of Arbenz and Arevalo did the
shooting, a fact which Arbenz admitted in 1968.''^

One interpretation holds that Arana * s death had
been an accident. According to Arbenz, President Arevalo
ordered Arbenz to do anything necessary to stop Arana.
Arbenz met with political leaders, and they agreed to
remove Arana as Chief of Armed Forces. Alfonso Martinez
Estevez led a group of men to arrest Arana, but Arana ' s
military aide pulled his gun, shooting started and Arana

lost his life. Arbenz expressed great sorrow over this

1 7
misfortune. Pellecer claims that no one wanted to

silence Arana, but only to exile him, "to leave him with
his mouth open and moving." Arevalo agreed that
Arana 's death had been accidental, as did Marroquin
Roj as.

The idea that Arana died accidentally during the
arrest attempt has some merit. In the past, leaders
accused of coup attempts against the government had never
been intentionally killed, only jailed or exiled. No one
after Arana was killed under Arevalo. Both friends and

205
foes of Arevalo, including long time opponent Clemente
Marroqu£n Rojas, have found it difficult to believe that
Arevalo, a sincere humanist, would approve the killing of
Arana. This author also believes that murder would be
foreign to Arevalo' s character and public record.
Arevalo himself has flatly denied direct responsibility
for the murder, 20 and he has remained quiet about his
possible role in an arrest attempt.

In spite of the above testimonies to the
contrary, the men who shot Arana have been widely
accused by Arevalo's opposition of premeditated murder.
In support of this view, Francisco Palacio, Arana ' s
driver and an eyewitness, testified that the killers had
given Arana no chance to submit peacef ully . ^^ Also, a
North American who investigated the killing interviewed
eyewitnesses and concluded that the Chief of the
Presidential Staff, Col. Felipe Antonio Giron, shot
Arana in the back when he left the car.^^

Premeditated murder is certainly a possibility.
It would have been difficult to keep the militarily
powerful Arana in jail or exile, thus his murder may have
been deemed necessary. The circumstances at the site of
the killing, with a blocked vehicle and many armed men,
would have been more in keeping with an ambush than an
arrest. Najera speculated that Arevalo may not have

206
ordered the killing, but that Arbenz and others took the
matter into their own hands. ^^

According to rumors that circulated widely in
Guatemala preceding Arana ' s death, Arana was planning to
overthrow Arevalo. The United States Embassy reported
that a fairly reliable source claimed that Arana had
planned a coup for July 18, the day of his death. ^^
Arbenz agreed, and claimed that on the 16th Arana gave
the President an order to dissolve the cabinet within 48
hours, by 10 P.M. on July 18; or face a coup. According
to Arbenz, Arana had long been urged by civilian and
military conservatives, as well as by representatives of
the U.S. Embassy, to overthrow Arevalo, and Arana felt he
had to act or lose a segment of his supporters . ^^

Arana, however, probably had not planned any coup
against Arevalo, at least not for the day of his death.
Circumstances surrounding Arana ' s death indicate that he
had not readied himself for a military struggle. He and
his followers appeared surprised and unprepared for the
attack. Arana had been making an inspection of a cache
of arms about fifteen miles from Guatemala City; he had
taken no armed guard, and he made no secret of his
movements. Such activities would have been absurd for a
man who had threatened the President with an overthrow,
scheduled to take place that very day. Nor did Arana ' s

207
soldiers and political supporters in Guatemala City
appear to expect any trouble, for the government easily
succeeded in weakening the pro-Arana forces before
knowledge of the killing became public. Arevalo sent for
Aranista Col. Francisco Oliva, commander of the crucially
important Guardia de Honor. Oliva left his post and
appeared at the palace, where Arbenz placed him in
custody. other top commanders were also apprehended
and held at the palace. ^'^ such easy capture would have
been improbable for men allegedly ready to attack the
President on the same day. Nor were the Aranistas in the
Air Force ready for conflict. Francisco Consenza and six
men captured Air Force headquarters, while the Aranista
Air Force commander. Col. Altolaquirre , had been at
home. 2^ After the fighting started, the Aranistas fought
poorly. A telegram from the Department of State to the
Embassy at Caracas claimed that the Aranistas' movements
lacked plan or coordination, and that they probably
proceeded by spontaneous reaction. ^^ All told, it seems
very unlikely that Arana had planned a coup.

The government forces were better prepared; they
were expecting a reaction after Arana ' s arrest or death.
Their most formidable weapon had been surprise. If Arana
had taken the initiative instead of the government, or if

208
Arana had been allowed an even chance, the outcome could
well have been reversed.

After the death of Arana, the government launched
a propaganda campaign to convince the public that the
Aranistas had rebelled. Organized labor and pro-Arevalo
politicians joined the effort. Many gave public speeches
in support of Arevalo, including the FPL Secretary of
Propaganda, Marco Antonio Villamar.-^°

Many other Guatemalans denounced the death of
Arana and accused the government of having plotted his
murder. Over the next several months, anti-government
demonstrations were held, and pamphlets which denounced
the assassination of Arana were passed to the public.
The United States Embassy also believed that Arana ' s
death had not been accidental, and all Embassy dispatches
refer to the incident as the "Arana assassination." With
Arana 's death, tensions and animosities reached new
extremes .

Notes

^^^ ,.,\'. There is no agreement on the particulars of

^h M^ ^"^' ^^ account of Francisco Palacio, see

ipo:
2. Cehelsky, "Habla Arbenz , " 121.

209

3. Bush, "Organized Labor", part 5, 13-14- on
"^"^^^t J' .Nuestro Diario pleaded to the civilians to
return their explosives, arms and munitions to the Army
Nuestro Diario. August 1. 1949, p. 7. ^'

^- ^ ^" . 1°^ ^'^ extended version of the fighting see
the report of Col. Willis F. Lewis, NAUS 81 !. 00/?:22!9

4. Samayoa Coronado, Escuela, 23.
5.

PC

no. 366.

6. Ydigoras, My War, 226.

7. NAUS 814.00/11-1248 no. 564.

this lee "eT'o ^J^-°Vl-^6,49 no. 85. Arevalo denies
tnis. See El Doctor Arevalo responde al Licenciadn
Alvarado Rubio," La Hora . Dec. 7, 1982, p. 4. '^^''^"^^^'^°

9. NAUS 814.00/7-2249 no. 386.

10. Schneider, Communism. 29.

11. Cehelsky, "Habla Arbenz , " 120. For the
version of Carlos Paz Tejada, see Carlos Caseres
Aproximacion a Guatemala (Sinaloa Mexico, 1980), 43-46?

12. NAUS 814.00/72249 no. 386.

13. "El gobierno informa al pueblo de Is
TorTs'^lf"^^ ''' ''''' ''^^' ""'^^^^ Papers^nd documents

^^- Nuestro Diario. August 2, 1949, p 3- Thomas?
and Margorie Melville, Guatemala: the Pol/, f.e ^ J . ^L^
Ownership (New York, 1971 ) , 42.

15. NAUS 814.00/2-2349 no. 97.

^r-io^ J^* . u^l^u^^^^' ""^^^^ Arbenz," 121. Arbenz had
tried to watch the events with binoculars.

17. Ibid., 120-121.

18. Pellecer, "Respuesta," 2.

Sept. 13^1972^'^^^^''^"'°^ ''°'' ^^ ^"^ ' ^^^^^1°'" La Hora.

210

20. '"La sangre de Arana es, no lo niego, una
mancha sobre mi gobierno' declar5 Juan Jose Arevalo," El
Imparcial, Dec. 6, 1961; "Habla Arlvalo," Prensa Libr^
Jan. 10, 1962. '

21. NAUS 814.00/2-2349 no. 97.

22. NAUS 814.00/2-1049 Memo, Air Intelligence
Information Report.

23. Najera, Estaf adores, pp. 111-112.

24. NAUS 814.00/7-2249 no. 386.

25. Cehelsky, "Habla Arbenz , " 120.

26. NAUS 814.00/7-2249 no. 386.

27. Cehelsky, "Habla Arbenz," 121.

28. NAUS 814.00/7-2249 no. 386.

29. NAUS 814.00/7-2049

30. Onda Larga, (July 1949), 11.

CHAPTER 1 3
THE ARBENZ COALITION

Arbenz won the presidential election of 1950,
supported heavily by Partido Acci5n Revolucionario (PAR),
Renovacion Nacional ( RN ) , labor, and some progressive
capitalists. The leftists had finally secured power, and
they were gleeful. Arana had been eliminated, and
Arbenz, the friend of PAR and the workers, controlled the
military. Rural and urban labor unions continued to grow
in size and power. The United States had become an
essential part of the opposition, but so far demonstrated
no plans to intervene militarily. Although significant
numbers of Arevalistas had wanted someone else besides
Arbenz for president, only the extreme opposition
demanded a violent overthrow of legal government. In
private, Arbenz promised moderation to those who feared
the far left. Many who had preferred other candidates
agreed to join the Arbenz government, including Manuel
Galich and Raul Osequeda, who would become cabinet
ministers. Arbenz was indubitably the choice of the
majority, and when Arevalo passed on the presidential
office peacefully and willingly, as required by the

21 1

212
Constitution, a legal and democratic system of government
seemed to be functioning. Maria Villanova de Arbenz wrote
to the wife of Enrique Munoz Meany that "we all have
faith and confidence in the future and even suspect that
some reactionaries are content because of the anticipated
tranquillity that surely will guarantee their economic
investments. "

Pro-government forces continued to strive for the
success of the reform movement. Notably, on December 12,
1949, Congress passed the Law of Forced Rental, which
obligated many landowners to rent part of their land to
the peasants at a fair price. Congress also passed
two laws in 1949 designed to reduce the political freedom
of government opponents, although the government did not
use the laws to their full potential.^ The first law,
passed by Congress on September 13, gave the government
the right to discharge any employee considered disloyal
to Guatemala. The law in theory affected all government
employees, or about 50,000 people.^ Diario de Centro
America advised its readers that tolerance for
non-reformist government employees "was not worth it."'^
The second law, decree 666, received Arevalo's signature
on September 24. The law was primarily aimed at the
press, and provided punishment for journalists who by
their writings "incited disregard for the law." Decree

213
666 also enacted new penalties against clergymen who
became involved in politics.

Causing the opposition further alarm, the
communists established two political parties during the
year that followed Arana ' s death. The public appearance
of communism, in spite of Article 32 of the Constitution
which had previously been interpreted as prohibiting
communism, attests to the greatly increased power of the
leftists. Moreover, the communists had achieved
influence in the labor leadership; had proven valuable
supporters of the Arevalista reform movement; and, most
importantly, had become allies of Arbenz in his quest for
the presidency.

The Partiao Comunista de Guatemala ( PCG ) , with
roots in the old Vanguardia, had its first congress on
September 28, 1949, and its first formal session in
January 1950. On May 20, 1950, a number of leading PAR
members resigned in order to align themselves with th
PCG, including ex-Secretary General Jose Manuel Fortuny,
four members of the executive committee and two members
of the political committee. Another communist party,
Partido Revolucionario Obrero de Guatemala ( PROG ) , formed
on June 1 , 1 950.

The PROG, led by victor Manuel Gutierrez,
consisted of communists who spent much time working

e

214

directly with the people. Gutierrez believed that the
workers must take the initiative on their own behalf, or
working class interests would be sacrificed to political
ends and opportunism. PCG, led by Manuel Fortuny,
worked less directly with the people but tried to
strengthen the communist movement through political and

bureaucratic channels, and cooperating with the

, . . 6
bourgeoisie.

According to Ronald Schneider, the policy

differences between Fortuny and Gutierrez led to serious

conflict. Carlos Manuel Pellecer concurs in stating that

significant differences existed between Fortuny and

Gutierrez, but he believes that the clash did not cause

deep divisions. According to Pellecer, the two leaders

manifested complementary currents of thought. Fortuny ' s

current followed the Soviet line of politics and

international goals; and this group published Soviet

style propaganda in the newsweekly Octubre . An able

bureaucratic politician, Fortuny had smooth political

relations with Arbenz. But (according to Pellecer)

Fortuny disliked the working masses and did not work well

with them. He had no rapport with city workers, and "he

hated to visit rural localities and talk with peasants."

On the other hand, Gutierrez looked mainly to solving

problems within Guatemala and paid full attention to the

215

plight of Guatemalan workers and peasants. Pellecer
concluded that the two approaches produced reciprocal
benefits, not division.

Communism in Guatemala by 1950 had certainly
become important, but observers disagreed on the actual
degree of its influence. Much of the disagreement
concerned who was a communist, and who was only a leftist
but tolerant of communism. Reformers who supported the
Arevalo government tended to see an important distinction
between the two groups, while the opposition, including
the United States government, tended to lump communists
and those tolerant of communists into the same category.

Guatemalans of the political left in general saw
the communists as allies in the struggle to overcome
their conservative enemies and bring social and economic
justice to Guatemala. Moreover, the left feared talk of
anticommunism, because they knew that conservatives
continued the traditional tactics of categorizing all
leftists as communists. From their standpoint, any
steps taken to eliminate the true communists would
eventually lead to the doors of the "near-communists."

Communists held leadership positions in labor, the
government, and political parties, although their actual
numbers were small. A U.S. intelligence report placed
the number of Guatemalan communists in mid-1950 at "well

216

under 500," a small figure when compared to the some
400,000 votes cast in the presidential elections of
that year. The number of truly outstanding and
influential communists was far less. Only a few
communists had been elected to Congress: there averaged
only about two communist congressmen under Arevalo. Nor
had many communists been appointed to administrative
posts. Examples would be Mario Alfredo Silva Jonama who
served as sub-secretary of education for a few months,
and Pellecer who once directed the Misiones Culturales.
Mario Silva Jonama also became propaganda chief of
government radio PAX, and Alfredo Guerra Borges became
editor-in-chief of the Diario de Centre America, the

Q

official newspaper. Most communists connected to the
administration held minor jobs, however. The ministry
which offered the most positions to communists proved to
be that of foreign affairs.

Communism strongly influenced the labor leadership
by 1949. Some of labor's most outstanding leaders openly
declared their communism, for example Victor Manuel
Gutierrez. Labor unions, however, did not officially
embrace communism, and possibly a majority of labor
leaders were not true communists, although non-communist

leaders remained on the sidelines while the committed

1 1
communists tended to maintain the initiative. Ordinary

217

union members, rural workers, and Indians remained

1 2
largely unaffected by communism. Workers in general

concerned themselves with wages and social rights, and

showed little understanding of an international ideology.

Labor leaders, even the communists, maintained more

concern for internal reform than international

, .^. 13
politics .

But the trend toward communism in labor had been

strong. The FSG had broken away from the CTG in 1946

because of CTG far-left inclinations, but by 1949 both

organizations had become ideologically similar. FSG

Secretary General Manuel Pinto Usaga never declared

himself a communist, but he demonstrated at least a

strong leftist proclivity and a willingness to work

closely with communists. In January 1950, FSG joined

the Confederacion de Trabaj adores de America Latina

(CTAL) and the World Federation of Trade Unions ( WFTU ) ,

pro-Soviet organizations which CTG had joined earlier.

WFTU ties to Guatemalan labor had become strong by 1950,

and Guatemalan labor leaders attended WFTU meetings,

1 4
sometimes with help from the Guatemalan government.

Political aims espoused by the labor movement invariably

included some demands typically championed by the World

Federation, for example the recognition of China, and

support for the anti-colonial struggles in Indonesia,

218

1 5
Vietnam, and Malaya. The United States was often

1 ft
criticized, and the Soviet Union sometimes praised.

The United States Embassy considered both FSG and CTG as

... ... 17

communistic organizations.

The communists did not control Guatemala. They had

1 R

virtually no influence in the police or armed forces.
Most Guatemalans, including the military, police, and
even a majority of leftists including both Arbenz and
Arevalo, would have opposed any attempts to create a true
communist state, and would have quickly eliminated the
handful of communists if they had felt so threatened.

The reform movement in 1 950 remained "fundamentally

1 9
democratic in its objectives."

The central political issue in 1950, however, was

not communism, but the November presidential elections.

Arbenz ' s power in Guatemalan politics increased greatly

with the Arana killing, and he thus became the primary

presidential contender. Some observers believed that

Arbenz, after July 1949, had become more powerful than

Arevalo. Minor Keihauer, a wealthy landowner,

businessman, and political ally of Arbenz, told U.S.

embassy officials that Arbenz was "in the saddle," that

is, the strongest directing force in Guatemalan

20
politics. Mario Monteforte Toledo, the President of

Congress at the time of Arana ' s death, believed that the

21 9
murder of Arana "concentrated all official politics in
the grip of Arbenz."^^ Reliable observers have
stated, however, that Arlvalo remained a strong
executive, and although Arbenz ' s power increased,
Arevalo's did not decrease. ^^

Power relationships actually remained complex, and
even in the military, Arbenz did not have unlimited
influence. Certainly, Arbenz became the strongman within
the armed forces with Arana ' s demise. The military was
immediately purged of the most influential of Arana ' s
followers, causing about twenty percent of the officers
to experience exile, jail, or early retirement . ^^ But
many officers who remained were not leftists, and they
gave Arbenz only lukewarm support. Morale had been badly
shaken by Arana ' s death in 1949, and in 1950 relations
within the military remained bitter and tense. ^^ Possibly
about 50% of the military officers retained conservative
inclinations. ^ In a 1968 interview, Arbenz claimed he
had wanted a full purge of all enemies in the army
following his victory over the Aranistas. He planned to
ship the defeated officers to El Peten "to try them in
military courts and shoot them like traitors. "^^ Arbenz
blamed Arevalo for extending pardons which allowed
conservatives and moderates to remain in uniform. ^^
According to Arbenz, these anti-leftists who survived in

220

the military eventually caused the destruction of his

2 8
presidency in 1954.

Arbenz, however, still led the "young military"
faction of the army, and with the death of Arana, the
Arbenz faction had taken over the military's top command.
Also, and just as important, Arbenz visited the various
garrisons, and promised the conservative officers that
leftists would not dominate in the Arbenz presidency. He
indicated that he needed the leftists to get elected, but
that in due course their power would be weakened. ^^
Arbenz thus soothed the fears of the non-leftist
officers, and kept the armed forces pacified during the
presidential campaign.

Progressive capitalists who supported Arbenz
established the Partido Integridad Nacional (PIN), which
represented businessmen and landowners such as Keilhauer
and Nicolas Brol Galicia. PIN opposed the extreme left,
but supported land reform. ^° Arbenz promised the
capitalists the same that he promised military officers:
the communists and far-leftists would not control his
government. Many Guatemalans did in fact believe that
Arbenz would exercise the presidential powers as a
political moderate, and that the leftists would
eventually see their power diminished . ^^

221

Labor unions openly endorsed Arbenz , and became
deeply involved in the election campaign, even though the
Labor Code proscribed unions from political activities . ^^
In December 1949 and January 1950 all of the most
influential elements of labor formed a new organization
called ComitI Politico Nacional de los Trabajadores
(CPNT). Pinto Usaga became secretary general, and
Gutierrez became secretary of organization. On 24
February 1950 CPNT declared "the candidate of the working
class and peasants to be Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. "^"^ PAR,
RN, and the newly formed communist parties also nominated
Arbenz for President; and they campaigned actively and
enthusiastically, in both rural and urban areas.

Evidence indicates that a few leftist elements
had some misgivings about Arbenz. The United States
Embassy claimed that labor worried about the "real depth
of Arbenz 's affection." Pinto Usaga received a letter
which complained that workers of at least one locality
did not know enough about Jacobo Arbenz. ^^ Likewise, the
Arevalista parties all had some dissenting members who
did not champion Arbenz. An outstanding example is
Carlos Leonidas Acevedo, who resigned from RN in 1950,
and opposed the election of Arbenz. ^^ Acevedo 's high
posts had included minister of government under Arevalo
and secretary general of RN. Until 1950 Acevedo had been

222

one of the reform movement's most prestigious political
leaders .

Certainly, Arbenz did not have the great
popularity that Juan Jose Arevalo enjoyed in 1944. But
hesitancy on the part of labor and the left in general
remained minor, and in the main the left supported

Arbenz. Pellecer observed that workers and peasants had

37
"full confidence" in Arbenz. Arbenz ' s bond to the

political left was strengthened by his wife, Maria

Cristina Vilanova, who retained leftist beliefs herself

and was active in political matters. Maria evidently

retained a measure of influence over her husband, and

some observers, including Clemente Marroquin Rojas,

claimed that Maria actually dominated her husband.

Arevalo claims that he supported Arbenz for

President after it became clear that Arbenz was the

3 9
choice of the people. Arevalo did not declare Arbenz

the official candidate, nor did he openly declare his own

support for Arbenz. But the Arbenz campaign received

significant aid from the Arevalo administration. The

Ministry of Communications in particular helped by

lending personnel, vehicles, and other aids to the Arbenz

campaign. Government-supported newspapers worked for

Arbenz, and President Arevalo 's private secretary spoke

in Arbenz 's behalf. Moreover, Mariano Arevalo, brother

223
of President Arlvalo, appeared on the platform with
Arbenz during the campaign. Mariano, a close and trusted
political supporter of President Arevalo, became head of
t^^ Departamento de Fincas Nacionales e Intervenidas
(Department of National and Intervened Farms), in August,
1950, a position that gave him some influence over the
farm workers' vote. The board of directors, who had
elected Mariano, had themselves been appointed by
President Arevalo.

Arevalo may have merely backed the popular choice
of the people, but he also may have backed Arbenz for an
additional reason: i.e. he believed that Guatemala needed
a strong ruler to combat the obstacles to reform. Arevalo
had worked hard to promote social and economic changes,
but political difficulties had often impeded his efforts,
n November 7, 1949, Arevalo stated during a public
ech that he was glad to finish his term in office
"because personally I have no appetite, nor wish, nor
interest, nor advantage in continuing one day longer"
than the presidential term. He could not continue as
resident, he stated further, because he could not
maintain much longer his "white glove policy" which
avoided "shedding blood." He called his style of
government "romantic," because he valued and believed in
humanity and democracy. He recommended that the next

0
spe

P

224
president act "with a little more realism in regard to
the treatment of conspirators." The next government
would also have to solve the nation's economic problems
"with methods which are not very romantic . "'^^ Arbenz , a
practical military man of progressive ideas, appealed to
Arevalo. Moreover, while Arbenz promised Guatemala social
and economic modernization, a vigorous program of land
reform, and the end of imperialist domination, he did
not run a radical campaign or make extreme promises to
workers; his political speeches seemed moderate, even to
North American observers . '^'^

The area of greatest non-support in the Arevalista
camp was the FPL. A strong segment of the FPL had
backed Arana, and after their candidate's death they had
been purged from the pro-government forces. Some lost
their jobs, and some who had taken an active part in the
"Arana uprising" went to jail. Hector Espana spent
thirty days in jail.^^ Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro
left active politics. ^^ Mario Monteforte Toledo claimed
that FPL members had the choice of joining the opposition
or giving up to leftism. ^^ The U.S. Embassy, in
November 1949, reported that FPL lay weakened, a "has
been" party, with the remnants closer to PAR than at any
time since 1 947. ^^

225
In 1950, the FPL continued to function, but it no
longer enjoyed the power it held before July 1949. At
the time of Arana ■ s death, FPL had 28 members in
Congress, PAR and RN had 25, and the opposition had 14.
By November of 1950, five FPL members had switched to the
Arbenz camp, two had claimed independent status, and one
had resigned from Congress. ^^ The 20 remaining FPL
congressmen were profoundly disunited. "The remnants of
the party are in an advanced state of collapse," reported
the U.S. Embassy in October, 1950.'^^

FPL surviving members split their support between
Manuel Galich L5pez and Dr. victor Giordani. Grassroots
elements of FPL had wanted Giordani but the party
leadership decided to back Galich. ^^ Subsequently, the
two groups issued rival posters and campaign literature,
each claiming that their candidates had the endorsement
of the party. ^^ Both branches supported continued
reforms, for example land reform, and both attacked
Arbenz by claiming that an army officer as president

would politicize the military and endanger the reform

52
movement.

Jorge Garcia Granados, the "father of the 1945
Constitution," became a presidential candidate for
moderate reform. In late 1949, he pooled support from
the revolutionary parties to establish the Partido del

226

Pueblo. ^"^ The party began publishing the newspaper El
Pueblo, which reported general events as would any
newspaper but also advanced Garcia 's political views.
El Pueblo championed revolutionary goals but emphasized
non-extreme measures. On September 8, a political

aci'-ertisement claimed that Garcia was not a rebel or a

5 4
communist but a reformist. On September 18, the paper

spoke in favor of land reform, but only reform based on

moderation. First, El Pueblo claimed, Guatemala must

divide and distribute the national lands, then buy the

remaining large farms at a fair price and divide them

into small farms. Garcia Granados claimed that the

Arevalo government had failed to establish a rational

program of reform, and had developed no wide based

economic plan.^ Garcia would emphasize production, safe

investment, a stable and peaceful work force, and an end

to exploitation.^^ But Garcia failed to develop a large

following; he did not obtain the support of either the

Arevalista parties or the conservative opposition.

The opposition had achieved a measure of better

organization from 1944 to 1949 (see chapter 8), but in

1950 it failed to rally behind one candidate. The

opposition suffered from strong differences of opinion,

ambitious leaders and factions, government harassment,

and, most important, a profound lack of popular support.

227

Uni5n Nacional Electoral ( UNE ) , meant to be a
coordinating organization for the opposition parties,

r o

suffered a rapid decline in strength in 1950, and in
October, the U.S. Embassy reported that the opposition
remained "still as far from unification as ever, and will

probably go down to defeat still bickering among

59
themselves . "

Opposition efforts to overcome the reformers led

to more violence. On July 19, 1950, the opposition

promoted a demonstration in front of the National Palace,

as an act of homage to Col. Francisco Arana and a protest

against the Arevalo government. On the second day,

pro-government groups joined with the police and army to

disperse the protesters, violence broke out, and several

people were killed. The government declared martial law,

and Major Carlos Paz Tejada, chief of the armed forces,

assumed command of Guatemala City for 12 days.

Constitutional guarantees were suspended for 45 days.

About 20 leaders of the demonstration were deported,

including Manuel Cobos Batres, and Ramon Blanco. The

opposition parties faced suppression and retribution

after the July violence. In August, the National

Election Board, controlled by Arevalistas, canceled the

legal party status of two opposition political parties

which had taken part in the July violence. The final

228

frustrated attempt before the elections to overthrow
Arivalo occurred on November 6, when Colonel Carlos
Castillo Armas led an armed force of about 70 men, in a
vain plan to capture important military installations.
About one-half of the rebels would be killed or
wounded.

Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, an ex-army general who
refused to join the revolution of 1944, became the
conservative opposition's chief candidate. By late
1950, Yd£goras and Garcia Granados were Arbenz ' s only
outstanding rivals. Both men claimed they confronted
heavy political harassment and campaign obstructions,
such as the destruction of party property and campaign
literature. Garcia Granados accused the police of
breaking into his house and sacking the valuables . ^''

The November voting, which took place on the 10th,
11th, and 12th, produced a solid victory for Jacobo
Arbenz. The final count gave Arbenz 266,778 votes, while
Ydigoras received 73,180 and Garcia drew 28,897. Giordani
of FPL took 15,664. Manuel Galich of the other FPL
branch withdrew his candidacy on the first day of the
three-day election in order to back Arbenz. Eighty-six
percent of the illiterate vote went to Arbenz, ten
percent to Ydigoras and four percent to Garcia. Of the
literate vote, Arbenz drew fifty-six percent, Ydigoras

229
thirty-one percent and Garcia twelve percent. In
Guatemala City, Arbenz pulled 25,000 votes out of a
possible 58,000.^2 ^^^ voting pattern demonstrated the
importance of the peasants and workers to the Arbenz
victory. Much of Arbenz ' s vote came from the workers on
the large farms which had been unionized. In Guatemala
City, where many middle class conservatives and moderates
lived, he received less than one half of the votes.

Although Arbenz took most of the votes from the
countryside, some peasants, possibly influenced by church
pressures, remained politically conservative and voted
for other candidates. Richard Adams recorded the
election events in Magdalena Milpas Alpas, a small
village which split its votes between Ydigoras and
Arbenz. The village had two barrios, an "upper" and a
"lower." The upper barrio consisted of Indians who were
mostly small landowners. Politically and religiously
conservative, they voted for Ydigoras Fuentes. The lower
barrio had more ladino characteristics, and all the
town's true ladinos lived there. They were less
religious, and many held jobs outside the village. The
lower barrio voted for Arbenz. ^"^

There has been controversy as to whether the
presidential elections were conducted fairly. Some
have asserted that the elections were completely

230
honest/^ where as Ydxgoras claimed that only in the cxty
did honesty prevail, and fraudulence characterized the
countryside. 65 In fact, election abuses undoubtedly
occurred, but only Arbenz with the backing of PAR, the
communists, labor, as well as the tacxt endorsement of
the government, commanded the political forces necessary
to obtain a majority vote. As to the alleged election
abuses, one author sagely commented that "although Arbenz
was probably the choice of more voters than were any of
the opposition candidates, nothing was left to chance. "^^
Arbenz won the elections with a reformist
coalition based on labor and peasants, leftist
politicians, the "young military," and capitalist
progressives. He had appeased some moderates and
conservatives with promises to curb the power of

communism and far leftists Tho o^=i-;^--

xeLciscs. ine coalition promoted their

candidate with energy, zeal, and confidence, and
succeeded admirably although not to the level of 1944.
Instability, however, underlay the coalition and the
Guatemalan political reality as a whole. The killing
of Arana had created a radical political polarization,
and the rise of the communists reinforced this tendency.
The year 1950 had been characterized by turmoil and
conflict, between the pro-government forces and the
opposition, and within each camp. The legitimacy of the

231

majority vote, which is the basic tenet of democracy,
remained unacceptable to many in the sphere of Guatemalan
politics. No consensus had been reached on the desired
shape of a "new Guatemala": cooperation and agreement
remained elusive.

Notes

o^"*' .ocn^^""^^ Villanova to Amalita, Guatemala City,
Dec. 20, 1950, Biblioteca Cesar Branas, Cartas de Jacobo
Arbenz Guzman.

Jan. 1^9S0.Tl '' ' ■°°''-'''' "°- = '^' ^' Imparcial,
3. Silvert, A Study in Government. 33.

io.n ^: "Editorial," Diario de la Manana . Oct. 23,

1949, p.1. '

5. Schneider, Communism. 58-59, 61.

6. Ibid., 97.

7. Pellecer, "Respuesta," 7-8. On February 2,
lybl, PROG dissolved and most members joined PCG
Pellecer noted that he followed the current of Gutierrez*
and Guerra Borges followed the current of Fortuny '
Prominent communist who took a middle path included Mario
Silva Jonama and Bernardo Alvarado Monz5n.

8. NAUS OIR 5123,8.

9. Government radio stations were mainly
apolitical. NAUS OIR 4615.10.

10. NAUS OIR 5123, 114-116.

1 7
18,
19.

232

11. Bush, "Organized Labor," oart 4 n 41 q^^

Peasant M^..:^L:':"fl.\-..^''l'.9.r:'^^-^ ^%' ^ati^^JBerican

12. Ibid., part 3, pp.17, 33.

13. Pellecer, "Respuesta," 8.

14. Bishop, "Organized Labor," part 3, pp. 104-5.

15. NAUS 714.00/4-350.

16. NAUS 714.00/1-2650.
Bush, "Organized Labor," part 3, p. 16.
NAUS 714.00/8-450 no. 140.
NAUS OIR 5123, 78.

20. NAUS 711.14/7-2249 nn ^ft^. -, i
814.00/7-2549 no. 340. / ' ^^^^ no. 385; also see

21. Monteforte, Monografia. 312.

valenzuela , int'ervie«'Lth' 'autl" ' Jur^"""", SSy^^'nli"

no. 74. "■ "*"^ 814.00/11-749 Memo; NAUS 714.00/8-150

no.214;'7;4.00/5-14l;.'-°°"'-''' "^"°' '^^-""Z 8-^"0

25. Monteforte, Monografia. 364-370.

26. Cehelsky, "Habla Arbenz , " 122.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

NAUS 713!5/4-29l2!'"°"'' °' """^ ' ^""'^^^ ^^"^^^^ Azurdia,

233

LCMD/Gd'°pi„-b:x1!''° '"' '"""° integridad National,

31 . NAUS 71 4.00/8-2450.

32. NAUS 714.00/8-2950 no. 221.
CPNT-Bofi5. '^'^^^^^^ "°- '' ^^b. 24, 1950, LCMD/GD,

Rpl.fiJ!' /"i^^"^ ^^^^^^ Department of State, Foreign

Relations of the United States 1950- Tho American

Republics (Washintnn^ 1Q79^_ «75^ -^^ — American

LCMD/GD''cPNT-Box'?5^ '''"^°'' '° ''"'° "^"^"' ^^^ ^^^°'

La Hora'^Mav 2T;^95 8. ''''"' "°' '°^ ^^"^°^ "^ Aceredo,"

37. Pellecer, "Respuesta," 3.

^ 38. Clemente Marroquin Rojas, "Jacobo Arbenz
Guzman: ex-Presidente de Guatemala," La Hora . Jan. 28^
1971; also see NAUS 714.00/8-450. "

^u ^^" ^ ^^^^ '^°^^ Arevalo, interview with the
author, Guatemala City, July 14, 1986.

40. NAUS 714.00/9-2050.

41 . NAUS 71 4.00/10-450.

42. NAUS 714.00/8-950 no. 152.

^. "^l' Diario de Centro America. Nov. 8, 1949 n 1-
In his final speech as President, Arevalo made similar
statements. See Arevalo, Escritos politico^, 493-507.

44. Mundo Libre. Jan. 21, 1950, p.1.

45. Nuevo Amanecer, 1966, p. 4.

46. Monteforte, Monografia. 312.

47 NAUS 814.00/11-1649 no. 674; also see La
Hora, July 1, 1950, p.1; El Imparcial. April 11, 1 95 0~
p.1; and newspapers in 1950 in general.

48. NAUS 714.00/9-750 no. 153.

234

49. NAUS 71 4.00/1 0-450.

50. Najera, Estaf adores , 107.

51. Unfiled papers and documents for 1950,
various campaign leaflets and posters, AGC.

52. Ibid.

53. NAUS 814.00/12-1649 no. 800.

54. El Pueblo, Sept. 8, 1950, p. 3.

55. El Pueblo, Sept. 18, 1950, p. 5.

56. Jorge Garcia Granados, and Emilio Zea
Gonzalez, Discursos de los licenciados Jorge Garcia
Granados candidito del Partido del Pueblo a la
presidencia de la Republica y Emilio Zea Gonzalez,
secretario general del Partido del Pueblo (Guatemala,
1950), 8-10.

57. Ibid., 12-13.

58. NAUS 714.00/10-1350 no. 410.

59. NAUS 71 4.00/10-1 950.

60. NAUS 714.00/11-750 no. 481.

61. El Pueblo, Sept. 8, 1950, p.1; NAUS
71 4.00/8-450.

62. NAUS 714.00/12-750; Silvert, A Study
in Government, 60; Schneider, Communism, 34.

63. Richard Newbold Adams, "Magdalena Milpas
Altas: 1951-1952" in Richard Newbold Adams, comp. ,
Political Changes in Guatemalan Indian Communities ( New
Orleans, 1957), 15.

64. North American Congress on Latin America,
Guatemala (New York, 1974), 47.

65. Ydigoras, My War, 231.

66. Schneider, Communism, 33.

CHAPTER 1 4
THE USA AND GUATEMALA,
1 949-1951

The United States and Guatemala remained in a
state of official conflict during the remainder of
Arevalo's presidency. The U.S. government continued to
defend U.S. business in Guatemala, but by 1950 communism
had become the issue of most ostensible importance. The
growth of communism in Guatemala had actually paralleled
the growth of the Cold War and fear of communism in the
United States. Eric Goldman called 1949, the same year
communist parties surfaced in Guatemala, a turning point
for the United States, when the Alger Hiss case
developed, Mao won in China, and the Soviets exploded an
atom bomb. "1949 was a year of shocks, shocks with
enormous catalytic force. "^

In a strategy to increase awareness of the
communist "threat" in Guatemala, the State Department
and U.S. owned companies promoted an anti-Guatemala
information campaign in the United States which sought to
discredit the Guatemalan government to the North American
public. By August, 1949, the Department had decided to
have "open and frank discussions" with newspaper and

235

236

magazine correspondents about communism in Guatemala "to

encourage them to go to Guatemala, to see for themselves

2

what is going on and to acquire material for articles."

In 1950, the anti-Guatemala campaign would be aided by
the Truman administration's Psychological Operations
Coordinating Committee.

The United Fruit Company conducted a propaganda

campaign that was, in the words of Richard Immerman,

4
"extremely successful." Correspondents who traveled to

Guatemala were well treated by UFCO, and most of them

received the material for their stories directly from

UFCO and U.S. Embassy officials. The positive aspects of

Guatemala's reform movement were generally ignored.

During 1950, publications such as the New York Herald

Tribune, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report,

Atlantic Monthly, and the Saturday Evening Post, all

pictured Guatemala as a communist dominated country which

unjustly persecuted American owed business. UFCO also

obtained help from Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and

Representative John McCormack, who in 1949 gave

anti-Guatemala speeches in their respective Congressional

Chambers. Both men represented UFCO ' s home state of

Massachusetts. Other Congressmen who would speak out

against the Guatemalan treatment of US businesses

included Representatives Christian Herter and Mike

237

Mansfield; and Senators Lister Hill, Claude Pepper, and
Alexander Wiley.

U.S. companies and the State Department also
encouraged the Guatemalan local press to play up the
communist issue. Secretary of State Dean Acheson himself
once directed the Embassy to discreetly advise the

"friendly" Guatemalan press to emphasize the communistic

7
activities of Carlos Manuel Pellecer. When U.S.

officials were told by a "confidential source" that

Guatemalan police had tortured a Guatemalan employee of

International Railways of Central America (IRCA), Acheson

directed that this story "leak out" to the Guatemalan

local press, therefore to become "public knowledge,"

allowing the Embassy to obtain the story "from other than

g

confidential sources."

The United States used aid programs as an
additional tool to pressure the Guatemalan government.
Guatemala received aid in education, health, military
training, public administration, agriculture, and a
variety of programs designed to develop and modernize the
nation. Aid and loans, for example, helped build
hospitals and roads. Between 1946 and 1950, the Office
of Foreign Agricultural Relations gave substantial
assistance to Guatemala.^ Total aid to Guatemala,
however, remained small.

238

As early as 1949, the State Department considered
concelling aid programs, as a protest to the Guatemalan

government, but decided to continue existing programs and

1 0
create no new ones. The Arevalista government

eventually came to believe that the State Department used

the aid programs to spread pro-U.S. propaganda; and in

1950 Guatemala expelled the U.S. education mission and

restricted the activities of U.S. agrarian and health

. , . , 11
specialists .

From the Cold War viewpoint of the United States,

cause for alarm did exist. By all indications, the

communists had gained significant influence and power

from 1944 to 1950. Communists were making concerted and

energetic efforts to proselytize the Guatemalans and

dominate the reform movement. International contacts

were evident, and the United States was being heavily

criticized. The government of Guatemala, in particular

Arevalo and the Congress, had done little, in the eyes of

the United States, to smother the communist movement.

U.S. officials sometimes seemed irritated over the growth

of communism, as did Milton K. Wells in a report on

Partido Accion Revolucionaria (PAR):

It would perhaps be unnecessarily repetitious to
comment on the pro-Communist slant on
international issues found throughout the PAR
statement. It is replete with the typical
Communist line views on peace and democracy; and
the monotonous tirade against foreign

239

imperialistic" companies reveals an emotional
devotion to the Arevalista thesis regarding the
so-called need of achieving "full economic and
political sovereignty."

But the United States officials significantly
overemphasized the danger of communism taking control of
Guatemala; in part because they lumped together
communists and "near-communists," thus incorrectly
pushing influential men such as Charnaud MacDonald and
Pinto Usaga into the communist camp. The
"near-communists" did not identify themselves with the
Marxist doctrine, even though they shared some common
goals with the Guatemalan communists and felt no reason
to hate or distrust them. U.S. officials worried that
the differences between the communists and other leftists
would become triflingly minor when U.S. interests were at
stake. The U.S. Embassy reported that "clear cut lines
between Marxism and leftist liberalism have yet to be
drawn. "^^

In 1950, the Office of Intelligence Research
(OIR) in the Department of State compiled a comprehensive
report on communist influence in Guatemala. Dated October
23, the report investigated communism, communists, and
"near-communists," and on the whole was accurate, but in
the end it overemphasized communist strength. The OIR
report correctly noted that the communist movement had

240

made steady progress since 1944, becoming "almost
inextricably a part of the Revolution," and that the
communists had become some of "the most ardent leaders of
the movement which is fundamentally democratic in its
objectives." The report recognized that communism had

not permeated everywhere. Communism had made little

1 5
headway with the rank and file of labor. There existed

"no evidence that the population as a whole or any

considerable segment of it" had been responsive to

communist programs.''^ The Soviet Union had no

representative in Guatemala, although Guatemalan

communists received educational material, "and presumably

directives," from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, and from

1 7
communists throughout Latin America. The anti-United

States aspects of the reform movement could be best

explained as a manifestation of nationalism rather than

communism.''^ Communists had no influence in the police

or armed forces. Communist and "pro-Communist" members

in Congress had been few.^ Neither did the report find

anything extremely radical in the labor code or other

pro-labor laws.^° Arevalo's foreign policy toward

neighboring countries had been supported by communists

and communist propaganda, but otherwise, "the Guatemalan

government had not pursued any policy which could be

definitely attributed even in part to Communist

241

2 1

influence.' Communist influence on Guatemala's

attitude toward the Inter-American system probably had

2 2
been significant but "by no means" dominant. Guatemalan

actions in the United Nations revealed "little overt

communist influence or significant pro-communist

activity. "

The OIR report paid careful attention to all

possible indications of communist influence. A study of

one labor union's policy statement that expressed "a

desire for peace and international solidarity, favored

religious freedom and equality of women, and opposed the

Rio Defense Pact," led OIR to conclude that each

policy point in itself was "not necessarily communistic,"

but that the points taken together formed "a pattern

similar to that of communists in other Latin American

24
countries." The OIR report treated the party programs

of PAR and Renovacion Nacional (RN) in much the same way

and decided that:

An emphasis on agrarian reform, anti-imperialism,
peace and democracy suggests, but is not
necessarily evidence of, communist penetration in
PAR and to almost the same degree in RN . This
line, however, tends to echo the propaganda of
known communists elsewhere in Latin America and is
reasonably ascribable, in part at least, to
influencepj- of militant communists in these
parties .

The OIR report concluded that communists had
become extremely powerful in Guatemala. Based "upon a

242
few intellectual, political, and labor leaders, the
communists had obtained "considerable, and in some areas
possibly decisive, influence in the government . "^S
Communist influence in government, the political parties,
and in the labor movement probably gave them "very nearly
a balance of power position in strictly domestic
political matters. "^'^

U.S. officials rarely questioned the need to
defend business interests. George McGhee of the State
Department once cautioned his colleagues that the UFCO,
because of its great importance in Guatemala, may have
unduly influenced the opinions of the U.S. Embassy, ^^
while one report indicated there were some differences of
opinion in the State Department as to whether the UFCO
stand on the labor code could be legally justified. ^^
John Fishburn, the Labor Officer of the Office of
Regional American Affairs, wrote a long memorandum on the
latter question, in which he suggested that the disputed
sections of the labor code were not far different from
practices in the United States, and did not "warrant
diplomatic aid to the UFCO." It would be unwise,
Fishburn continued, "to be tied to the company's position
without regard for Guatemala's aspirations or sovereign
feelings." Such a position would allow the communists "to
pose as champions of labor and national sovereignty" and

243
could threaten the entire Good Neighbor policy. ^° These
few comments, however, did not alter the State Department
consensus. Edward Clark of the Office of Middle American
Affairs (MID) wrote to the embassy in Guatemala that "all
of us here in MID think Fishburn is way off the beam in
his thinking on this matter and have told him so."^^

But one month later, in recognition that United
States policies might have only strengthened the leftists
and communists, the State Department made a minor change
in tactics. It abandoned the use of the official and
public protests against leftism, and only in private
would United States representatives be allowed to make
their views known. The policy makers theorized that some
Guatemalans sympathized with the United States but could
not do so openly without being branded as lackeys of the
imperialists. If the United States could change its
"reactionary" image, reformers who secretly opposed
communism would lose their fear to oppose communism
publicly. If the more moderate elements thus gained the
confidence to oppose the radical left, the communists
might become isolated from the main body of Guatemalan
politicians. Thus separated, they would cause the United
States interests less damage. ^^ The new policy did not
offer any substantial alteration of past policy. The
Embassy continued its protest in private conversations.

244
and nothing in the new policy called for compromise or
reconsideration of the United States interests. The
State Department hoped that its change of approach would
give the Guatemalan people a chance to eventually
repudiate the communists, but if the Guatemalans failed

to do so, the Department stood ready to revise its policy

33
again. The Department noted that the communist issue

was less difficult in Guatemala than China, because

Guatemalan geography and economics made it "much easier

to exert force if, as a last resort, this should be

3 4
necessary. "

By 1950 the United States needed more than an end
of public protest against Guatemalan leftism in order to
change its image. Furthermore, a middle group of
political moderates who would acquiesce to the United
States' uncompromising defense of UFCO, etc., essentially
did not exist. Garcia Granados campaigned on a moderate
reform ticket that criticized both Arbenz and Arevalo,
but Garcia remained under U.S. suspicion for his earlier
links to the far left. Moreover, Garcia remained a
sincere reformer. Mario Monteforte Toledo, an FPL
moderate and ex-President of Congress, actively opposed
the rise of communism, but Monteforte told a North
American friend that he retained three pet hates:
communists, UFCO, and Ambassador Patterson. ^^ Clemente

245

Marroquin Rojas, editor of the moderate-conservative La
Hora newspaper, had become an early foe of the
Arevalistas. The U.S. Embassy noted that Marroquin hated
communism, was a devout Catholic, supported U.S. foreign
policy and at times defended U.S. investments in
Guatemala; but "it is doubtful that he has any particular
affection for the U.S. and Americans . "^^

The Guatemalan government probably hoped its
occasional repression of communists would soften U.S.
anger. In 1950, the government discharged two Marxist
editors from the Diario de Centro America. Mario Silva
Jonama was dismissed from the government radio station,
and arms were confiscated from several labor unions. ^^
In September, Arevalo's strongly anti-communist Minister
of Government, Col. Elfego Hernan Monzon, closed the
communist newspaper Octubre and the Jacobo Sanchez School
of Communist Doctrine; and late in the month submitted to
the Congress a bill that would outlaw communism. -^^
However, Monzon resigned when Congress approved an act of
interpellation, 46 to 2, accusing the minister of
employing illegal and unconstitutional conduct.'*^

The United States remained unconvinced that
the Guatemalan government had sincere intentions to
halt communism. The moves against communism, the
State Department believed, resulted largely from

international developments and fro. internal political
considerations/^ Moreover, the communists retained
their influence in labor and elsewhere. Events st.U
occurred which angered the United States. During the
Central Amerxcan Olympics in Guatemala, for example, to
protest united States colonialism the Guatemalans
initially refused to fly the United States flag or play
the "Star Spangled Banner" when the Puerto Rican team
appeared. "Colonies are not recognized in Guatemala-
proclaimed the Diario_^^_ia_Manana.^2 ^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^

Guatemala's foreign minister and the ambassador to thi
U.S., under instructions from Arevalo, asked the State
Department to recall Ambassador Patterson. The U.S.
ambassador's incessant criticisms and demands, and his
arrogance, had earned the enmity of Guatemala. Arevalo 's
ministers claimed that Patterson was so unpopular in
Guatemala, that his life was in danger. As the State
Department deliberated, rumors circulated that Patterson
would soon be officially declared persona non grata. ^^
Patterson left Guatemala in early April, and no other
ambassador served under Arevalo.

Arbenz, meanwhile, in order to gain the United
States' trust, had been trying hard to convince the
Embassy that he was not a communist. Two or three days
after Arana ' s death, Arbenz made an advance to the

247

Embassy through Minor Keilhauer, who, acting as Arbenz ' s
messenger, reported that Arbenz had taken control of
Guatemala and "U.S. interests would be better off."
Keilhauer called Arevalo a trouble maker for the United

States, and said the harmony between Arevalo and Arbenz

44
had been partly feigned. Arbenz repeated similar

messages during the months that followed. On August 9,

1949, Arbenz had a lengthy discussion with Ambassador

Patterson. Arbenz claimed to agree with Patterson that

the United States companies had been badly treated by the

reform movement, and promised to do his best to convince

labor leaders to be more "reasonable". He claimed that

union leaders trusted him "because they think I am a

communist." In early 1951, referring to communists,

Arbenz told a representative of the International Bank

for Reconstruction and Development that "something would

have to be done about these people, but that he

(Arbenz) would have to move slowly and with great

„46
care.

The United States officials were not convinced,

feeling that Arbenz only sought increased U.S. aid and

capital loans to Guatemala. Ambassador Patterson remarked

that Arbenz wanted to play up to the United States for

opportunistic reasons. Moreover, although Arbenz had

promised the Embassy that he would control leftism, the

248

Guatemalan political situation did not change. In
August, 1950, one United States official noted that "at

this time" there was "no chance of Guatemala receiving

4 8
more aid." In December, Arbenz lamented that, although

he had tried hard to please the State Department, the

49
United States' banks remained closed to Guatemala.

The United States would settle for nothing less

than a total or near total elimination of communists and

"near-communists" from Guatemalan politics. As early as

October 1949, the U.S. Embassy had concluded that "only a

purge can bring about a real change for the better." In

the OIR report, it was recognized that Guatemala had

indicated some willingness to restrain communism, but

that the restraints would be "virtually negligible"

if the government continued (as in fact it did) to accept

51
communist support. In a statement that foretold the

future, the report had observed that "more effective

cooperation with the U.S. would probably be possible

52
under a non-communist authoritarian regime."

The Office of Intelligence Research speculated on

three possible avenues which Arbenz would have open to

him concerning the communists. One, he could continue to

accept their support. Two, he could establish a personal

popularity with labor and ease the communists out. Three,

53
he could establish a non-leftist military dictatorship.

249

Only the second and third alternatives would be
acceptable for the United States. The State Department
recognized that the second would be difficult for Arbenz ,

as he lacked the "prestige and talent" needed to gain a

54
popular following. He had to rely on men like

Gutierrez and Pellecer to promote his support among the

masses. The third possibility, a military dictatorship

and a forceful suppression of communists, appeared "much

more likely." This third outcome was also expected by

Ernest Siracusa, the Department of State Guatemalan desk

officer .

Notes

1 . Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade: America
1 945-1955 (New York, 1956), 112.

2. NAUS 814.00/8-149 Memo.

3. Immerman, The CIA, 111.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 113.

6. For detailed accounts of the UFCO campaign,
see Immerman, The CIA, 111-118; and Stephen Schlesinger
and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: the Untold Story of the
American Coup in Guatemala (New York, 1983), 79-86.

7. NAUS 814.00/7-2349 Tele.

8. NAUS 814.00/1-1149 CSM.

250

Lyman Bryson (New York, 1 960) , 23 5

1 10

10,

1 1 .
12.
13.

1 4.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21 .

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31 .

NAUS 814.00/6-849 Memo; Immerman, The CIA.

Adams, "Social Change in Guatemala," 236.

NAUS 714.00/2-2350.

NAUS 81 4.00B/10-749.

NAUS OIR 5123, 78.

Ibid., 17.

Ibid., 32.
Ibid., 33.
Ibid., 57.
Ibid., 55.
Ibid., 56.
Ibid., 64.
Ibid., 67.
Ibid., 68.
Ibid., 18.
Ibid., 23.
Ibid., 79.
Ibid., 81 .

"•S-/ Foreign Relations: 1950. 902.
Ibid., 898.
Ibid., 880-884.
Ibid., 903.

251

32. Ibid., 880-884; NAUS 714.00/5-1050 Memo.

33. NAUS 71 4.00/5-1050.

34. Ibid.

35. Piero Gleijeses, "Guatemala: Crisis and
Response" in Richard R. Fagan and Olga Pellicer, eds.,
The Future of Central America (Stanford, 1983), 187-188.

36. NAUS 714.00/5-2550.

37. NAUS 714.00/10-1050; Also see OIR 5123, 74.

38. OIR 5123, 53.

39. Ibid.

40. Istmania, 39 (Oct. 20, 1950), 3.

41 . OIR 5123, 53.

42. U.S., Foreign Relations: 1950, 867.

43. Ibid., 875; Immerman, The CIA, 99.

44. NAUS/71 1 .1 4/7-2249 no. 385.

45. NAUS 711.14/8-1249 no. 435.

46. NAUS 711.14/1-1851 Memo.

47. NAUS 711.14/7-2249 no. 385.

48. NAUS 814.00/8-1149 no. 433.

49. U.S., Foreign Relations: 1950, 908.

50. NAUS 81 4.00B/10-749.

51 . OIR 51 23, 85.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., 83-84.

252

54. Ibid., 84.

55. Ibid., 83.

56. NAUS 814.00/7-2949 Memo.

CHAPTER 1 5
SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATIONS

Commentators on Guatemalan history have often
characterized the Arbenz period, 1951-1954, as a time of
more profound reforms than what occurred under Arevalo,
largely because of the 1952 land reform law. Certainly,
the land reform measures went beyond what Arevalo
enacted, but it was only with the hard-won reforms under
Arevalo that land reform could be achieved in 1952,
Arevalo' s outstanding legacy was the growth of labor
unions, both urban and rural, the growth of labor rights,
for example the social security system, and the increased
political awareness of the workers. Indeed, Arevalo and
the Arevalistas not only enthusiastically worked to bring
immediate reforms, but strived to pave the way for future
reforms. Also, it should be remembered that many of the
people active under Arevalo remained active under Arbenz,
and it was these Guatemalans who had envisioned, and
worked for, many of the reforms that took place between
1945 and 1954, A line of differentiation between the
Arevalo and Arbenz presidencies should not be drawn too
distinctly.

253

254

Marxist writers have generally accused Arevalo and
many of the Arevalistas of lacking a sincere commitment
to reform. Marxists of course find fault with Arevalo' s
anti-communism, and further note that very little land
reform occurred 1945-1951. Generally, Marxist writers
depict the Arevalo period as one dominated by bourgeois,

middle class interests, at the expense of more

2

far-reaching popular reforms.

Marxist and non-Marxist writers have criticized
Arevalo because they thought his ideas were too unclear
and unrealistic. This line of thought, also propagated
by the U.S. Embassy, began in 1944. The critics felt
Arevalo' s doctrine of spiritual socialism lacked a
pragmatic approach to government and failed to offer a
definite plan or structure for reform. Mario Na j era
noted that "many people who are considered cultured or

versed in practical matters mocked what Arevalo called

3
spiritual socialism."

"Spiritual socialism" was certainly abstract and

out of the ordinary; and worse, "socialism" in the title

had a non-democratic ring. Dion translated the following

typical statement from Arevalo:

Spiritual socialism will surpass the philosophy of
national socialism which grants the status of
personality solely to the chief. Like liberalism,
spiritual socialism will restore to the
personality all of its civil and moral grandeur,
but it will go further than liberalism in

255

obligating man to leave his isolated position to
enter the sphere of social values, to embrace the
needs and goals of society understood
simultaneously as economic organism and spiritual
entity .

Authors have been further misled by Arevalo's
campaign and early presidential speeches, where he at
times adopted a soft and conciliatory line towards the
economic upper class, trying to promote unity, and his
own security. (Arevalo hoped that his leadership, and the
moral force of the revolutionary ideals, would eventually
win over even the opposition.) Furthermore, during his
presidency, while trying to balance and overcome
political disunity and the U.S. and Guatemalan
opposition, Arevalo made political moves and statements
that could appear rightist, middle of the road, or
leftist. But a careful study demonstrates that Arevalo
had been solid in his reformist and democratic goals at
the time of his election, and always pursued them
thereafter.

Arevalo, as president of Guatemala, never entirely
stopped being Dr. Arevalo the teacher. A forceful,
effective, and popular teacher, Arevalo believed that the
position of presidency could be used to "teach" high
ideals and democracy to the Guatemalan people.
Education, he felt, was a key to the future, to be
instilled in each person individually and in the nation

256

as a whole. Arevalo especially held great confidence in

the potential of the young, and encouraged their

participation in Government.

Arevalo is thus often seen as an idealist, a

"romantic", and indeed he had high ideals and hopes. But

Arevalo was not solely an idealist, unaware or unable to

accept the many obstacles he faced. Education, and his

teaching talents, according to Arevalo' s strategy, were

to be used as political tools which would promote the

positive, and obtain the best from both the politicians

and the people. One Arevalista congressmen said that

"when Arevalo met with us, it was like sitting in a

classroom" Another congressman called Arevalo' s method

g
of government "politics by instruction."

Arevalo also used aggressive force and raw

political power to overcome threats and obstacles. He

instructed the Guardia Civil to counter external and

internal dangers, and keep watch over potential and

identified enemies. Enemies would be jailed or exiled if

necessary, and denied jobs in the government certainly.

Arevalo wanted democracy, but he felt that for the

present, reality demanded a ruler to use occasionally

undemocratic means. He actively cultivated friendly

elements of the armed forces, and promoted power to labor

unions and reform-minded political parties. He took a

257

strong stand before the U.S. embassy and U.S. -owned
companies, and promoted the fall of dictators via the
Caribbean Legion. His own governmental appointees,
including cabinet members, would be replaced quickly,
like "a bolt of lightening from above," whenever he saw
the need. Arevalo was more aggressive than his overt
image as a humanist would indicate. He was not a
military dictator, nor a "bleeding heart" liberal.
Rather, he strove to be a strong but loving teacher. He
endeavored to bring democracy to his country but he
would carry a stick for the opposition.

The Arevalista reform movement had great potential
to succeed, but serious obstacles stood in the way. One
obstacle was created by the resistance maintained by the
opposition, which yearned for a return to a conservative,
authoritarian government. Social scientists have noticed
numerous examples of authoritarianism in Latin American
politics and society. Scholars who have treated the
subject include Claudio Veliz, who in a 1980 monograph
claimed that Latin America remains predominantly under
the influence of a "centralist tradition," first
developed in the colonial age. Periodical bouts with
liberalism in the 19th and 20th centuries have been
aberrations, according to Veliz, and, "for the past half
century--with the expected variations from country to

258

country--Latin America has been finding its way back to

.18

its centralist mainstream.

An authoritarian tradition (or conservative, or
centralist), certainly exists, and has long existed, in
Guatemala. But by the twentieth century, a liberal (or
reformist) and democratic tradition also existed. From a
small number of persons profoundly influenced by the
Enlightenment, the liberal tradition developed and
expanded during the nineteenth century, until this new
tradition began to equal in depth and force the older,
"centralist" tradition. Democracy, or some form of it,
had been a professed ideal in Guatemala from the
nineteenth century, and by 1944 a sincere and profound
desire for a just and democratic government was felt by
the great majority of the middle class sector. Also by
1944, socialism and Marxism had made a profound impact on
liberal thought, thus encouraging reformist tendencies.

Both traditions, the old and the new, can be
clearly and separately identified, as two distinct waves,
and Guatemalan history can in part be examined through
the clash of these two, separate, antagonistic
intellectual, social and political currents. It would be
more accurate, however, to think of Guatemalan history in
terms of a "dual tradition," whose elements often
overlapped and mixed together, especially in the

259

multifarious goals and beliefs of the individual. Staunch
conservatives like Marroquin Rojas and Adrian Recinos
exhibited many aspects of a humanitarian and reformist
nature. Conversely, zealous reformers like Juan Jose
Arevalo could embrace authoritarian means to achieve
their goals. This clash of the dual tradition, expressed
most clearly in the conflict between the reformers and
the conservatives, would remain unresolved during the
Arevalo period.

Disunity within the reform movement created
another obstacle, but it would be an error to consider
the divisive, contentious nature of Arevalista politics
dominant over unity. Reformers had accomplished much,
and they continued sharing similar goals and ideals.
They did not want the Arevalo government to fail. The
Arevalistas never criticized Arevalo in public, and
respect for him remained high. For many, especially the
young, the Arevalo period remained an exhilarating time
of pride and hope. They knew that the divisions and
disagreements among them hurt their chances for continued
success, but they remained confident that the goals of
the revolution would be reached. Even with the divisions
that developed during the 1949-1950 presidential
campaign, an underground level of unity remained. Many
of the reformers who had worked against the Arbenz

260

candidacy joined his government after the election:
Manuel Galich serves as an outstanding example.

Divisiveness within the Arevalista parties,
however, was serious. As Arevalo would later say,
disunity caused "lamentable delays" Divisiveness, it
may be noted, also afflicted Arevalo' s opposition;
and the refusal of the various sectors to play by
democratic rules--or to compromise or coexist--remained a
pernicious legacy of Guatemalan history and remains so
today. Asked in 1985 how Guatemala could achieve
democracy, Juan Jose Arevalo, then 81 years old, exhorted
fellow Guatemalans to "dominate sectarian passions,"
meaning that when politicians lose the elections they

must support the winners, which "is a question of civil

1 1
education and political ethics."

United States interference with the reform

movement caused the third obstacle. Left alone, or

better yet helped, the Arevalista reformers may well have

eventually overcome their problems of internal

divisiveness and the conflict found in the dual

tradition. Instead, the United States worked against the

Arevalista movement, and gave aid, hope, and confidence

to U.S. companies and the national opposition. By

bolstering the opposition, the United States made

compromise and cooperation appear unnecessary. u.b.

261

policy also resulted in great frustration for the
Arevalista reformers, and exacerbated the internal
divisions .

The United States initially found justification
for its Guatemalan policy in the alleged unfair treatment
given the U.S. companies by the reformers. But by the
end of 1949, communism had become the primary rationale
behind policy. The rapid growth of apparent communist
strength under Arevalo was completely unacceptable to
U.S. officials. For the last few years during Arevalo's
presidency, it was still hoped that the moderates would
soon gain control of the situation, but U.S. policy
planners were already considering the possible need for
military intervention.

The concerns of U.S. officials, however, were

exaggerated and U.S. policy only made the situation

1 3
worse. Marxism had influenced the beliefs of many

educated Guatemalans, but by no means dominated the

reform movement. Reformers generally accepted as truths

the concepts of U.S. imperialism, class conflict, the

"historic struggle" between patron and peasant, and

between capitalism and labor; but they did not desire a

communist state. Rule of the proletariat was

contemplated only by a very few. Reform laws passed by

the Arevalo government were modeled on concepts and goals

262

considered proper in Western democracies, and
demonstrated very little, if any, communist influence.
Even the land reform of 1952 was moderate. Possibly the
most "radical" response of the government was its
acceptance of the very existence of communism in the
political process. The communists, however, did have
significant power in the unions, and through the power of
the workers' vote they helped keep the reform movement on
the leftist path.

Scholars have interpreted U.S. policy rationale in
various ways. Jose Ayabar de Soto believes that the

U.S.A. acted primarily in defense of the U.S. companies;

1 4
he rejects ideology as a factor. Walter LaFeber claims

that the U.S.A. used carefully thought-out measures,

based on economic, political, and military power, to

dominate and control Central America in a policy designed

to further U.S. interests, with little regard for the

best interests of Central America. Richard Immerman

believes that the U.S.A. sincerely feared the Guatemalan

communists, but concludes that U.S. policy makers lacked

knowledge of Guatemala, and did not understand the

1 fi
Guatemalan situation. This author believes that all

three above interpretations contain much truth.

Embassy and State Department officials could

hardly have missed the sincerity in the Guatemalan desire

263

for reform and democracy, and the significant advances
achieved. But U.S. officials after 1947 seldom
demonstrated any concern or empathy for the reform
movement. By 1949, strongly encouraged by U.S. companies
and the native Guatemalan opposition, the United States
identified the Arevalista movement as dangerously close
to Communism. Immerman noted that U.S. officials

repeatedly "used McCarthy-like inferences rather than

.,17
facts to find evidence of Guatemalan communism.

Although the Cold War did create genuine world-wide

security concerns, it must be noted that these concerns

dovetailed very nicely with a traditional U.S. defense of

business in Guatemala.

In sum, formidable obstacles afflicted the reform

movement, and resulted in the failure to establish a

solid, long lasting democracy in Guatemala. By the end

of 1949, the writing was on the wall. Turmoil and

violence had not been eliminated, they had become more

ominous and deep-seated. Opposition to Arevalo had not

been pacified or co-opted, it had grown in size and

organization. The communist issue became much more

profound, as a number of outstanding leaders in the

Arevalista parties became increasingly outspoken and

public with their Marxist beliefs. Urban and rural

workers had reached a high degree of organization,

264

political power, and militancy, which increased the fear
and resolve felt by the opposition. With the death of
Arana and the subsequent loss of power by the FPL, the
Arevalista camp became narrowed. The Arana-Arbenz
conflict had not ended with Arana ' s death. Arana
supporters and sympathizers remained in the military, and
in the civilian community. They would weaken the
governments of both Arevalo and Arbenz . Historic
conflicts in Guatemalan society, such as the
Indian-ladino conflict, had not been eliminated: they had
increased. The United States government and business
interests had become all the more recalcitrant and
adamantly rejected compromise with the Arevalistas. Cold
War fears matured in 1949, "the year of shocks," with
Russia exploding the Bomb, and the "loss of China."

As a postscript to the Arevalo period, it may be
noted that the government of Arbenz, 1951-1954, continued
the reforms begun under Arevalo. A stress on education
and social amelioration of the masses remained, and the
Arbenz government promoted many programs which were
designed to help the people. Notably, the government
enacted a comprehensive land reform law which promised to
supply land eventually to all landless Guatemalans. The
government also made extensive use of the organizations
set up under Arevalo to foster economic modernization.

265

The military continued to be a major center of
power in Guatemala. In 1954, the president of the
Congress, seven other congressmen, all twenty-two local
department governors and the head of the land refor

m

1 8
program were Army officers. A State Department

intelligence report noted that Arbenz , as President and

head of the military, had "the power to check or break

the communist organization at will." According to the

report, the communists lacked the economic resources and

1 9
popular following to oppose Arbenz.

Arbenz, and his more business oriented supporters,

concentrated on capitalistic enterprises designed to

modernize Guatemala and make themselves prosperous.

Cotton production continued to be popular with this

group, and government policy was geared toward helping

cotton growers. Indeed, the laws may have helped the

20
cotton growers at the expense of the Guatemalan public.

Arbenz supporters were also given primary access to

21
government loans.

But Arbenz encountered the same obstacles that
beset Arevalo. Internal division, which had never

actually subsided, grew especially rife over the

2 2
controversial land reform law. Labor leaders found

much to criticize in the entrepreneur elements of the

Arbenz coalition who did not consider the advancement of

266

the masses their first priority. ^^ Some Arbenz
followers, although they supported land reform, were
upset over the degree of communism and radicalism in the
labor movement. In July of 1951, for example, four
non-communist parties that supported Arbenz issued a
joint statement claiming that they did not approve of
communism. Arbenz ' s desire and ability to control the
communists increasingly became in doubt.

The Guatemalan opposition continued to fight and
plot against the government. The United Fruit Company
expanded and intensified its campaign in the United
States against Guatemala. In the end, the U.S. government
and the Guatemalan opposition to Arbenz collaborated in
an effort to destroy his regime.

The impaired democracy developed under Arevalo
could not be repaired by Arbenz: in fact the political
situation only became worse. On June 18, 1954, Col.
Carlos Castillo Armas, who had failed in a 1950 coup
attempt against Arevalo, led an invading force of about
200 exiles into Guatemala from Honduras. By way of the
presence of a number of top "Aranistas," the ghost of
Francisco Arana would accompany the invasion force.
Several airplanes that had been provided to the invaders
by the United States bombed and strafed the capital and
other towns. The United States also blocked entry into

267

Guatemala of all arms shipments. The Guatemalan Army and

Air Force refused to fight, and the Arbenz government

P n 25
fell .

Notes

1. See, for example. Handy, "Revolution and
Reaction," 2, 137; Garcia Anoveros, "caso Guatemala,"
187.

2. See, for example, Diaz Rozzotto, El
caracter , 39-40, 67-69, 303-307, and passim; GarcTa
Anoveros, "caso Guatemala," 187; Galich, "Diez ahos,"
39-40; Maria Luisa Mulet de Cerezo, Bibliograf ia
analitica de la revolucion del 20 de octubre de 1944
(Guatemala, 1980), 25; Solorzano, "Factores economicos,"
47; North American Congress on Latin America, Guatemala,
47.

3. Najera Farfan, Los estaf adores, 77. For
examples of recent authors who accept this criticism of
Arevalo, see, Ayabar de Soto, Dependency and
Intervention, 115; Handy, Gift of the Devil, 107;
LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 112-113; Schlesinger,
Bitter Fruit, 42.

4. Dion, "Ideas of Juan Jose Arevalo," 73.

5. Ricardo Asturias Valenzuela, interview with
the author, Guatemala City, July 15, 1987.

6. Marco Antonio Villamar Contreras, interview
with the author, Guatemala City, July 17, 1987.

7. Oscar Barrios Castillo, interview with the
author, Guatemala City, July 9, 1987.

8. Claudio Veliz, The Centralist Tradition in
Latin America (Princeton, 1980), 9.

9. Ricardo Asturias Valenzuela, interview with
author, Guatemala City, July 8, 1987; Oscar Benitez Bone,
interview with author, Guatemala City, July 1, 1987;

268

Jorge Arriola, interview with author, Guatemala City,
June 27, 1986; Raul Osequeda, interview with author,
Guatemala City, June 29, 1986; Marco Antonio Villamar
Contreras, interview with author, Guatemala City, July
17, 1987; Oscar Barrios Castillo, interview with author,
Guatemala City, July 9, 1987.

10. Juan Jose Arevalo, letter to the author,
September 4, 1986.

11. "Remanso de la democracia," Prensa Libre,
Dec. 5, 1985, p. 6.

12. Frankel, "Political Development," 267;
Silvert, A Study in Government, 55.

13. Immerman, The CIA, 93-94; Frankel,
"Political Development," 267-268.

14. Ayabar de Soto, Dependency and Intervention,
294.

15. LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 16-18.

16. Immerman, The CIA, ix, 9-19; for a^^similarly
stated point of view, see Frankel, "Political
Development," 273-4.

17. Immerman, The CIA, 93.

18. Schneider, Communism, 43.

19. "Guatemalan Support of Subversion and
Communist Objectives 1950-1953," April 30, 1953, NAUS OIR
6185, 2.

20. Adams, Crucifixion, 385; Marcos Mishaan, "La
produccion nacional de algodon y la industria textile
algodonera" (Licenciado thesis, Universidad de San
Carlos, 1961 ), 149.

21. LCMD/GD, Government Patronage-Box 3.

22. "Agrarian Reform in Guatemala," March 5,
1953, NAUS OIR 6001, 6-7; Handy, "Precious Fruit," 29,
41, 47; see also the Guatemalan newspapers 1952-1954.

23. "Telegramas de CGTG," LCMD/GD, Presidency-
Box 3 .

269

24. "Integrada la alianza de los partidos
democraticos, " Integridad (July 1951), 7.

25. The standard sources on the 1954 invasion
have become Schlesinger, Bitter Fruit, and Immerman, The
CIA in Guatemala.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Documents used during this study include the State
Department papers of 1944 to 1951, which are contained in
the National Archives of the United States. All
available documents concerning Guatemala of the 711, 714,
and 814 categories were viewed. Part of the 1952 to 1954
documents were also used. State Department documents
include records of the correspondence between the State
Department in Washington and the American Embassy in
Guatemala, meetings between American officials and
Guatemalans, and inter-office communications and meetings
in the State Department in Washington. Reports from the
Office of Intelligence Research (OIR Reports) were also
viewed. Several items were obtained under the Freedom of
Information Act.

Extensive use was also made of the documents kept
in the Archive General de Centroamerica in Guatemala
City. The papers of the Ministerio de Gobernacion and of
the Presidente de la Republica provided valuable insights
into the presidency and administration of Juan Jose
Arevalo, but unfortunately only the documents for 1944 to

270

271

1948 were available. The remaining documents are still
stored in the National Palace, and could not be obtained
by this author. The Archivo also contains many
newspapers and magazines from the Arevalo period.

Microfilms and prints of the documents collected
in 1954 by the Comite Nacional de Defensa contra el
Comunismo, contained in the U.S. Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, gave further aid to this study.
These are the documents used by Ronald Schneider to
produce Communism in Guatemala 1944 to 1954, and they
were donated to the Library by the Foreig.. Policy
Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania.
The collection contains about 50,000 items, which cover
the years 1944 to 1954, but most material pertains to the
Arbenz period.

The archives of El Imparcial supplied a great
amount of information. Besides the collection of El
Imparcial newspapers, various books, photos, and
reference materials, the archives contain many thousands
of newspaper and magazine clippings, filed by subject or
person's name. The archives were begun under the Arbenz
period and continued until the present day and now
contain a wealth of bibliographic and political material.
Other sources include the Biblioteca Nacional, which
contains a large collection of Guatemalan newspapers, and

272
the Biblioteca Cesar Brafias, which contains rare books,
pamphlets, periodicals, and several collections of
personal letters.

Interviews

D

r. Juan Jose Arevalo (President of Guatemala, 1945-1951)

Dr. Jorge Arriola (Hero) of the 1944 revolution, Minister
of Education under the Junta)

Dr. Ricardo Asturias Valenzuela (PAR and FPL Secretary
General, Congressman)

Lie. Oscar Barrios Castillo (FPL, President of Congress)

Lie. Oscar Benitez Bone (RN, Congressman)

Don Rufino Guerra Cortave (El Imparcial newspaperman)

Dr. Raul Osequeda (Minister of Education, Minister of
Foreign Relations, close friend of Arevalo)

Lie. Marco Antonio Villamar Contreras (FPL, Congressman)

Questionnaire

Carlos Manuel Pellecer (communist leader)

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1957

273

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Almengor Rodriguez, Adolf o, Alegato ante la Sala Primera
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274

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Alan LeBaron received a B.A. in history from Boise
State University, December 1974; an M.A. in history from
the University of Maryland, May 1978; and a Ph.D. in
history from the University of Florida, December 1988.
Mr. LeBaron has seven years experience teaching English
in Korea and Japan, and has taught history for the
University of Maryland in Korea and Japan during
1978-1979 and 1985. Mr. LeBaron has lived, worked, and
traveled 12 years out of the United States, in Europe,
Asia, and Central America, and has a special interest in
international political and cultural relations.

286

I certify that I have read this study and that in
my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of
scholarly presentation and is fully adequatey' in scope
and quality, as a dissertation to^r' the deg^ree of Doctor
of Philosophy. ^■

David Bushnell, Chairman
Professor of History

I certify that I have read this study and that in
my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of
scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope
and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy.

at

Paul L. Doughty,'
Professor of Anthropology

I certify that I have read this study and that in
my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of
scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope
and quality, as a dissertation^f or the de^gree of Doctor
of Philosophy,

Graduate Research Professor of
History

I certify that I have read this study and that in
my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of
scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope
and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy.

T^A- \] JL Hi

LV/Le N. 'McAlister

uJUyVt

Distinguished Service
Professor of History

I certify that I have read this study and that in
my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of
scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope
and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy.

Charles F. Sidman
Professor of History

This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the Department of History in the College of Liberal
Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was
accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December 1988

Dean, Graduate School

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

3 1262 08666 364 7